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Abstract
The topics treated in this thesis are inherently two-fold. The first part considers the
problem of a market maker who wants to optimally set bid/ask quotes over a finite time
horizon, to maximize her expected utility. The intensities of the orders she receives depend
not only on the spreads she quotes, but also on unobservable factors modelled by a hidden
Markov chain. This stochastic control problem under partial information is solved by means
of stochastic filtering, control and piecewise-deterministic Markov processes theory. The
value function is characterized as the unique continuous viscosity solution of its dynamic
programming equation. Afterwards, the analogous full information problem is solved and
results are compared numerically through a concrete example. The optimal full information
spreads are shown to be biased when the exact market regime is unknown, as the market
maker needs to adjust for additional regime uncertainty in terms of P&L sensitivity and
observable order flow volatility.
The second part deals with numerically solving nonzero-sum stochastic differential games
with impulse controls. These offer a realistic and far-reaching modelling framework for
applications within finance, energy markets and other areas, but the difficulty in solving
such problems has hindered their proliferation. Semi-analytical approaches make strong
assumptions pertaining very particular cases. To the author’s best knowledge, there are no
numerical methods available in the literature. A policy-iteration-type solver is proposed to
solve an underlying system of quasi-variational inequalities, and it is validated numerically
with reassuring results. In particular, it is observed that the algorithm does not enjoy global
convergence and a heuristic methodology is proposed to construct initial guesses.
Eventually, the focus is put on games with a symmetric structure and a substantially
improved version of the former algorithm is put forward. A rigorous convergence analysis is
undertaken with natural assumptions on the players strategies, which admit graph-theoretic
interpretations in the context of weakly chained diagonally dominant matrices. A provably
convergent single-player impulse control solver, often outperforming classical policy iteration,
is also provided. The main algorithm is used to compute with high precision equilibrium
payoffs and Nash equilibria of otherwise too challenging problems, and even some for which
results go beyond the scope of all the currently available theory.
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Introduction
This thesis is divided in two main parts. The first one (Chapter 1) deals with the well-known
and very relevant problem of optimal market making under a novel and realistic framework
of partial information. The second one (Chapters 2 and 3), focuses on the development
of numerical methods for a very general class of far-reaching models known as nonzero-
sum stochastic differential games with impulse controls. From a mathematical viewpoint,
stochastic control (in a broad sense) is the unifying underlying topic, spanning from classical
‘continuous’ controls, to impulse controls and impulse games; and covering the different levels
of the problems: from the applications and motivation to the most technical aspects, from
the theoretical analysis to the numerical methods and their implementation.
However, the problems, models and techniques used vary so widely, that a unique and
comprehensive introduction is not only difficult, but likely counterproductive. For this rea-
son, each chapter starts with a detailed introduction of its own. This section is therefore
intended only to briefly motivate the problems to be studied, comment on the techniques
used, and list the main resulting scientific contributions.
The optimal market making problem (Chapter 1) consists on determining how a liquidity
provider for a given asset should (continuously) choose to set her bid/ask quotes if she wishes
to maximize her expected utility. In doing so, she faces a complicated problem with both
dynamic and static components, and several risks ranging from adverse price movements,
exposure, execution costs and more. An increasingly popular approach, both academically
and in practice, is the stochastic optimal control framework proposed by Avellaneda and
Stoikov [AS08], where the liquidity taken from the market maker decays as a function of the
spreads she quotes. Different variants of the first model have been proposed and thoroughly
studied since, both for market making and optimal liquidation [AS08, BL14, CDJ17, CJ15,
CJR14,FL12,FL13,Gue´17,GL15,GLFT13].
Motivated by empirical evidence [CJ13], we consider a hidden Markov-chain model that
unifies and generalizes features of all the previously mentioned ones, and admits the pos-
sibility that liquidity may also vary due to unobservable market conditions. We solve this
combined control and partial information problem in full, using stochastic control, stochastic
filtering and piecewise-deterministic Markov processes (PDMPs) theory [DF99]. The anal-
ogous and idealized problem in which the market maker can observe the market state is
also solved, and results are compared numerically through a concrete example. Our main
contributions are:
• A general and realistic Avellaneda–Stoikov-type model for optimal market making,
incorporating for the first time the liquidity dependence on hidden market conditions
and allowing for very general intensity (liquidity) shapes.
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2• A novel approach, within this framework, to characterize the value function of the
market maker. The complexity of the dynamic programming equation in our model
prevents us from using the most standard technique: proposing an ansatz and proving
it valid by a verification theorem. Instead, we explicitly find the ansatz decomposition
in terms of the value function of a new, diffusion-free, problem. This result is interesting
in itself, as it opens the door to probabilistic and PDMPs numerical techniques when
the dimension of the problem renders partial differential equations (PDEs) methods
prohibitive.
• Ultimately, we characterize the ‘reduced’ value function as the unique continuous vis-
cosity solution [FS06] of its formally derived equation.
• Having solved the idealized full information problem with a general verification theo-
rem, we show that the corresponding optimal strategies become suboptimal when the
market regime is unknown, as the market maker needs to manage a higher regime risk.
We interpret the adjustment needed in terms of observable order flow volatility and
sensitivity of the expected profit to observable regime changes. Ultimately we see and
interpret why the bias of the full information optimal strategies becomes higher, the
longer the waiting time in between orders.
Chapters 2 and 3 consider very general models known as nonzero-sum stochastic impulse
control games [ABC+19,BCG19], in which players interact by shifting a certain continuous-
time stochastic process at discrete (usually random) points in time. Such models have
motivation and wide applicability within finance, energy markets, insurance and many other
fields. Unfortunately, they are utterly challenging, what has rendered their study far too
underdeveloped. In light of the evident need for numerical methods, and the nonexistence
of any such one, Chapter 2:
• puts forward the very first iterative algorithm to solve nonzero-sum stochastic impulse
games. The method is of policy-iteration-type [AF16,BMZ09] and solves an underlying
system of differential quasi-variational inequalities, involving highly nonlinear, nonlocal
and noncontractive operators, as well as non-smooth solutions.
The proposed algorithm is admittedly heuristic and no convergence analysis is carried out
in this chapter. Instead, it is validated numerically over a series of experiments, considering
different games over both fixed and refining grids, performing simulations and comparing
results with the only (almost) fully analytically tractable game in the literature [ABC+19].
The results suggest that the algorithm can effectively be used to gain insight into general
nonzero-sum stochastic impulse games.
In Chapter 3, we specialize our study by putting the focus on symmetric games. This
subclass is broad enough to include plenty of interesting applications, such as competi-
tion between central banks [ABC+19, AF16, CZ99, JP93, MØ98], cash management prob-
lems [BCG19] and the generalization of many impulse control problems to the two-player
instance.
For this type of games, an iterative algorithm which substantially improves the one in
Chapter 2 is presented and rigorously studied, using techniques from policy iteration for im-
pulse control [AF16], fixed-point policy-iteration [HFL12] and graph-theoretic notions relat-
3ing to weakly chained diagonally dominant (WCDD) matrices and their recently introduced
matrix sequence counterpart [Azi19a]. The main contributions of this chapter are:
• An iterative algorithm for the effective solution of symmetric nonzero stochastic im-
pulse games, which improves the general one in terms of simplicity, efficiency, precision
and stability.
• Providing the missing convergence analysis, which is performed under very natural
assumptions on the players strategies and interpreted in terms of WCDD matrices and
their extension in [Azi19a]. The latter is applied to impulse control for the first time,
to the author’s best knowledge.
• Proof of properties of contractiveness, boundedness of iterates and convergence to
solutions, as well as sufficient conditions for convergence.
• As a by-product and to improve efficiency, an impulse control solver often outperform-
ing classical policy iteration is also provided, and its convergence is proved.
• An extensive numerical validation is carried out, considering different performance
metrics and addressing practical matters of implementation.
• Ultimately, equilibrium payoffs and Nash equilibria are computed with high precision,
for games seemingly too challenging for the available analytical approaches, and even
some for which results go beyond the scope of all the currently available theory (includ-
ing discontinuous impulses and very irregular discontinuous payoffs). The latter also
motivate further research into this field, with an emphasis on the need for a viscosity
solutions framework.
Chapter 1
Optimal market making under partial
information with general intensities
Introduction
Given a financial market, a market maker (MM) can be understood as someone who provides
liquidity for a certain asset. That is, she (almost) continuously posts bid/ask quotes for the
asset, in the hope to profit from the bid-ask spread. In choosing how to do so, the MM faces
a complicated problem on several levels; namely: the instantaneous margin/volume trade-off
(the further away she quotes from the ‘fair price’, the less she gets executed, and vice-versa),
adverse price movements and inventory risk (exposure), execution costs, and many others.
An increasingly popular mathematical approach to the MM problem, both in academia
and in practice, is by means of stochastic optimal control. In particular, a line of research has
focused on the modelling framework proposed by Avellaneda and Stoikov [AS08] (rooted in
turn in [HS81]). Although widely motivated in the literature by order-driven markets such as
equity markets, the shape of the limit order book is not explicitly taken into account. Thus,
the framework is more easily understood and applied to over-the-counter (OTC) quote-driven
markets such as the foreign exchange (FX) market, and we therefore choose to present it in
this setting.
In this framework, the MM gives firm bid-ask quotes during a finite time interval by
choosing bid/ask spreads with respect to a certain reference price.1 Depending on the mar-
ket, this price could be for example an aggregated mid-price or a dealer-to-dealer price,
and it is frequently assumed to behave as an arithmetic Brownian motion. To explicitly
model the margin/volume trade-off, the probability that the MM gets executed decays as a
function of the corresponding spread. More precisely, it is assumed that the MM receives
market orders according to counting processes of stochastic intensity. Most typically in
the mathematical literature, intensities are assumed to decay exponentially on the spreads
(mainly for tractability reasons). The goal of the MM is to find a strategy that allows her
to maximize her expected terminal utility, which is taken as a constant absolute risk aver-
sion (CARA) utility. The problem is then translated into a deterministic one: solving the
1Also referred to by some authors as micro-price [CJP15] or efficient price [DRR13] in the martingale
case.
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associated Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equation, which is a partial-integro differential
equation (PIDE) for the MM’s value function, and ultimately retrieving the optimal strategy
in feedback form.
Within the described framework, a lot variants have been put forward and extensively
studied. In [BL14,GLFT12], Bayraktar and Ludkovski, and Gue´ant, Lehalle and Fernandez-
Tapia, apply a one-trading-side version to optimal liquidation in the risk-neutral and risk
averse contexts, respectively. The introduction of a constraint on the inventory in [GLFT13],
allowed the authors to rigorously solve the original problem of [AS08] with exponential in-
tensities, by means of a verification theorem. This constraint has been widely used moving
forward, with the exception of [FL12,FL13], where strategies are derived without a verifica-
tion theorem.
Gue´ant and Lehalle continued to actively contribute to the area. In [GL15], they revisit
the risk averse optimal liquidation problem for general intensities satisfying a certain ordinary
differential inequality, and in [Gue´17] the same is done for market making.2 This assumption
had been firstly introduced in [BL14, Sect.5.3] under risk-neutrality.
Other prolific contributors in the field are Cartea, Jaimungal and their coauthors [CJ15,
CJP15, CJR14], who introduced a quadratic running penalty on the inventory to manage
the ‘accumulated’ inventory risk for an otherwise risk-neutral MM. Constraints on the MM’s
spreads have also been considered in some of them. It is worth noting that [Gue´17] shows
how the two seemingly different subclasses of models (risk averse and ‘risk-neutral’ with
running penalty) can ultimately be characterized by a unique system of ordinary differential
equations (ODEs) when considering two appropriate ansatz.
A relevant issue in practice that has not been included in the previous models is the
following one. Empirical evidence (see, e.g., [CJ13]) suggests that liquidity taken by clients
depends not only on the quoted spreads but also on other unobservable factors. Indeed,
the confluence of factors such as market sentiment towards the asset and the competition
with other market makers also affects the intensities at which the MM receives orders. This
complicated effect can be modelled in a simplified fashion by making the intensities depend
as well on a hidden finite-state Markov chain, effectively reflecting the regime or state of the
market (different levels from very slow to very active). To the best of our knowledge, this has
only been briefly done in the Avellaneda–Stoikov framework by proposing an approximation
for the optimal strategy with exponential intensities [CJ13, Sect.5.1] or studying a simple
two-states version with power-law intensities [BL14, Sect.5.4]. Both of these papers deal
only with the ‘risk-neutral’ (possibly penalized) case and make the unrealistic assumption
that the current market regime is known by the MM.3
When the state of the market is unknown, the problem becomes significantly more chal-
lenging for several reasons:
• It becomes a combined problem of stochastic control and filtering. The MM needs to
dynamically make her best possible prediction of the market regime (or more precisely,
its distribution), based on the information she has (i.e., the orders she has received so
far and the evolution of the reference price), and adjust her spreads accordingly. This
2The latter paper also considers the multi-asset case.
3 [BL09, Sect.3.3] (arXiv version) also studies optimal trade execution under partial information, albeit
with uncontrolled intensity.
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prediction is known as a filter.
• The associated HJB PIDE has higher dimension and more non-linearities.
• The standard approach used in all of the previously cited papers relies on reducing the
HJB PIDE to a system of ODEs by means of an ansatz, proving that such a system
has a classical (smooth) solution, and recovering the value function via a verification
theorem. Under partial information however, the reduced HJB equation is still a
complicated PIDE such that, in general, a classical solution may not exist (or it may
be too difficult to prove otherwise). Hence, the ansatz argument breaks down.
• As a consequence, one needs to resort to the concept of viscosity solutions [FS06]. In
addition, the numerical resolution unfailingly becomes a lot more involved than for
simple systems of ODEs.
• On a technical level, the construction of the model is not straightforward. The MM
needs to adjust her strategy based on her observable information, such as the arriving
orders, but this flow of information is in turn affected by the MM’s actions.
In this chapter (based on [CZ19]), we solve the problem of the MM under partial in-
formation. First, we start by unifying in one single formulation all the modelling features
described so far. This allows us to simultaneously tackle all the models at once with a single
approach, while generalising them at the same time. Indeed, our formulation allows for the
interaction of any CARA utility (whether risk-neutral or risk averse) with running inventory
penalty, terminal execution cost, inventory constraints and spread constraints. Further, mo-
tivated by practitioners’ needs, we strongly generalize the intensity shapes to any continuous,
decreasing to zero functions, adding modelling flexibility.4 We even allow for the inventory
to be unconstrained when no penalties are present. (This scenario is considered mainly for
the sake of completeness and comparison, at almost no extra cost.)
Secondly, we let the intensities depend on a k-dimensional hidden Markov chain. Follow-
ing [CEFS16a], we use a weak formulation5 to construct a well-defined model (with exogenous
information) and solve the filtering problem by means of the reference probability approach
of stochastic filtering [Bre´81, Chpt.VI]. The rigorous setting of the model and its full char-
acterization are carried out in Section 1.1, while the filtering problem is solved in Section
1.2.
The optimization problem of the MM is then reformulated in terms of the usual state
variables together with the k-dimensional observable distribution of the Markov chain (Sec-
tion 1.3). At this point, the problem is too involved both analytically and numerically. We
proceed by showing that, formally, there is an ansatz for the value function that reduces the
dimensionality of the problem (i.e., the standard approach). However, as this methodology is
not valid any more, we rigorously prove that the ansatz decomposition holds true (Theorem
1.3.1.1), and that the reduced value function can be characterized as the unique continuous
viscosity solution of its formally derived equation (Theorem 1.3.1.3). The latter is done by
4This is done at the expense of renouncing to uniqueness in the optimal strategy. We also assume the
decay to be ‘fast enough’ in certain cases.
5That is, with controlled probability measures.
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harnessing results of piecewise-deterministic Markov process (PDMPs) [CEFS16a,DF99], as
first defined in [Dav84].
Thirdly, we solve the idealized problem of a MM with full information, who can observe
the Markov chain (Section 1.4). We show that a similar ansatz and the standard approach
work out in this case. We prove that the MM’s value function is a classical solution of its
HJB equation via a general verification theorem (Theorem 1.4.4.1) and we recover the well
known strategies for one regime as particular cases.
Finally, we compare the optimal strategies under full and partial information through
a concrete example, by numerical analysis (Section 1.5). In particular, we show that the
optimal full information spreads are biased when the exact regime is unknown, and using
them becomes suboptimal. We interpret the adjustment needed in terms of observable order
flow volatility and sensitivity of the expected profit to observable regime changes; and we
show how this effect becomes higher, the longer the waiting time in between orders (leading
to higher uncertainty for the MM).
1.1 Setting and main assumptions
1.1.1 Preliminaries on the probability spaces
We start by setting up our framework in an abstract fashion, deferring the question of
existence of a model to Proposition 1.1.4.1, and a characterization of all such models to
Proposition 1.1.4.2. As mentioned in the Introduction, we seek to construct a model under
a weak formulation, so that the information flow remains exogenous (i.e., unaffected by the
MM’s actions).
Let T > 0 be a given finite horizon and (Ω,F ,F = (Ft)0≤t≤T ) a right-continuous filtered
measurable space with FT = F . Suppose it supports three adapted stochastic processes
W,N+, N−. (More assumptions to be added in the sequel.) Let FW,N+,N− = (σ(Wu, N+u , N−u :
0 ≤ u ≤ t) ∨ F0)0≤t≤T be the natural filtration of these processes enlarged (‘completed’) by
F0 and define the set of admissible spreads as
A := {δ : [0, T ]× Ω→ (δ∗, δ∗) : δ is FW,N+,N−-predictable and bounded}, (1.1.1.1)
where −∞ ≤ δ∗ < δ∗ ≤ +∞ are fixed constants and (a, b) = R∩ [a, b] denotes the closure of
the interval (a, b) in R, for any −∞ ≤ a < b ≤ +∞. Note that for δ∗ = −∞ and δ∗ = +∞,
the admissible spreads are not uniformly bounded. The self-imposed constraints δ∗, δ∗ for
the MM’s spreads can be taken to be different for the bid and the ask if wanted, without
any additional effort.
Consider on the former space a family (Pα)α∈A2 , α = (δ−, δ+), of equivalent probability
measures such that the sigma algebra generated by their null sets is F0. Note that for each
α, (Ω,F ,F,Pα) is under the usual conditions and F0 is the completed trivial sigma algebra.
We refer to Pα as the physical or historical probability given the admissible strategy (or
control) α, and we write Eα for the expectation under Pα. We will drop the ‘α’ from the
notation when there is no room for ambiguity.
Henceforth, all the processes (resp. properties) considered are supposed to be defined
(resp. hold) on the space (Ω,F ,F,Pα) for all α ∈ A2, unless otherwise stated. For example, a
CHAPTER 1. OPTIMAL MARKET MAKING WITH PARTIAL INFORMATION 8
‘Brownian motion’ is a process on [0, T ]×Ω that is an (F,Pα)-Brownian motion for all α. All
subfiltrations are understood to have been augmented to satisfy the usual conditions (which
in the case of the natural filtrations of Feller processes, it amounts simply to completing
them). Ca`dla`g versions of the processes are used whenever available.
1.1.2 Description of the model
A market maker in a quote-driven market gives binding bid/ask quotes S−, S+ resp. for
a certain financial asset, during the time interval [0, T ]. She receives unitary size market
orders6 to buy/sell according to counting processes N−, N+ starting at 0, with a.s. no
common jumps and stochastic intensities λ−, λ+ resp. (see [Bre´81, p.27, Def. D7]). Each
intensity at time t depends on the corresponding spread δ±t := ±
(
S±t − St
)
between the
MM’s quotes and a reference price S. S may be interpreted, e.g., as an aggregated mid-price
or a dealer-to-dealer price, depending on the market. We assume S is a Brownian motion
with drift, of the form
St = s0 + µt+ σWt, (1.1.2.1)
where W is a Wiener process, s0, µ ∈ R and σ ≥ 0. Note that the MM can fully specify
her quote S±t by choosing the spread δ
±
t , since S
±
t = St ± δ±t . We assume δ−, δ+ ∈ A. In
particular, the MM chooses her spreads based on the observation of W, N− and N+. We
refer to FN−,N+,W as the observable filtration.
In addition, the intensities also depend on a hidden Markov chain Y with state space
{1, . . . , k}, initial distribution µ0 and deterministic generator matrix Q = (qijt )1≤i,j≤k. We
assume Q is a continuous, stable and conservative Q(t)-matrix, i.e.:
Assumptions 1.1.2.1 (Generator matrix). For all t ∈ [0, T ] and 1 ≤ i ≤ k:
0 ≤ qijt < +∞ for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k, j 6= i,
k∑
j=1
qijt = 0 and Q ∈ C[0, T ].
The previous are standing assumptions in the literature of Markov chains and they guarantee
in particular the existence of a unique (up to evanescence) ca`dla`g version of Y , and the
existence of the predictable intensity kernel for its jump measure, as given in (1.1.3.1) below.
In addition, we suppose that
Y has a.s. no common jumps with N− and N+. (1.1.2.2)
In this model, Yt represents the market regime at time t and results from the interaction of
a range of different factors, such as market sentiment towards the asset and varying levels of
competition with other liquidity providers. These effects are almost never explicitly modelled
in the mathematical literature of market making. To this end, it is natural to assume that Y
is not directly observable by the MM who can only see N−, N+ and W . (As often assumed
in filtering and control with hidden Markov chain models, the parameters k,Q, and µ0 of Y
are known to the MM, who needs to model/estimate them in practice.)
6Any constant size would work in the same way, but this convention simplifies the notation. See, e.g.,
[Gue´17] for some formulas with arbitrary constant size under full information.
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We define the MM’s inventory process
Nt := n0 +N
−
t −N+t (1.1.2.3)
and the cash account process
Xδ
−,δ+
t := x0 +
∫ t
0
(
Su + δ
+
u
)
dN+u −
∫ t
0
(
Su − δ−u
)
dN−u , (1.1.2.4)
for some fixed initial values n0 ∈ Z and x0 ∈ R. Note that
FN−,N+ = FN and FN−,N+,W = FN,W ,
since N−, N+ have a.s. no common jumps.
We shall make some very natural modelling assumptions on the intensities. These
strongly generalize those in [BL14, Gue´17, GL15] to a context with several market regimes,
without the need of any conditions on the derivatives or even smoothness.
Assumptions 1.1.2.2 (Orders intensities). There exist functions Λ±i : (δ∗, δ∗)→ (0,+∞)
for i = 1, . . . , k and N∗ ∈ N ∪ {+∞} with −N∗ ≤ n0 ≤ N∗, such that:
(i) λ±t = λ
±,α
t = Λ
±
Yt−
(δ±t )1{∓Nt−<N∗} if α = (δ
−, δ+).
(ii) Λ±i is continuous, decreasing (not necessarily strictly) and lim
δ→+∞
δ1{γ=0}Λ±i (δ) = 0 if
δ∗ = +∞, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Notation. For the sake of readability, we will often write 1±t instead of 1{∓Nt−<N∗}.
N∗ is a self-imposed constraint on the MM’s inventory (whichever its sign) as originally
proposed in [GLFT13]. When N∗ = ∞ we are in the unconstrained context, while a finite
N∗ effectively means that the MM will not buy (resp. sell) whenever Nt− = N∗ (resp.
Nt− = −N∗). In practice, the MM could achieve this either by abstaining from quoting or
by quoting with an excessively large spread that prevents any transaction (i.e., a ‘stub’ or
‘placeholder quote’).7
Remark 1.1.2.3. The last assumption states in particular that the intensities should decrease
to zero when the spreads grow arbitrarily large. Furthermore, when γ = 0 we require that
they decay faster than 1/δ. Loosely speaking, this states that for any γ ≥ 0 the ‘expected’
utility of the MM’s instantaneous margin, z±i (δ) := Λi(δ)Uγ(δ), should vanish for ‘stub
quotes’. This is a reasonable assumption in practice, as the opposite could lead to unrealistic
optimal strategies such as continuously quoting ‘infinite spreads’.
7For simplicity and without loss of generality, only the first alternative is formalized in our model (as
done in [Gue´17,GL15,GLFT13]) and this is reflected in the admissible spreads being real-valued. We could
also allow for different constraints depending on the sign of the inventory, but we refrain from this to simplify
the notation.
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Remark. Note that the above intensities are predictable, and since any admissible spreads
δ−, δ+ are bounded, λ−, λ+ are in turn bounded. Accordingly, N−, N+, N and X are non-
explosive (see, e.g., [Bre´81, p.27 T8]). Furthermore, for any constant λ∗ > 0 such that
λ− + λ+ ≤ λ∗, it is easy to see that for all p ∈ N, t ∈ [0, T ] and r ≥ 0,
Eα[|Nt|p] ≤ Eα[(n0+N−t +N+t )p] ≤ Eα[(n0+M)p], Mα|Nt|(r) ≤Mαn0+N−t +N+t (r) ≤M
α
n0+M
(r),
(1.1.2.5)
where M ∼ Poisson(λ∗T ) and MαR is the moment generating function of a random variable
R.8
The following are some examples which we shall come to back in Section 1.4.5, when
revisiting the standard assumptions in the literature. We remark that exponential, power-
law and logistic intensities are the explicit ones most commonly used in the mathematical
literature, for tractability reasons.
Examples 1.1.2.4. 1. Λ±i (δ) = a
±
i e
−b±i δ, with a±i , b
±
i > 0, −∞ ≤ δ∗ < δ∗ ≤ +∞.
2. Λ±i (δ) =
a±i
1+c±i e
b±
i
δ
, with a±i , b
±
i , c
±
i > 0, −∞ ≤ δ∗ < δ∗ ≤ +∞.
3. Λ±i (δ) = a
±
i
(
pi/2+arctan(−b±i δ+c±i )
)
, with a±i , b
±
i > 0, c
±
i ∈ R, −∞ ≤ δ∗ < δ∗ ≤ +∞.
4. Λ±i (δ) = a
±
i (b
±
i δ + c
±
i )
−d±i , with a±i , b
±
i , d
±
i > 0, c
±
i ∈ R, maxi{−c±i /b±i } < δ∗ < δ∗ ≤
+∞.
To fix ideas, consider Example 1 and let us observe that if Y represents decreasing levels
of competition for the MM, the values of a±i (resp. b
±
i ) should increase (resp. decrease)
as Y increases. The same is true if Y represents increasing levels of positive sentiment (or
‘bullishness’) towards the asset. In practice, Y will result from the combination of these
effects and many more.
Suppose the MM can hedge any remaining inventory at time T at the reference price ST
minus a certain execution cost and that she has a terminal CARA utility function
Uγ(c) =
1− e−γc
γ
, for c ∈ R,
when γ > 0 and U0 = Id. The parameter γ is known as absolute risk aversion.
Neglecting discounting between 0 and T , we consider the optimization problem faced by
the MM who tries to maximize the expected utility of her terminal penalized profit and loss
(P&L),
sup
δ−,δ+∈A
Eδ−,δ+
[
Uγ
(
Xδ
−,δ+
T + STNT − `(NT )−
1
2
σ2ζ
∫ T
0
N2t dt
)]
, (1.1.2.6)
where:
8By possibly enlarging the space, one can consider a counting process Z with no common jumps with
N−, N+ and stochastic intensity λ∗ − λ− − λ+ ≥ 0. Then the process Z + N− + N+ is a Poisson with
intensity λ∗ that dominates N+ +N−. The claim follows immediately.
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(i) ζ ≥ 0. When ζ > 0 we are including in the model a running penalty, as firstly done
in [CJ15], for the MM to further control her accumulated inventory risk. This is the
same as subtracting the variance of the mark-to-market value of the inventory, weighted
by ζ.
(ii) ` : R → [0,+∞) represents the final execution cost and is increasing on [0,+∞),
decreasing on (−∞, 0] and `(0) = 0. (And usually convex in practice.)
(iii) If N∗ = +∞, we set γ = ζ = 0 ≡ `.
The last restriction on the parameters states that the only case we will consider in which the
inventory could be arbitrary large (whichever its sign) is that of a completely risk-neutral
MM with negligible costs. The risk averse case is far more challenging and has not been
treated in full mathematical detail even in the complete information case (see discussion
in [GLFT13]). The model given by (iii) is of secondary interest in practice, yet, it will allow
us to further understand the general problem and methodology and to have a more holistic
view at almost no extra cost.
Remark. Previous works in optimal market making do not consider both penalty and CARA
utility (with γ > 0) in unison, and instead treat the two families of models separately
[Gue´17]. Besides the obvious interest in unifying the approach and generalizing existing
models, allowing for γ > 0 and ζ > 0 simultaneously adds flexibility to the risk managing
capabilities of the MM. Indeed, in [Gue´17] the author derives some HJB-type systems of
ODEs for each problem with a unique risk aversion parameter γ¯, and then relates them by
the introduction of an auxiliary parameter 0 ≤ ξ¯ ≤ γ¯. The later is afterwards interpreted as
measuring risk aversion to non-execution risk only and it is carried forward to the formulae of
the ‘optimal strategies’. However, such strategies are not shown to result from any particular
optimization problem for 0 < ξ¯ < γ¯. By looking at the equations of the full information
version of our model (Section 1.4) with a single market regime, one can immediately see
that the equations in [Gue´17] are obtained via the reparametrization γ = ξ¯ and ζ = γ¯ − ξ¯.
Thus, the formulation in (1.1.2.6) allows us, in particular, to establish the optimality of the
strategies in [Gue´17] for any value of the non-execution risk aversion and, in general, to
differentiate between aversion to different types of risks. We can say that, in our model, γ
represents aversion to all types of risks, while the penalty ζ is used to further increase the
aversion to price risk only.
1.1.3 Jump measures
It will be useful in the sequel to understand which are the jump measures and intensity
kernels involved in our model. Let µN(dt, dz) (or simply µN) be the jump (or counting)
measure of N (see def. in [Bre´81, p.234] or [JS02, p.69]). We use a similar notation for the
jump measures of Y and the pair (Y,N). These are all finite random measures since the
processes are non-explosive for any δ+, δ− ∈ A (see (1.1.2.5)), and they admit predictable
intensity kernels (see [Bre´81, p.235 D2]). If mz0(dz) is the Dirac measure at a point z0 ∈ R,
then the (Pα,F)-predictable intensity kernels of µN , µY and µ(Y,N) are respectively given by:
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ηα,Nt (dz) = η
N(Yt− , δ
−
t , δ
+
t , Nt− , dz)
= λ−t m1(dz) + λ
+
t m−1(dz)
= Λ−Yt− (δ
−
t )1{Nt−<N∗}m1(dz) + Λ
+
Yt−
(δ+t )1{−Nt−<N∗}m−1(dz),
ηYt (dh) = η
Y (Yt− , dh) =
∑
j 6=Yt−
q
Yt− ,j
t mj−Yt− (dh)
(1.1.3.1)
and
η
α,(Y,N)
t (dh, dz) = η
α,N
t (dz)⊗m0(dh) + ηYt (dh)⊗m0(dz). (1.1.3.2)
We denote by µ¯Nα (dt, dz), µ¯
Y
α (dt, dh) and µ¯
(Y,N)
α (dt, dh, dz) the corresponding (F,Pα)-compen-
sated measures.
Remark. Note that equation (1.1.3.2) is a consequence of assuming that Y,N have a.s. no
common jumps (which in turn is equivalent to (1.1.2.2)). Indeed, it is easy to see that Y,N
have a.s. no common jumps if and only if
µ(Y,N)(dt, dh, dz) = µN(dt, dz)⊗m0(dh) + µY (dt, dh)⊗m0(dz), (1.1.3.3)
which implies (1.1.3.2).
1.1.4 Construction and characterization of the model
We now prove the existence of a model within our framework (Proposition 1.1.4.1). We
construct it by means of a reference probability (an overview of which can be found, e.g.,
in [Bre´81, Chpt.VI]) and, in particular, the Girsanov theorem for point processes.
For the following proposition, let us consider a filtered probability space (Ω,F ,F,Q)
under the usual conditions, with F = FT and F0 the completed trivial sigma algebra.
We refer to Q as the reference probability. Suppose this space supports a two-dimensional
counting process (N−, N+) (see def. in [Bre´81, Chapt.II]), a Wiener process W and a
Markov chain Y with finite state space {1, . . . , k}, initial distribution µ0 and time-dependent
generator matrix Q = (qijt )1≤i,j≤k satisfying Assumptions 1.1.2.1, such that N
−, N+, Y verify
(1.1.2.2). We set N = N− −N+ as before and suppose N± has intensity 1±t = 1{∓Nt−<N∗}.
(N∗ ∈ N∪{+∞} is given.) Such a simpler model can be constructed for example as a product
of canonical spaces, with the existence of the counting processes with the right intensities
proved in [JP82, Thm.24 and Cor.31].9 Let Λ±i : (δ∗, δ∗) → R for i = 1, . . . , k be functions
under the Assumptions 1.1.2.2 ((ii)),for given −∞ ≤ δ∗ < δ∗ ≤ +∞ and N∗ ∈ N ∪ {+∞}
with −N∗ ≤ n0 ≤ N∗, and define A as in (1.1.1.1).
Proposition 1.1.4.1. Let α = (δ−, δ+) ∈ A2 and define the process Zα as the stochastic
exponential
Zα := E
(∫ ·
0
(
Λ−Yu− (δ
−
u )− 1
)(
dN−u − 1−u du
)
+
(
Λ+Yu−
(δ+u )− 1
)(
dN+u − 1+u du
))
.
Then,
9The finite-dimensional result has the same proof as in one dimension, starting from independent Poisson
measures.
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(i) Zα is a strictly positive uniformly integrable (UI) martingale. In particular, EQ[ZαT ] =
1.
(ii) Pα defined by dPα
dQ = Z
α
T is an equivalent probability measure such that, for (F,Pα), N±
is a counting process with intensity λ±t = Λ
±
Yt−
(δ±t )1
±
t , W is a Wiener process and Y is
a Markov chain with state space {1, . . . , k}, initial distribution µ0 and generator matrix
Q. (That is, Assumptions 1.1.2.1, 1.1.2.2 and (1.1.2.2) are all verified.)
Proof. N−, N+ are finite variation (FV) processes with no common jumps, hence [N−, N+] =
0 Q-a.s. Therefore, the multiplicativity of the stochastic exponential [JS02, p.138] and
the exponential formula for FV processes [Bre´81, p.337 T4] yield the explicit expression
Zα = Zα,−Zα,+, with
Zα,±t = exp
(∫ t
0
(
1− Λ±Yu− (δ
+
u )
)
1
±
u du
) ∏
u≤t:
∆N±u 6=0
Λ±Yu− (δ
+
u ). (1.1.4.1)
Then (i) follows from the strict positivity and boundedness of Λ±i (δ
±) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, as
in [Bre´81, p.168 T4] with terminal time T . The only difference is that in our case the
Q-intensity of N± is 1{∓Nt−<N∗} ≤ 1 instead of 1. The proof remains the same though,
simply recalling that the Q-moment generating function of N±T is dominated by the one of
a standard Poisson random variable (see (1.1.2.5)). Uniform integrability is immediate.
(i) guarantees that Pα, as defined in (ii), is an equivalent probability measure. The shape
of the Pα-intensities of N−, N+ is due to [Bre´81, p.166 T3].
The fact that W is still a Wiener process under Pα is a consequence of the Girsanov–Meyer
Theorem [Pro04, p.132 Thm.35] and Levy’s characterization Theorem.
As for Y , note first that its initial distribution does not change as Zα0 = 1 , and the same
goes for its infinitesimal generator operator. To see this, consider the Q-generator operator
AYt : RE → RE, AYt f(i) =
∑k
j=1 q
ij
t f(j). We know the process Mt = f(Yt) − f(Y0) −∫ t
0
AYu f(Yu)du is a Q-local martingale. Once again, by the Girsanov–Meyer Theorem., M is
also a Pα-local martingale ([M,Z] = 0 since Y,N−, N+ are FV processes satisfying (1.1.2.2)).
Moreover, being bounded, M is a true Pα-martingale and Y solves, for (F,Pα), a well-posed
martingale problem for (AYt , µ0). This implies Y is a Pα-Markov chain with a uniquely
determined law [EK09, p.184 Thm.4.2].10 That Q is also the Pα-generator matrix follows
from uniqueness.
(1.1.2.2) clearly remains unchanged under an equivalent change of probability measure.
Reciprocally, suppose we start with a family of filtered probability spaces {(Ω,F ,F =
(Ft)0≤t≤T ,Pα)}α∈A2 as in Section 1.1.1, supporting a counting process (N−, N+) and a
Markov chain Y satisfying condition (1.1.2.2), together with a Wiener process W . Sup-
pose also that Y has finite state space {1, . . . , k}, initial distribution µ0 and time-dependent
generator matrix Q, and that our Assumptions 1.1.2.1 and 1.1.2.2 are in place. We put
10Although our martingale problem is non-homogeneous in time, (Qt) is deterministic, so this does not
represent a problem.
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N = N− − N+ as always. We would like to characterize any such model in terms of a
reference probability as in Proposition 1.1.4.1 by an inverse change of measure. However,
we only claim the uniqueness of the reference probability on FN . We will come back to this
result in the sequel.
Proposition 1.1.4.2. Let α = (δ−, δ+) ∈ A2 and define
Z¯α := E
(∫ ·
0
(
1/Λ−Yu− (δ
−
u )− 1
)(
dN−u − λ−u du
)
+
(
1/Λ+Yu−
(δ+u )− 1
)(
dN+u − λ+u du
))
.
Then,
(i) Z¯α is a strictly positive UI martingale. In particular, Eα[Z¯T ] = 1.
(ii) Qα defined by dQα
dPα = Z¯
α
T is a probability measure equivalent to Pα such that, for (F,Qα),
N± is a counting process with intensity 1±t , W is a Wiener process and Y is a Markov
chain with state space {1, . . . , k}, initial distribution µ0 and generator matrix Q. Fur-
thermore, Y,N,W are independent.
(iii) If we define Zα as in Lemma 1.1.4.1 under Qα, then Zα = 1/Z¯α (i.e., the two changes
of measure are inverse of each other).
(iv) For all α˜ ∈ A2, Qα˜ ≡ Qα on FNT .
Proof. (i) and (ii) are proved just as in Proposition 1.1.4.1 (the processes 1/Λ±i (δ
±) are
strictly positive and bounded for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and the intensities λ+, λ± are bounded).
The Qα-independence of Y,N,W is a consequence of [JYC09, p.543 Lem.9.5.4.1]. That
is, the (Qα,F)-martingales Y − ∫ ·
0
∑k
j=1 q
Yu− ,j
u jdu, N −
∫ ·
0
(1−u − 1+u )du and W have the
predictable representation property with respect to FY , FN and FW resp. (see [Bre´81, p.239
T8] for compensated counting measures) and they are (F,Qα)-orthogonal, which implies
their independence.
The explicit expressions for the stochastic exponentials (see (1.1.4.1)) show straightfor-
wardly that ZαZ¯α = 1, proving (iii).
(iv) is due to [Bre´81, p.64 T8].
1.2 Filtering problem
Since the MM cannot directly observe all the information in F but only FN,W (in particular,
she cannot observe Y ), in order to solve the optimization problem (1.1.2.6) under partial
information we want to reduce it first to an equivalent one under full information. Through-
out this section we work under Pα with α = (δ−, δ+) ∈ A2 fixed. We sometimes omit α from
the notation for simplicity.
Recall that for any ca`dla`g bounded process M (not necessarily adapted) on a filtered
probability space (Σ,H,H,P) satisfying the usual conditions, the optional projection of M
on H is the unique ca`dla`g process oM (P,H) such that oM (P,H)t = EP[Mt|Ht] a.s. for each t.
Its existence is guaranteed by the Optional Projection Theorem (see, e.g., [JYC09, p.264]
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or [Nik06, p.357-358]). (We omit P and/or H when clear from the context.) Let us consider
the optional projections
Πα,i :=o (1{Yt=i})
(Pα,FN,W ), 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and Πα := (Πα,1, . . . ,Πα,k).
In other words, Πα is the unique ca`dla`g version of the conditional distribution of Y given the
observable information, i.e., Πα,it = Pα(Yt = i|FN,Wt ). We now characterize the observable
(that is, the FN,W -) predictable intensities of N−, N+ and µN in terms of Πα. Loosely
speaking, the observable intensity of, say N+, is obtained projecting: Eα[λ+t |FW,Nt ] [Bre´81,
p.32 Comment and Pseudo-Proof of T14]. The only technical difficulty is that of finding a
predictable version of such process. o(λ+) has the desired projective property but it is not
predictable in general. o(λ+)t− , on the other hand, is predictable but does not normally
enjoy the projective property. In fact, the process we are looking for is ‘in between’ these
two.
Proposition 1.2.1.1 (Observable intensities). The (Pα,FN,W )-predictable intensities of
N± and µN , resp., are
λ̂±t
α
:= 1±t
k∑
i=1
Πα,iu−Λ
±
i (δ
±
u ) and η̂
α,N
t (dz) := λ̂
−
t
α
m1(dz) + λ̂
+
t
α
m−1(dz).
Notation. We set Λ̂±(pi, δ) =
∑k
i=1 pi
iΛ±i (δ); thus, λ̂
±
t
α
= 1±t Λ̂±(Π
α
u− , δ
±
u ).
Proof. We prove it just for N+, the others being analogous, and we omit α for simplicity.
It is clear that λ̂+ is predictable. We need to check that for any FW,N -predictable process
ψ ≥ 0,
E
[∫ T
0
ψtλ̂
+
t dt
]
= E
[∫ T
0
ψtdN
+
t
]
.
For any 1 ≤ i ≤ k, each path of the ca`dla`g processes Πi and 1{Y·=i} has only countably many
jumps. We can therefore interchange these processes and their left limits when integrating
with respect to dt. By properties of the conditional expectation and Fubini’s Theorem,
E
[∫ T
0
ψtλ̂
+
t dt
]
= E
∫ T
0
ψt1
+
t
k∑
i=1
Πit−Λ
+
i (δ
+
t )dt
 = E
∫ T
0
ψt1
+
t
k∑
i=1
ΠitΛ
+
i (δ
+
t )dt

= E
∫ T
0
ψt1
+
t
k∑
i=1
E
[
1{Yt=i}
∣∣FN,Wt ]Λ+i (δ+t )dt
 = ∫ T
0
E
E[ψt1+t k∑
i=1
Λ+i (δ
+
t )
∣∣FN,Wt ]
 dt
=
∫ T
0
E
[
ψt1
+
t
k∑
i=1
1{Yt=i}Λ
+
i (δ
+
t )
]
dt = E
∫ T
0
ψt1
+
t
k∑
i=1
1{Yt−=i}Λ
+
i (δ
+
t )dt
 = E[∫ T
0
ψtλ
+
t dt
]
= E
[∫ T
0
ψtdN
+
t
]
.
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We give now the filtering (or Kushner-Stratonovich) equations for the observable dis-
tribution of Y . These are coupled stochastic differential equations (SDEs) governing the
dynamics of Πα.
Notation. We denote by ∆ ⊂ Rk the (k − 1)-simplex (i.e., ∆ = {pi ∈ Rk : 0 ≤ pii ≤
1 for all i, and
∑
i pi
i = 1} and by ∆◦ its interior relative to the hyperplane {pi ∈ Rk :∑
i pi
i = 1} (i.e., ∆o = {pi ∈ ∆ : 0 < pii < 1 for all i}).
Proposition 1.2.1.2 (Observable distribution of Y ). The process Πα = (Πα,1, . . . ,Πα,k)
is the unique strong solution of the constrained system of SDEs
dΠit =
k∑
j=1
qjit Π
j
tdt+ Π
i
t−
 Λ−i (δ−t )∑k
j=1 Π
j
t−Λ
−
j (δ
−
t )
− 1
dN−t − 1−t k∑
j=1
ΠjtΛ
−
j (δ
−
t )dt

+ Πit−
 Λ+i (δ+t )∑k
j=1 Π
j
t−Λ
+
j (δ
+
t )
− 1
dN+t − 1+t k∑
j=1
ΠjtΛ
+
j (δ
+
t )dt
 ,
(1.2.1.1)
such that Π0 = µ0 and Πt ∈ ∆ for all t ∈ [0, T ] a.s. Equivalently,
dΠit =
k∑
j=1
(
qjit Π
j
t + Π
i
tΠ
j
t
(
1
−
t (Λ
−
j − Λ−i )(δ−t ) + 1+t (Λ+j − Λ+i )(δ+t )
))
dt
+ Πit−
 Λ−i (δ−t )∑k
j=1 Π
j
t−Λ
−
j (δ
−
t )
− 1
 dN−t + Πit−
 Λ+i (δ+t )∑k
j=1 Π
j
t−Λ
+
j (δ
+
t )
− 1
 dN+t ,
(1.2.1.2)
with Π0 = µ0 and Πt ∈ ∆ for all t ∈ [0, T ] a.s.
Proof. The equivalence between the constrained systems of SDEs (1.2.1.1) and (1.2.1.2)
results from rearranging the terms and using
∑k
j=1 Π
j
t = 1.
Let us check that Πα solves (1.2.1.2). Clearly, the constraint and the initial condition
are satisfied. The verification of the SDEs is due to [CEFS16a, Prop.3.3] (with more details
in [CEFS16b, App.A, Lemma A.2 and Prop.3.3]), albeit some considerations need to be
made.
On the one hand, the authors work with a pure jump model, with strategies adapted to
the natural filtration of the driving jump process only (i.e., there is no diffusion) and constant
generator matrix for the Markov chain. However, mutatis mutandis the former differences
yield no major change in the proofs.
On the other hand, the main assumption of the authors, [CEFS16a, Asm.2.1], postulates
the existence of some deterministic measure η˜N(dz) on R with compact support11 such
that for all i ∈ E, δ+, δ− ∈ (δ∗, δ∗), n ∈ [−N∗, N∗] ∩ Z, the measure ηN(i, δ+, δ−, n, dz) is
equivalent to η˜N(dz) and the Radon-Nikodym derivative dηN(i, δ+, δ−, n, ·)/dη˜N is uniformly
bounded and bounded away from zero η˜N(dz)-a.s.
11In [CEFS16a] the support is assumed to be a subset of (−1,∞), but this is only for a ‘return (or yield)
process’ as in their case.
CHAPTER 1. OPTIMAL MARKET MAKING WITH PARTIAL INFORMATION 17
Since the spread processes are fixed and bounded, we can assume without loss of gener-
ality that δ∗ is finite. Setting η˜N(dz) := m1(dz) +m−1(dz) we see straightforwardly that the
two measures are equivalent with derivative
dηN(i, δ−, δ+, n, ·)
dη˜N
(z) = Λ−i (δ
−)1{n<N∗}1{z=1} + Λ+i (δ
+)1{−n<N∗}1{z=−1}, (1.2.1.3)
uniformly bounded by Λ−i (δ∗) + Λ
+
i (δ∗). However, our model allows for dη
N/dη˜N(z) = 0,
which is a consequence of having vanishing intensities λ±. This poses no issue nonetheless,
as dηN/dη˜N(z) > 0 is only used in [CEFS16a, Prop.3.3] to guarantee Z¯α > 0 (see Propo-
sition 1.1.4.2). This condition, also satisfied in our model,12 allows to go from the physical
probability Pα to a reference probability Qα and backwards.
We turn now to the proof of uniqueness. We remark first that the jump height coefficients
in (1.2.1.2) will typically not be Lipschitz (classical results for SDEs such as [Pro04, p.253
Thm.7] cannot be applied) and the paths of the spreads need not be continuous between the
jump times of N (ruling out the most classical results of ODEs [CL55]). Nevertheless, we can
still follow a pathwise ODEs approach. Let us fix a path and alternatively verify uniqueness
inductively on the intervals [τm, τm+1), where τ0 := 0 and 0 < τ1 < τ2 < · · · < τM = T are
the jump times of N (including the terminal time T even if there is no jump at that point).
Then Aji is bounded for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k. Now observe that any ca`dla`g process Π˜, solving
the constrained system of SDEs (1.2.1.2), must solve pathwise for m = 0, 1, . . . ,M − 1 the
following system of ODEs in integral form, for t ∈ [τm, τm+1):
Π˜it = R
i
m
(
Π˜τ−m
)
+
∫ t
τm
k∑
j=1
(
qjiu Π˜
j
u + Π˜
i
uΠ˜
j
uA
ji
u
)
du, (1.2.1.4)
with Rim
(
Π˜τ−m
)
:= Π˜i
τ−m
Λ±i (δ
±
τm)/
∑k
j=1 Π˜
j
τ−m
Λ±j (δ
±
τm) if ∆Nτm = ∓1, m > 0, and Ri0
(
Π˜τ−0
)
=
µi0. Elementary algebra of bounded Lipschitz functions shows that f
i : [τm, τm+1)×∆→ R,
defined by f i(u, pi) =
∑k
j=1(q
ji
u pi
j +piipijAjiu ) is Lipschitz in pi (uniformly in u). Let K be the
maximum Lipschitz constant of f l for 1 ≤ l ≤ k and suppose Πα
τ−m
= Π˜τ−m (clearly satisfied
for m = 0). Then (1.2.1.4) yields ‖Παt − Π˜t‖ ≤ K
∫ t
τm
‖Παu − Π˜u‖du, implying Παt = Π˜t
on [τm, τm+1) by Gro¨nwall’s inequality. As a consequence, the equality on [0, T ) follows by
induction. It must clearly hold at time T as well, either by continuity or (if there is a jump)
because ΠαT = RM
(
Πα
τ−M
)
= RM
(
Π˜τ−M
)
= Π˜T .
Remark 1.2.1.3. Consider the identification ∆ ' [0, 1]k−1 (resp. ∆◦ ' (0, 1)k−1) obtained
by the substitution pik = 1−∑j<k pij (where the choice of the k-th coordinate over the rest
is completely arbitrary). Then the constrained system of SDEs (1.2.1.1) (or equivalently,
(1.2.1.2)) for (Πα,1 . . . ,Πα,k) becomes an ‘unconstrained’ system for (Πα,1 . . . ,Πα,k−1) ∈
[0, 1]k−1. Henceforth, we shall use this identification whenever convenient.
We finish this section with a short lemma. It states that the conditional distribution Πα
can never reach the relative border of the simplex ∆, provided it starts from the relative
interior. This amounts to saying that all regimes have some positive probability at time zero.
12This was ultimately a consequence of the decomposition in Assumptions 1.1.2.2 ((i)), that allowed for
the vanishing factors of the intensities to be secluded as the reference probability intensities.
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Lemma 1.2.1.4. If µ0 ∈ ∆◦, then Παt ∈ ∆◦ for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T a.s.
Proof. We want to show that Πα,it > 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, 0 ≤ t ≤ T a.s. We proceed by
induction on the jump times of N , for each path, as at the end of the proof of Proposition
1.2.1.2. Using the same notations, let 1 ≤ i ≤ k and suppose Πα,j
τ−m
> 0 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k
(satisfied for m = 0 by assumption). Then (1.2.1.4), Assumptions 1.1.2.1 and the fact that
Aii ≡ 0 by definition, show that Πα,i is absolutely continuous on the interval [τm, τm+1) and
satisfies
(Πα,it )
′ =
k∑
j=1
(
qjit Π
α,j
t + Π
α,i
t Π
α,j
t A
ji
t
)
= Πα,it
(
qiit +
∑
j 6=i
Πα,jt A
ji
t
)
+
∑
j 6=i
qjit Π
α,j
t
≥ Πα,it
(
qiit +
∑
j 6=i
Πα,jt A
ji
t
)
,
(1.2.1.5)
for dt-a.e. t ∈ [τm, τm+1), subject to Πα,iτm = Rim(Πατ−m) > 0. Let us set s := sup([τm, τm+1) ∩
{t ∈ [0, T ] : Πα,it > 0}). We need to prove that s = τm+1. By the continuity of Πα,i, it must
be s > τm. Consequently, (1.2.1.5) and the absolute continuity of log Π
α,i on [τm, t] ⊂ [τm, s)
yield
Πα,it ≥ Rim(Πατ−m) exp
(∫ t
τm
(
qiiu +
∑
j 6=i
Πα,ju A
ji
u
)
du
)
for dt-a.e. t ∈ [τm, s).
If it were s < τm+1, the continuity of Π
α,i again and the former inequality would imply
0 = Πα,is > 0, proving by contradiction that s = τm+1 and Π
α,i is positive on the whole
interval [τm, τm+1). Positivity on [0, T ) now follows by induction, and it must clearly hold at
time T as well, as either there is a jump or we can reason as we just did.
In light of the previous lemma, we will assume from here onwards that
µ0 ∈ ∆◦, (1.2.1.6)
and therefore work with ∆◦ instead of ∆.
1.3 Value function and HJB equation
In this section, we tackle the control problem of the MM with the filter as an additional
state variable. We define the MM’s value function and we aim to characterize it by means
of an HJB equation.
Let t ∈ [0, T ]. We consider our model ‘starting at t’ instead of 0. Whenever a process is
defined from time ‘t− onwards’ (i.e., from time t onwards and decreeing its left-limit value
at t) this implicitly means it is constant on [0, t). In particular, we use this convention
for all integrals (stochastic or not) of the form
∫ ·
t
and (with a slight abuse of notation) for
the processes W −Wt and N± − N±t− . We work with t− instead of t due to the jumps of
the processes N−, N+. However, since N−, N+ are quasi-left continuous,13 for most intended
13For example, because they are increasing ca`dla`g processes admitting continuous compensators for (any
one of) the physical probabilities [JS02, p.70 Prop.1.19 or p.77 Prop.2.9].
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purposes one can drop the left limit with no harm . We define Ft,W,N = (σ(Wr−Wt, Nr−Nt− :
t ≤ r ≤ u ∨ t) ∨ F0)u and Ft,N analogously.
Let s, x ∈ R, n ∈ Z ∩ [−N∗, N∗] and pi ∈ ∆◦ ⊂ Rk. The set At of admissible
spreads starting at t is the set of δ ∈ A which are independent of FN,Wt− (equivalently,
the δ ∈ A which are Ft,W,N -predictable). Consider for each α = (δ−, δ+) ∈ A2t the processes
St,s, Xα,t,x,s, N t,n,Πα,t,n,pi defined pathwise, outside some set A ∈ F0, by (1.1.2.1), (1.1.2.4),
(1.1.2.3), (1.2.1.1) resp., replacing the initial conditions s0, x0, n0, µ0 at time 0 by s, x, n, pi
resp. at time t−. We remark that Ft,W,N = Ft,W,Nt,n (since N t,n = n+N−−N+−(N−t−−N+t−))
and all the processes defined in this section are adapted to this filtration. We further assume
there exists a family of ‘physical’ probabilities (Pα,t,n,pi)α∈A2t such that their null sets generate
F0, and for (Pα,t,n,pi,Ft,W,N) it holds that W −Wt is a Wiener process and N± − N±t− has
predictable intensity λ̂±
α,t,n,pi
, as defined in Proposition 1.2.1.1 in terms of N t,n and Πα,t,n,pi.
We define the penalized P&L from t to T (see (1.1.2.6) for parameter restrictions) as
Pα,s,x,nt,T := X
α,t,x,s
T + S
t,s
T N
t,n
T − `(N t,nT )−
1
2
σ2ζ
∫ T
t
(N t,nu )
2du, (1.3.1.1)
and the value function of problem (1.1.2.6) as
V (t, s, x, n, pi) := sup
α∈A2t
Eα,t,n,pi
[
Uγ
(
Pα,s,x,nt,T
)]
. (1.3.1.2)
Our goal is to compute optimal or ‘close to optimal’ strategies.14 The Dynamic Programming
Principle and Ito’s Lemma allow us to formally derive (see, e.g., [Bou07]) the Hamilton–
Jacobi–Bellman (or dynamic programming) partial-integro differential equation associated
to V :
0 = vt + µvs +
1
2
σ2vss +
k∑
i,j=1
qjit pi
jvpii +
1
2
σ2ζn2(γv − 1)
+ 1{n<N∗} sup
δ−∈(δ∗,δ∗)
{ k∑
i,j=1
(Λ−j − Λ−i )(δ−)pijpiivpii + d−δ−(v)
k∑
i=1
piiΛ−i (δ
−)
}
+ 1{−n<N∗} sup
δ+∈(δ∗,δ∗)
{ k∑
i,j=1
(Λ+j − Λ+i )(δ+)pijpiivpii + d+δ+(v)
k∑
i=1
piiΛ+i (δ
+)
}
,
(1.3.1.3)
with terminal condition v(T, s, x, n, pi) = Uγ(x+ sn− `(n)), where:
d±δ (v)(t, s, x, n, pi)
= v
(
t, s, x± (s± δ), n∓ 1, 1∑k
j=1 pi
jΛ±j (δ)
(
pi1Λ±1 (δ), . . . , pi
kΛ±k (δ)
))− v(t, s, x, n, pi),
and we convene the following:
14By ‘close to optimal’ we mean that for each ε > 0 there exists a strategy such that the supremum in
(1.3.1.2) is attained up to ε.
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Notation. (i) The derivatives with respect to pi = (pi1, . . . , pik) should be understood via the
identification of Remark 1.2.1.3. (ii) Although it is not meaningful to evaluate v on the
inventories ±N∗ ± 1, this only happens in equation (1.3.1.3) when the corresponding term
vanishes. This slight abuse of notation can be found throughout previous works and we will
be using it as well.
Equation (1.3.1.3) can also be seen as a coupled system of PIDEs indexed in n ∈
Z ∩ [−N∗, N∗]. (We will talk about system of equations or simply ‘equation’ indistinctly).
Nonlinearity aside, (1.3.1.3) is rather complex, in particular due to being of second order,
high-dimensional and with derivatives in almost all of these dimensions. Tackling it directly
(either analytically or numerically) is utterly challenging. Consequently, it has become com-
mon practice for optimal market making and optimal liquidation models a` la Avellaneda–
Stoikov [AS08] to propose an ansatz for the solution [AS08,BL14,CDJ17,CJ15,CJR14,FL12,
FL13, Gue´17, GL15, GLFT13]. This approach however, relies heavily on the existence of a
classical solution for the resulting simplified equation, so that the ansatz is ultimately proved
valid by a suitable verification theorem. (See Section 1.4 for more details.) When the sim-
plified equation does not admit (or cannot be guaranteed to admit) a classical solution, and
a viscosity approach needs to be used instead, the previous argument breaks down.
If we attempted to solve our problem by the standard approach, a plausible ansatz for
the value function could be
V (t, s, x, n, pi) = Uγ(x+ sn+ Θ(t, n, pi)). (1.3.1.4)
Formal substitution yields the following equation for Θ:
0 = θt + µn− 1
2
σ2n2(γ + ζ) +
k∑
i,j=1
qjit pi
jθpii
+ 1{n<N∗} sup
δ−∈(δ∗,δ∗)
{ k∑
i,j=1
(Λ−j − Λ−i )(δ−)pijpiiθpii + Uγ
(
δ− + d−δ−(θ)
) k∑
i=1
piiΛ−i (δ
−)
}
+ 1{−n<N∗} sup
δ+∈(δ∗,δ∗)
{ k∑
i,j=1
(Λ+j − Λ+i )(δ+)pijpiiθpii + Uγ
(
δ+ + d+δ+(θ)
) k∑
i=1
piiΛ+i (δ
+)
}
,
(1.3.1.5)
with terminal condition θ(T, n, pi) = −`(n), where:
d±δ (θ)(t, n, pi) = θ
(
t, n∓ 1, 1∑k
j=1 pi
jΛ±j (δ)
(
pi1Λ±1 (δ), . . . , pi
kΛ±k (δ)
))− θ(t, n, pi).
The new system of PIDEs is of first order and no longer depends on the variables s and x
(there is no diffusion anymore). This is a considerable simplification; one that will permit
effective numerical solution in Section 1.5. But it is not good enough for us to assert existence
of a classical solution. Notwithstanding, we are able to rigorously prove the decomposition
(1.3.1.4) and explicitly find Θ as a new ‘value function’ (Theorem 1.3.1.1). When the control
space is compact, this ultimately allows us to characterize Θ as the unique solution of the
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terminal condition PIDE (1.3.1.5) in the viscosity sense (Theorem 1.3.1.3), further simplified
in the unconstrained inventory case. These two theorems constitute the main theoretical
results of this chapter. They allow us to safely postulate reasonable candidates for optimal
(or -optimal) strategies for the MM, i.e., those given by spreads that (at least approximately)
realize the suprema in (1.3.1.5).
Theorem 1.3.1.1. There exists a unique function Θ : [0, T ]×(Z∩[−N∗, N∗])×∆◦ → R such
that the decomposition (1.3.1.4) holds true. Furthermore, there exists a family of equivalent
probability measures P˜α,t,n,pi ∼ Pα,t,n,pi, α = (δ−, δ+) ∈ A2t , such that
(i) Πα,t,n,pi is the unique strong solution of (1.2.1.1) with initial condition (t−, pi) under
P˜α,t,n,pi.
(ii) µN
t,n
has (P˜α,t,n,pi,Ft,W,N)-predictable intensity kernel
η˜Nu (dz) := e
−γδ−u λ̂−u
α,t,n,pi
m1(dz) + e
−γδ+u λ̂+u
α,t,n,pi
m−1(dz).
(iii) Θ = U−1γ ◦Ψ = − 1γ log(1− γΨ) with
Ψ(t, n, pi) := sup
α∈A˜2t
E˜α,t,n,pi
[
Uγ
(
P˜α,n,pit,T
)]
, (1.3.1.6)
where P˜α,n,pit,T :=
∫ T
t
{
Uγ(δ
−
u )λ̂
−
u
α,t,n,pi
+Uγ(δ
+
u )λ̂
+
u
α,t,n,pi
+µN t,nu − 12σ2(γ+ζ)(N t,nu )2
}
du−`(N t,nT )
and A˜t := {δ ∈ A : δ is Ft,Nt,n-predictable}.
Proof. For shortness, we make an abuse of notation and omit (t, n, pi) from the probability
measures and expectations. Let us start by proving (1.3.1.4) and finding (P˜α)α∈A2t with the
desired properties. Using integration by parts we can re-write the penalized P&L (1.3.1.1)
as
Pα,s,x,nt,T = x+ sn+
∫ T
t
{
µN t,nu −
1
2
σ2(γ + ζ)(N t,nu )
2
}
du− `(N t,nT )
+ σ
∫ T
t
N t,nu dWu +
1
2
σ2γ
∫ T
t
(N t,nu )
2du+
∫ T
t
δ−u dN
−
u + δ
+
u dN
+
u
=: x+ sn+ P
α,n
t,T ,
(1.3.1.7)
Consider first the case γ = 0. The integrals with respect to W,N−, N+ all have bounded
integrands (and predictable for N−, N+), except in the case of unconstrained inventory:
N∗ = +∞ and γ = ζ = 0 ≡ ` (see (1.1.2.6)). Regardless, we still have Eα
[∫ T
t
(N t,nu )
2du
]
=∫ T
t
Eα
[
(N t,nu )
2
]
du < +∞ by (1.1.2.5). Choosing P˜α := Pα the conclusion follows by taking
expectation and by Propositions 1.2.1.1 and 1.2.1.2.
Consider now γ > 0. Hence, we are in the case |N | ≤ N∗ < +∞. We define
Aα := E
(
−γσ
∫ ·
t
N t,nu dWu
)
= exp
(
−γσ
∫ ·
t
N t,nu dWu −
1
2
σ2γ2
∫ ·
t
(N t,nu )
2du
)
.
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By Novikov’s condition, Aα is a strictly positive UI martingale with Eα[AT ] = 1, and therefore
defines an equivalent probability measure Aα ∼ Pα via dAα
dPα = A
α
T . Note that the Girsanov–
Meyer Theorem. [Pro04, p.132 Thm.35] ensures the Ft,W,N -intensities of N± − N±t− remain
the same when changing to Aα. Let us set
Bα := E
(
−γ
∫ ·
t
Uγ(δ
−
u )dN
−
u
α
+ Uγ(δ
+
u )dN
+
u
α
)
= E
(∫ ·
t
(
e−γδ
−
u − 1)dN−u α + (e−γδ+u − 1)dN+u α) ,
where N±u
α
denote the corresponding (Pα,Ft,W,N)-compensated (or equivalently, (Aα,Ft,W,N)-
compensated) processes. By the same arguments of Propositions 1.1.4.1 and 1.1.4.2, Bα is
a strictly positive UI martingale with EAα [BαT ] = 1 and defines an equivalent probability
measure P˜α ∼ Aα ∼ Pα via dP˜α
dAα = B
α
T , such that (ii) holds true. Note that (i) is also
trivially verified due to the equivalence of the probability measures.
Suppose for the time being that Ψ is defined as in (1.3.1.6) but taking supremum over
the whole set of admissible controls A2t ⊇ A˜2t instead. We will see afterwards that this makes
no difference. To see (1.3.1.4), observe that the identity Uγ(a+ b) = Uγ(b)e
−γa + Uγ(a) and
(1.3.1.7) yield Uγ(P
α,s,x,n
t,T ) = Uγ(P
α,n
t,T )e
−γ(x+sn) + Uγ(x+ sn), giving
V (t, s, x, n, pi) = sup
α∈A2t
Eα
[
Uγ(P
α,n,pi
t,T )
]
e−γ(x+sn) + Uγ(x+ sn).
On the other hand, by the same identity,
Uγ(x+ sn+ Θ) = (Uγ ◦Θ)e−γ(x+sn) + Uγ(x+ sn) = Ψe−γ(x+sn) + Uγ(x+ sn).
As a consequence, (1.3.1.4) is equivalent to the equality Ψ(t, n, pi) = supα∈A2t E
α
[
Uγ(P
α,n
t,T )
]
.
We check instead the stronger statement
Eα
[
exp
(
− γPα,nt,T
)]
= E˜α
[
exp
(
− γP˜α,nt,T
)]
, for all α ∈ A2t . (1.3.1.8)
Using the explicit exponential formula (see equation (1.1.4.1)) and by straightforward
computations:
exp
(
− γPα,nt,T
)
= exp
(
−γ
(∫ T
t
{
µN t,nu −
1
2
σ2(γ + ζ)(N t,nu )
2
}
du− `(N t,nT )
))
× AαT exp
(
−γ
∫ T
t
δ−u dN
−
u + δ
+
u dN
+
u
)
= exp
(
− γP˜α,nt,T
)
AαT exp
(
γ
∫ T
t
{
Uγ(δ
−
u )λ̂
−
u
α,t,n,pi
+ Uγ(δ
+
u )λ̂
+
u
α,t,n,pi}
du
)
×
∏
t≤u≤T :
∆N−u 6=0
exp
(−γδ−u ) ∏
t≤u≤T :
∆N+u 6=0
exp
(−γδ+u )
= exp
(
− γP˜α,nt,T
)
AαTB
α
T ,
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which yields (1.3.1.8) after taking Pα-expectation.
It remains to see that
Ψ(t, n, pi) := sup
α∈A2t
E˜α
[
Uγ
(
P˜α,n,pit,T
)]
= sup
α∈A˜2t
E˜α
[
Uγ
(
P˜α,n,pit,T
)]
=: Ψ˜(t, n, pi).
Clearly Ψ ≥ Ψ˜. Let us check Ψ ≤ Ψ˜. As done in Proposition 1.1.4.2 we can define a family
of ‘reference’ equivalent probability measures Q˜α ∼ P˜α, α ∈ A2t , such that for (Q˜α,Ft,W,N) it
holds: W−Wt is a Wiener process independent of the counting process (N−−N−t− , N+−N+t−)
and N±−N±t− has predictable intensity 1±,t,nu := 1{∓Nt,n
u−<N
∗} (in particular, its law does not
depend on α). Furthermore, the inverse change of measure is given by dP˜α/dQ˜α = Z˜αT with
Z˜α :=
E
(∫ ·
t
(
Λ̂−(Πα,t,n,piu− , δ
−
u )− 1
)(
dN−u − 1−,t,nu du
)
+
(
Λ̂+(Πα,t,n,piu− , δ
+
u )− 1
)(
dN+u − 1+,t,nu du
))
.
Let us fix α ∈ A2t . Denote by D = D([t, T ],R) the Skorokhod space of ca`dla`g functions with
its usual sigma algebra and by PW ,PN the laws (or pushforward measures) induced on D by
W −Wt, N t,n resp. when starting from Qα. These laws do not depend on α and characterize
the joint law of (W − Wt, N t,n) on D2 as PW ⊗ PN , due to the independence of the two
processes. Since α is Ft,W,N -predictable, by a monotone class argument one can show there
exists a jointly measurable process f : [t, T ] × D2 → R such that αu = fu(W −Wt, N t,n)
and for PW -almost every w ∈ D, the process α˜u := fu(w,N t,n) is in A˜2t . Note also that we
can write Z˜αTUγ
(
P˜α,n,pit,T
)
= g(α,N t,n) = g(f(W −Wt, N t,n), N t,n) for some function g. By
Fubini’s theorem,
E˜α
[
Uγ
(
P˜α,n,pit,T
)]
= E˜Qα
[
Z˜αTUγ
(
P˜α,n,pit,T
)]
=
∫
EPN
[
g(f(w, ·), ·)] dPW (w)
≤
∫
Ψ˜dPW (w) = Ψ˜.
Since α ∈ A2t was arbitrary, we conclude that Ψ = Ψ˜.
Just as it occurs under full information (see Section 1.4), for a fully risk-neutral MM
with negligible costs (i.e. N∗ = +∞, γ = ζ = 0 ≡ `), Θ can be further decomposed.
Note, from their definition, that in this case λ̂±
α,t,n,pi
and Πα,t,n,pi do not depend on n. As it
was proved in Theorem 1.3.1.1, when γ = 0 the family (P˜α,t,n) can be taken as the original
physical probabilities, and these do not depend on n either. The following corollary is now
immediate.
Corollary 1.3.1.2. If N∗ = +∞ and γ = ζ = 0 ≡ ` then
V (t, s, x, n, pi) = x+ sn+ µn(T − t) + Φ(t, pi),
with Φ(t, pi) = supα∈A˜2t E
t,pi
[∫ T
t
{
δ−u λ̂−u
α,t,pi
+ δ+u λ̂
+
u
α,t,pi
+ µ(λ̂−u
α,t,pi − λ̂+u
α,t,pi
)
}
du
]
.
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In the context of the previous corollary, formal substitution in (1.3.1.3) or (1.3.1.5) yields
the following PIDE for Φ:
0 = φt +
k∑
i,j=1
qjit pi
jφpii
+ sup
δ−∈(δ∗,δ∗)
{ k∑
i,j=1
(Λ−j − Λ−i )(δ−)pijpiiφpii +
(
δ− + µ(T − t) + d−δ−(φ)
) k∑
i=1
piiΛ−i (δ
−)
}
+ sup
δ+∈(δ∗,δ∗)
{ k∑
i,j=1
(Λ+j − Λ+i )(δ+)pijpiiφpii +
(
δ+ − µ(T − t) + d+δ+(φ)
) k∑
i=1
piiΛ+i (δ
+)
}
,
(1.3.1.9)
with terminal condition φ(T, pi) = 0, where:
d±δ (φ)(t, pi) = φ
(
t,
1∑k
j=1 pi
jΛ±j (δ)
(
pi1Λ±1 (δ), . . . , pi
kΛ±k (δ)
))− φ(t, pi).
We now want to prove that Θ (resp. Φ) is the unique continuous viscosity solution
of the terminal condition PIDE (1.3.1.5) (resp. (1.3.1.9)). (See, e.g., [Son88, Def.2.1] for
the relevant definition, or more in general [DF99, Def.7.3], recalling that in our case we
have no boundary conditions other than that at terminal time.) A complication inevitably
arises, as classical viscosity techniques [Bou07, FS06, ØS09] cannot be applied directly to
weak formulation models such as ours. However, the decomposition of Theorem 1.3.1.1
(resp. Corollary 1.3.1.2) not only reduces the dimensionality of the problem, but also states
that the MM may neglect the diffusion component of the state process altogether, focusing
solely on the time-space state variable (u,N t,n,Πα,t,n,pi) (resp. (u,Πα,t,n,pi)). This is a PDMP
as introduced in [Dav84] (detailed treatments also found in [BR11, Dav93]). Using results
from PDMPs theory, our continuous-time problem is identified with a control problem for a
discrete-time Markov decision model, as in [BR09,BR10,BR11,CEFS16a], and linked again
with viscosity solutions of HJB PIDEs as in [CEFS16a,DF99].
An inevitable drawback is that the PDMPs approach relies on the use of the so-called
randomized (or relaxed) controls and requires the control space to be compact. Hence, for
the following theorem we will assume −∞ < δ∗ < δ∗ < +∞. Assuming a uniform lower
constraint δ∗ > −∞ is hardly a problem. On the contrary, δ∗ = 0 (or even some small
positive number) is the most meaningful in practice, as negative spreads imply the MM is
willing to offer her clients better prices than the reference price S. (δ∗ = −∞ is motivated
in the literature by mathematical convenience rather than modelling accuracy.) A uniform
upper bound δ∗ < +∞, on the other hand, is harder to assess a priori. Fortunately, in
most situations encountered in practice, the unconstrained optimization will yield bounded
optimal spreads nonetheless, and the MM can dispense with δ∗, δ∗ if she wishes to do so (see
Section 1.5 for an example).
Theorem 1.3.1.3. Assume −∞ < δ∗ < δ∗ < ∞. For N∗ < ∞ (resp. N∗ = +∞ and
γ = ζ = 0 ≡ `), let Θ (resp. Φ) be as in Theorem 1.3.1.1 (resp. Corollary 1.3.1.2). Then Θ
(resp. Φ) is the unique continuous viscosity solution of the terminal condition PIDE (1.3.1.5)
(resp. (1.3.1.9)).
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Proof. Case N∗ < +∞ and γ > 0: Let us write Ψ = 1+Υ
γ
, with
Υ(t, n, pi) = sup
α∈A˜2t
E˜α,t,n,pi
[
exp
(
− γ(P˜α,n,pit,T + `(N t,nT )))(− exp (γ`(N t,nT )))] .
Then Υ can be regarded as the value function of an optimization problem in the standard
Bolza-Lagrange formulation, i.e.,
Υ(a) = sup
α∈A˜2t
E˜α,a
[∫ T
t
Dα,at,u f(u,A
α,a
u , αu)du+D
α,a
t,T g(A
α,a
T )
]
,
where the state variable Aα,au = (u,N
t,n
u ,Π
α,t,n,pi
u ) is a PDMP with bounded state space [0, T ]×
(Z∩ [−N∗, N∗])×∆◦ and initial condition a = (t, n, pi), Dα,at,u = exp
(
− ∫ v
t
ρ(u,Aα,au , αu)du
)
is the discount factor and f, g, ρ are bounded functions. (These functions are bounded
thanks to the control space being bounded.) The continuity of Υ can be proved now in the
same way as in [CEFS16a, Thm.4.10] albeit in a more straightforward manner. This is due
to the boundedness of f, g, ρ, the fact that Πα,t,n,pi never visits the relative border of the
simplex ∆, and that there is no exit time of the state space other than the terminal time.
Assumptions [CEFS16a, Asm.4.7] are clearly verified in our model, and [CEFS16a, Asm.2.1]
has already been accounted for at the beginning of the proof of Proposition 1.2.1.2.15 We
remark that in our case the bounding function (see [CEFS16a, Lem.4.6]) can be taken simply
as b(t, n, pi) = exp(η(T − t)), for an η > 0 large enough to prove contractiveness.
Having proved the continuity, the same proof of [CEFS16a, Thm.5.3] (or [DF99, Thm.7.5])
shows that Υ is the unique continuous viscosity solution of its standard HJB equation. We
remark once again that our case is simpler, in that Υ is bounded and we do not have any
boundary conditions other than the terminal time condition. In particular, there is no need
for additional assumptions on the growth of Υ.
Finally, the result for Θ is obtained via the two increasing diffeomorphic transformations
Ψ = 1+Υ
γ
and Θ = U−1γ ◦Ψ.
Case N∗ < +∞ and γ = 0: The only difference with the previous case is that the
Bolza-Lagrange representation of the problem is obtained directly, since
Θ(t, n, pi) = sup
α∈A˜2t
Eα,t,n,pi
[∫ T
t
{
δ−u λ̂−u
α,t,n,pi
+ δ+u λ̂
+
u
α,t,n,pi
+ µN t,nu −
1
2
σ2ζ(N t,nu )
2
}
du− `(N t,nT )
]
,
with no need for any transformation.
Case N∗ = +∞ and γ = ζ = 0 ≡ `: The same as the latter case but working instead
with the state variable (u,Πα,t,n,pi) and the value function Φ.
1.4 Full information
In this section we consider the idealized case of a MM with full information. We assume the
MM has inside information in such a way that she can observe the full filtration F, and in
15An additional detail now is that [CEFS16a, Asm.2.1] is also used in [CEFS16a, Lem.4.1], which states
that the drift coefficient in equation (1.2.1.2) is Lipschitz in the state variable, uniform in time and control.
This is routinely verified in our case, under our new assumption: −∞ < δ∗ < δ∗ <∞.
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particular she can observe Y . For example, if Y represents different levels of competition
amongst liquidity providers, this would practically mean the MM has information regarding
her competitors’ quotes. We will see that in this case the value function turns out to be a
regular, classical solution, of its HJB equation. Afterwards, we will compare the results with
those obtained in the more realistic setting of partial information.
1.4.1 Dimensionality reduction and the general system of ODEs
We consider problem (1.1.2.6) but under full information, with the set of admissible spreads:
U := {δ : [0, T ]→ (δ∗, δ∗) : δ is F-predictable and bounded from below}.
Note that in this section, and when δ∗ = +∞, we do not assume upper-boundedness of the
spreads. Let t ∈ [0, T ], s, x ∈ R and (n, i) ∈ I := (Z ∩ [−N∗, N∗]) × {1, . . . , k}. Consider
the processes St,s, Xα,t,x,s, N t,n, Pα,s,x,n as defined in Section 1.3 and Y t,i a Markov chain
with deterministic generator matrix Q, state space {1, . . . , k} and such that Y t,it− = i. We
assume the physical probabilities Pα,t,n,i are defined for every α ∈ U2 and that Assumptions
1.1.2.1, 1.1.2.2 and (1.1.2.2) (starting at time t−) are still in place. The value function in
this case is
V (t, s, x, n, i) := sup
α∈U2t
Et,n,i
[
Uγ
(
Pα,s,x,nt,T
)]
, (1.4.1.1)
By means of the Dynamic Programming Principle and Ito’s Lemma one can formally
derive the following HJB PIDE for V :
0 = vt(t, s, x, n, i) + µvs(t, s, x, n, i) +
1
2
σ2vss(t, s, x, n, i)
+
1
2
σ2ζn2(γv(t, s, x, n, i)− 1) +
k∑
j=1
qijt v(t, s, x, n, j)
+ 1{n<N∗} sup
δ−∈(δ∗,δ∗)
Λ−i (δ
−)
(
v
(
t, s, x− (s− δ−), n+ 1, i)− v(t, s, x, n, i))
+ 1{−n<N∗} sup
δ+∈(δ∗,δ∗)
Λ+i (δ
+)
(
v
(
t, s, x+ (s+ δ+), n− 1, i)− v(t, s, x, n, i)),
(1.4.1.2)
with terminal condition v(T, s, x, n, i) = Uγ(x+ sn− `(n)).
In this new context, instead of formally proving a decomposition of V as in Theorem
1.3.1.1, it is more straightforward to propose an ansatz and ultimately prove it valid with
a verification theorem. (This is the standard approach used in the Avellaneda–Stoikov
framework.) Let us consider an ansatz for the value function analogous to those used for the
one regime case:
V (t, s, x, n, i) = Uγ(x+ sn+ Θ(t, n, i)),
for some function Θ : [0, T ] × I → R, C1 in time. Substituting in (1.4.1.2) and using
Assumptions 1.1.2.1, we see that Θ must satisfy a system of ODEs indexed in (n, i) ∈ I:
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0 = θt(t, n, i) + µn− 1
2
σ2n2(ζ + γ) +
∑
j 6=i
qijt Uγ
(
θ(t, n, j)− θ(t, n, i))
+ 1{n<N∗}H−i
(
θ(t, n+ 1, i)− θ(t, n, i))+ 1{−n<N∗}H+i (θ(t, n− 1, i)− θ(t, n, i)), (1.4.1.3)
with terminal condition θ(T, n, i) = −`(n), where:
1. H±i (d) := supδ∈(δ∗,δ∗) h
±
i (δ, d), for d ∈ R.
2. h±i (δ, d) := Λ
±
i (δ)Uγ(δ + d), for d ∈ R, δ ∈ (δ∗, δ∗).
The original problem is simplified in this way, both by the dimension of the state variable
and by the complexity of the equations, provided we can show that problem (1.4.1.3) admits
a solution. With this aim in mind, let us prove first the following property of the Hamiltonian
functions H±1 , . . . , H
±
k .
Lemma 1.4.1.1. For all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, it holds:
(i) For each compact K ⊂ R, there exists [a, b] ⊆ (δ∗, δ∗) such that H±i (d) = maxδ∈[a,b] h±i (δ, d),
for all d ∈ K.
(ii) H±i is locally Lipschitz.
Proof. Fix 1 ≤ i ≤ k and let K ⊂ R be a compact set. We verify first that (i) is a
consequence of Assumptions 1.1.2.2. Let C > 0 such that |d| ≤ C for all d ∈ K. If
δ∗ = −∞, then we can take any a < min{−C, δ∗} since h±i (δ, d) < h±i (a, d) for all δ < a
and d ∈ K. On the other hand, if δ∗ = +∞, take some c > max{δ∗, 2C}. It holds that
h±i (c, d) ≥ Λ±i (c)Uγ(C) =: ε > 0 and we can choose b > c such that h±i (δ, d) ≤ h±i (δ, C) < ε
for all δ ≥ b and d ∈ K. Replacing supremum by maximum is now immediate due to the
continuity of h±i (·, d) on [a, b] for all d.
(ii) is routinely verified using that the family {h±i (δ, ·)}δ∈[a,b] is equi-Lipschitz on K.
We want to prove now that the Cauchy problem (1.4.1.3) admits a unique global classical
solution θ which is C1 in time. To this purpose, we will treat the cases of the finite system
(N∗ <∞) and infinite system (N∗ =∞) of equations separately.
1.4.2 Constrained inventory ODEs
For N∗ < ∞ we are dealing with a finite system of ODEs. We know that under certain
regularity conditions the Cauchy problem (1.4.1.3) is guaranteed to have a classical solution
on some neighbourhood (τ, T ] ⊂ [0, T ] of T . Nonetheless, it is not always the case that such
a local solution can be extended to a global one on [0, T ]. Following [Gue´17,GL15], we start
by proving a comparison principle for (1.4.1.3) that will allow us, in particular, to show the
existence of a global solution. The argument used is standard for comparison principles of
HJB-type equations.
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Proposition 1.4.2.1 (Comparison Principle). Let I ⊆ [0, T ] be an interval containing T
and let θ, θ : I × I → R be classical (C1 with respect to time) super- and sub-solutions resp.
of (1.4.1.3). That is,
0 ≤ −θt(t, n, i)− µn+ 1
2
σ2n2(ζ + γ)−
∑
j 6=i
qijt Uγ
(
θ(t, n, j)− θ(t, n, i))
− 1{n<N∗}H−i
(
θ(t, n+ 1, i)− θ(t, n, i))− 1{−n<N∗}H+i (θ(t, n− 1, i)− θ(t, n, i)), (1.4.2.1)
0 ≥ −θt(t, n, i)− µn+
1
2
σ2n2(ζ + γ)−
∑
j 6=i
qijt Uγ
(
θ(t, n, j)− θ(t, n, i))
− 1{n<N∗}H−i
(
θ(t, n+ 1, i)− θ(t, n, i))− 1{−n<N∗}H+i (θ(t, n− 1, i)− θ(t, n, i)) (1.4.2.2)
and
θ(T, ·, ·) ≤ −` ≤ θ(T, ·, ·). (1.4.2.3)
Then
θ ≤ θ.
Proof. Suppose first I = [τ, T ] for some 0 ≤ τ < T and let ε > 0. Since N∗ < ∞, there
exists (tε, nε, iε) ∈ [τ, T ]× I such that
θ(tε, nε, iε)− θ(tε, nε, iε) + ε(T − tε) = min
(t,n,i)∈[τ,T ]×I
θ(t, n, i)− θ(t, n, i) + ε(T − t). (1.4.2.4)
If tε < T , then we must have
θt(tε, nε, iε)− θt(tε, nε, iε) ≥ ε.
Let us see that the left-hand side is non-positive. By (1.4.2.1) and (1.4.2.2),
θt(tε, nε, iε)− θt(tε, nε, iε)
≤
∑
j 6=iε
qiεjt
(
Uγ
(
θ(tε, nε, j)− θ(tε, nε, iε)
)− Uγ(θ(tε, nε, j)− θ(tε, nε, iε)))
+ 1{n<N∗}
(
H−i
(
θ(tε, nε + 1, iε)− θ(tε, nε, iε)
)−H−i (θ(tε, nε + 1, iε)− θ(tε, nε, iε)))
+ 1{−n<N∗}
(
H+i
(
θ(tε, nε − 1, iε)− θ(tε, nε, iε)
)−H+i (θ(tε, nε − 1, iε)− θ(tε, nε, iε)).
H±i increasing (resp. Uγ increasing) and (1.4.2.4) imply that the last two terms (resp. the
first one) are non-positive. We must have then that tε = T , and due to (1.4.2.4) and (1.4.2.3)
for all (t, n, i) ∈ [0, T ]× I:
θ(t, n, i)− θ(t, n, i) + ε(T − t) ≥ θ(T, nε, iε)− θ(T, nε, iε) + ε(T − T ) ≥ 0
θ(t, n, i) ≥ θ(t, n, i)− ε(T − t).
Since ε > 0 was arbitrary, we obtain the desired result.
The case I = (τ, T ] is now a consequence of comparing θ and θ on intervals of the form
[tn, T ] ⊆ (τ, T ] with tn ↘ τ .
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We can now prove the existence and uniqueness of a classical global solution of the Cauchy
problem (1.4.1.3).
Theorem 1.4.2.2. There exists a unique Θ : [0, T ]×I → R, C1 in time, which (classically)
solves the Cauchy problem (1.4.1.3).
Proof. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ k, Lemma 1.4.1.1 tells us that H±i : R→ R is locally Lipschitz. We
also assumed Q : [0, T ] → Rk×k continuous (Assumptions 1.1.2.1). Hence, by the Cauchy-
Lipschitz Theorem, the terminal condition system of ODEs (1.4.1.3) admits a unique C1
local solution (Θ(·, n, i))(n,i)∈I , defined on some maximal interval I ⊂ [0, T ] containing T .
Suppose that I ( [0, T ]. Then I = (τ, T ] for some 0 ≤ τ < T and ‖Θ(t)‖ → ∞ as t↘ τ .
We claim that Θ is actually bounded, resulting in a contradiction. Indeed, take
K = max
(i,n)∈I
{∣∣∣µn− 1
2
σ2n2(ζ + γ) + 1{n<N∗}H−i (0) + 1{−n<N∗}H
+
i (0)
∣∣∣}
and
K = `(N∗),
and define θ : I × I → R by θ(t, n, i) = K(T − t) and θ := −θ −K. Then θ (resp. θ) is a
super- (resp. sub-) solution of the Cauchy problem (1.4.1.3). By the Comparison Principle
(1.4.2.1),
−KT −K ≤ θ ≤ Θ ≤ θ ≤ KT,
proving that Θ is bounded.
1.4.3 Unconstrained inventory ODEs
We consider now N∗ = +∞, for which (1.4.1.3) becomes an infinite system of ODEs. Recall
that in this case we assumed γ = ζ = 0 ≡ `, i.e., the MM is fully risk-neutral and has
negligible costs. This allows us to further reduce the dimensionality of the state variable by
the additional ansatz
Θ(t, n, i) = µn(T − t) + Φi(t), (1.4.3.1)
for some Φ = (Φi)
k
i=1 ∈ C1([0, T ],Rk). Substituting in (1.4.1.3), we get that Φ must solve
the finite linear system of ODEs{
φ′(t) = −Q(t)φ(t) + b(t)
φ(T ) = 0,
(1.4.3.2)
with bi(t) = −H−i (µ(T − t)) − H+i (−µ(T − t)), i = 1, . . . , k. By continuity of Q and
b (see Lemma 1.4.1.1), the previous system is known to have a unique global solution
Φ ∈ C1([0, T ],Rk) which can be computed by the variation of parameters method. Straight-
forward verification now gives the following:
Proposition 1.4.3.1. Let Φ ∈ C1([0, T ],Rk) be the unique solution of (1.4.3.2). Then
Θ : [0, T ] × I → R such that Θ(t, n, i) = µn(T − t) + Φi(t), is the unique, C1 in time,
(classical) solution of the Cauchy problem (1.4.1.3) with N∗ = +∞ and γ = ζ = 0 ≡ `.
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1.4.4 General Verification Theorem
We give now the complete solution for the general model under full information. For the
next theorem we note that given the function Θ defined in Theorem 1.4.2.2 for N∗ < +∞
(resp. Proposition 1.4.3.1 for N∗ = +∞ and γ = ζ = 0 ≡ `) the difference or ‘jump’ terms
of equation (1.4.1.3) are bounded by continuity. That is, Θ(t, n∓1, i)−Θ(t, n, i) is bounded
on [0, T ]×I for N∗ < +∞ (resp. Θ(t, n∓1, i)−Θ(t, n, i) = ∓µ(T − t) is bounded on [0, T ]).
Theorem 1.4.4.1 (Verification Theorem). Let Θ be as in Theorem 1.4.2.2 for N∗ < +∞
and as in Proposition 1.4.3.1 for N∗ = +∞ and γ = ζ = 0 ≡ `. Then the value function in
(1.4.1.1) is
V (t, s, x, n, i) = Uγ(x+ sn+ Θ(t, n, i)).
Furthermore, given C > 0 such that |Θ(t, n∓1, i)−Θ(t, n, i)| ≤ C for all (t, n, i) ∈ [0, T ]×I
with −N∗ ≤ n ∓ 1 ≤ N∗, there exist Borel measurable functions δ±1 , . . . , δ±k : [−C,C] →
(δ∗, δ∗) such that δ±i (d) ∈ arg maxδ∈(δ∗,δ∗) h±i (δ, d) for all d ∈ [−C,C], 1 ≤ i ≤ k; and for any
such functions, the strategy (δ+u , δ
−
u ), with
δ±u := δ±Y t,i
u−
(
Θ(u,N t,nu− ∓ 1, Y t,iu−)−Θ(u,N t,nu− , Y t,iu−)
)
,
is optimal.
Notation. Note that we make a slight abuse of notation, writing δ±i for the Borel functions
in the theorem and (δ±u ) for the spread processes.
Proof. Let 1 ≤ i ≤ k. We check first that we can choose a maximizer of h±i (·, d) in a
measurable way with respect to d. Lemma 1.4.1.1 tells us that there exists [ai, bi] ⊆ (δ∗, δ∗)
such that h±i (δ, d) attains its maximum in [ai, bi] for all d ∈ [−C,C]. Due to Assumptions
1.1.2.2 ((ii)), h±i is continuous and, in particular, a Carathe´odory function [AB06, Def.4.50].
Thus, the Measurable Maximum Theorem [AB06, Thm.18.19] guarantees the existence of
a Borel selector of the arg max, δ±i : [−C,C] → [ai, bi] ⊆ (δ∗, δ∗). (Note that the weak
measurability assumption is trivially verified in this case.)
From here onwards, let δ±1 , . . . , δ
±
k : [−C,C]→ (δ∗, δ∗) be some Borel selectors as above.
By Lemma 1.4.1.1 again, these functions must be bounded from below, and the spread
processes (δ±u ) defined as in the theorem are clearly admissible.
We define now V˜ (t, s, x, n, i) := Uγ(x+ns+ Θ(t, n, i)) and we want to show that V˜ = V .
Let us fix the initial time and values, t ∈ [0, T ], s, x ∈ R and (n, i) ∈ I, and consider an
arbitrary strategy α = (δ−u , δ
+
u ) ∈ U2t . For shortness, we omit these initial conditions and
strategy from the notation of the processes and the expectation. We denote by S := {j − l :
1 ≤ l, j ≤ k, l 6= j}, the set of jump heights of Y , and
Rt,v := −1
2
σ2ζ
∫ v
t
N2udu, Zt,v := exp
(− γRt,v).
By the identity Uγ(a + b) = Uγ(a)e
−γb + Uγ(b), we can rewrite the utility of the MM’s
penalized P&L as
Uγ
(
Pt,T
)
= Uγ
(
XT + STNT − `(NT )
)
Zt,T + Uγ
(
Rt,T
)
= V˜
(
T, ST , XT , NT , YT
)
Zt,T + Uγ
(
Rt,T
)
.
(1.4.4.1)
CHAPTER 1. OPTIMAL MARKET MAKING WITH PARTIAL INFORMATION 31
Using integration by parts and Ito’s Lemma (recalling (1.1.2.2)), we re-express the last two
terms as
Uγ
(
Rt,T
)
= −1
2
σ2ζ
∫ T
t
Zt,uN
2
udu
and
V˜
(
T, ST , XT , NT , YT
)
Zt,T
= V˜ (t, s, x, n, i) +
∫ T
t
V˜ (u, Su, Xu, Nu, Yu)dZt,u +
∫ T
t
Zt,udV˜ (u, Su, Xu, Nu, Yu)
= V˜ (t, s, x, n, i) +
1
2
σ2ζγ
∫ T
t
V (u, Su, Xu, Nu, Yu)Zt,uN
2
udu+
∫ T
t
Zt,uV˜t(u, Su, Xu− , Nu− , Yu−)du
+ µ
∫ T
t
Zt,uV˜s(u, Su, Xu− , Nu− , Yu−)du+ σ
∫ T
t
Zt,uV˜s(u, Su, Xu− , Nu− , Yu−)dWu
+
1
2
σ2
∫ T
t
Zt,uV˜ss(u, Su, Xu− , Nu− , Yu−)du
+
∫ T
t
Zt,u
(
V˜ (u, Su, Xu− − (Su − δ−u ), Nu− + 1, Yu−)− V˜ (u, Su, Xu− , Nu− , Yu−)
)
dN−u
+
∫ T
t
Zt,u
(
V˜ (u, Su, Xu− + Su + δ
+
u , Nu− − 1, Yu−)− V˜ (u, Su, Xu− , Nu− , Yu−)
)
dN+u
+
∫ T
t
Zt,u
∫
S
(
V˜ (u, Su, Xu− , Nu− , Yu− + h)− V˜ (u, Su, Xu− , Nu− , Yu−)
)
µY (dt, dh),
where µY is the jump measure of Y . Substituting in (1.4.4.1),
Uγ
(
Pt,T
)
= V˜ (t, s, x, n, i) + σ
∫ T
t
Zt,uV˜s(u, Su, Xu− , Nu− , Yu−)dWu
+
∫ T
t
Zt,u
{
V˜t(u, Su, Xu− , Nu− , Yu−)du+ µV˜s(u, Su, Xu− , Nu− , Yu−)du
+
1
2
σ2V˜ss(u, Su, Xu− , Nu− , Yu−)du+
1
2
σ2ζN2u
(
γV (u, Su, Xu, Nu, Yu)− 1
)
du
+
∫
S
(
V˜ (u, Su, Xu− , Nu− , Yu− + h)− V˜ (u, Su, Xu− , Nu− , Yu−)
)
µY (dt, dh)
+
(
V˜ (u, Su, Xu− − (Su − δ−u ), Nu− + 1, Yu−)− V˜ (u, Su, Xu− , Nu− , Yu−)
)
dN−u
+
(
V˜ (u, Su, Xu− + Su + δ
+
u , Nu− − 1, Yu−)− V˜ (u, Su, Xu− , Nu− , Yu−)
)
dN+u
}
.
(1.4.4.2)
Next, we want to verify that the process
( ∫ v
t
Zt,uV˜s(u, Su, Xu− , Nu− , Yu−)dWu
)
t≤v≤T
is a
zero mean martingale. Since Zt,u is bounded (either N
∗ <∞ or γ = 0) it suffices to check∫ T
t
E
[
V˜s(u, Su, Xu, Nu, Yu)
2
]
du < +∞. (1.4.4.3)
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If γ = 0,
V˜s(u, Su, Xu, Nu, Yu)
2 = Nu
2
and (1.4.4.3) is a consequence of (1.1.2.5).
If γ 6= 0 (hence N∗ < ∞), let C be a lower bound for (δ−u ) and (δ+u ). Integration by parts
and Ho¨lder inequality yield
E
[
V˜s(u, Su, Xu, Nu, Yu)
2
]
= γ2E
[
exp
(− 2γ(Xu + SuNu + θ(u,Nu, Yu)))N2u]
= γ2 exp(−2γ(x+ sn))
× E
[
exp
(
− 2γ
∫ u
t
δ−wdN
−
w + δ
+
wdN
+
w + µNwdw + σNwdWw + θ(w,Nw, Yw)
)
N2u
]
≤ γ2N∗2 exp
(
2γ
(
x+ sn+ µN∗(T − t) + ‖θ‖L∞([t,T ]×I) + 2σ2γN∗2(T − t)
))
× E
[
exp
(
− 4γC(N−T +N+T −N−t− −N+t−))] 12E
[
exp
(
− 4γσ
∫ T
t
NudWu − 8γ2σ2
∫ T
t
N2udu
)] 12
and (1.4.4.3) is again consequence of (1.1.2.5) and Novikov’s condition (trivially satisfied).
In the same way, recalling that (Zt,u) is bounded, (δ
±
u ) is bounded from below and that Q is
bounded by continuity, one can check that∫ T
t
E
[
Zt,u
∣∣V˜ (u, Su, Xu− ± (Su ± δ±u ), Nu− ∓ 1, Yu−)− V˜ (u, Su, Xu− , Nu− , Yu−)∣∣λ±u ]du < +∞
and ∫ T
t
E
[
Zt,u
∑
j 6=Yu−
q
Yu− ,j
t
∣∣V˜ (u, Su, Xu− , Nu− , j)− V˜ (u, Su, Xu− , Nu− , Yu−)∣∣]du < +∞.
Taking expectation in (1.4.4.2), the Brownian term vanishes and integration with respect
to dN−, dN+ and dµY is replaced by integration with respect to their dual predictable
projections (see, e.g., [Bre´81, p.27 T8 and p.235 C4]). That is,
E
[
Uγ
(
Pt,T
)]
= V˜ (t, s, x, n, i) +
∫ T
t
E
[
Zt,u
{
V˜t(u, Su, Xu− , Nu− , Yu−)
+ µV˜s(u, Su, Xu− , Nu− , Yu−) +
1
2
σ2V˜ss(u, Su, Xu− , Nu− , Yu−)
+
1
2
σ2ζN2u
(
γV˜ (u, Su, Xu, Nu, Yu)− 1
)
+
k∑
j=1
q
Yu−j
t V˜ (u, Su, Xu− , Nu− , j)
+ 1−uΛ
−
Yu−
(δ−u )
(
V˜ (u, Su, Xu− − (Su − δ−u ), Nu− + 1, Yu−)− V˜ (u, Su, Xu− , Nu− , Yu−)
)
+ 1+uΛ
+
Yu−
(δ+u )
(
V˜ (u, Su, Xu− + Su + δ
+
u , Nu− − 1, Yu−)− V˜ (u, Su, Xu− , Nu− , Yu−)
)}]
du
≤ V˜ (t, s, x, n, i),
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as V˜ solves (1.4.1.2), with the equality attained for (δ−u ) = (δ−u ) and (δ
+
u ) = (δ
+
u ) by defini-
tion. We conclude that V = V˜ and that the pair (δ−u ), (δ+u ) is optimal.
Remark. For N∗ <∞, since the MM will not buy (resp. sell) whenever (Nu−) hits N∗ (resp.
−N∗), the value of (δ−u ) (resp. (δ+u )) at these stopping times is essentially irrelevant. From a
strict mathematical perspective, the only constraint is that whichever the value we choose,
the process needs to remain admissible.
1.4.5 Computing the optimal spreads: some particular cases
We have shown in Theorem 1.4.4.1 that the optimal spreads for the full information problem
(1.4.1.1) can be computed in feedback form in terms of (t, n, i) = (t, Nt− , Yt−) at each time
t ∈ [0, T ]. Practically, this means finding Θ (typically, numerically) that solves the terminal
condition system of ODEs (1.4.1.3), and finding the spreads by maximization:
δ±(t, n, i) ∈ arg max
δ∈(δ∗,δ∗)
Λ±i (δ)Uγ
(
δ + Θ(t, n∓ 1, i)−Θ(t, n, i)) . (1.4.5.1)
(See the proof of Lemma 1.4.1.1 to see how to reduce the maximization to a compact domain
in the cases of δ∗ = −∞ or δ∗ = +∞.) The functions in (1.4.5.1) may admit multiple
maximizers in general. In [BL14, Gue´17, GL15] stronger assumptions are imposed on the
orders intensities which guarantee, in particular, the uniqueness of the maximizers.
We now extend these assumptions to our context and give the corresponding characteri-
zation of the spreads. Henceforth, Assumption 1.1.2.2 ((ii)) is replaced by the following:
Assumptions 1.4.5.1. Λ±i ∈ C2
(
(δ∗, δ∗)
)
, Λ±i
′
< 0, Λ±i Λ
±
i
′′
< c(Λ±i
′
)2 for some 0 < c < 2
and lim
δ→+∞
Λ±i (δ) = 0 if δ
∗ = +∞, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k.16
Remark. The intensity functions of Examples 1.1.2.4 1, 2 and 3 all verify these stronger
assumptions, while Example 4 only does so for d±i > 1. As a matter of fact, by solving
the differential inequality in Assumptions 1.4.5.1, one sees that any Λ±i within this new
framework has a strict upper bound of the form of Example 4. In particular, for δ∗ = +∞,
limδ→+∞ δΛ±i (δ) = 0 is necessarily satisfied.
Under Assumptions 1.4.5.1, the maximization of (1.4.5.1) (for fixed (t, n, i)) can be re-
placed essentially by solving a contractive fixed point equation and flooring and capping the
results at δ∗ and δ∗ respectively. To make this precise, even when the intensity functions are
not defined beyond (δ∗, δ∗), let us set
d±i∗ :=
−U
−1
γ
(
Λ±i (δ∗)
Λ±i
′
(δ∗)
)
− δ∗ if δ∗ > −∞
+∞ if δ∗ = −∞,
d±i
∗
:=
−U
−1
γ
(
Λ±i (δ
∗)
Λ±i
′
(δ∗)
)
− δ∗ if δ∗ < +∞
−∞ if δ∗ = +∞.
The following result shows how, up to constraints, the optimal spreads are given by a first
term that maximizes the ‘expected’ utility of the MM’s instantaneous margin (see Remark
16Lateral derivatives are considered on the domain border. The strict inequality c < 2 is needed when
γ = 0 and spreads are unconstrained.
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1.1.2.3), plus an additional risk adjustment taking into account the inventory held and the
prospect of the market shifting. Note how the first term depends on Λ±i
′
/Λ±i , the percentage
sensitivity of the liquidity to spread changes.
Proposition 1.4.5.2. Under Assumptions 1.4.5.1, the functions δ±1 , . . . , δ
±
k of Theorem
1.4.4.1 are uniquely characterized by
δ±i (d) = δ
∗ if d < d±i
∗
, δ±i (d) = δ∗ if d > d
±
i∗ (1.4.5.2)
and if d ∈ (d±i ∗, d±i∗), then δ±i (d) is the unique solution of the fixed point equation
δ±i (d) = −U−1γ
(
Λ±i (δ
±
i (d))
Λ±i
′
(δ±i (d))
)
− d. (1.4.5.3)
Additionally, the Hamiltonians of equation (1.4.1.3) can be expressed as
H±i (d) =

h±i (δ
∗, d) if d ≤ d±i ∗
− Λ±i
2
(δ̂±(d))
Λ±i
′
(δ̂±(d))−γΛ±i (δ̂±(d))
if d±i
∗
< d < d±i∗
h±i (δ∗, d) if d ≥ d±i∗.
Proof. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ k, define
f±i (δ, d) = δ + U
−1
γ
(
Λ±i (δ)
Λ±i
′
(δ)
)
+ d, with δ ∈ (δ∗, δ∗), d ∈ R.
By Assumptions 1.4.5.1 and straightforward computations (see computations, e.g., in [Gue´17,
Lemma 3.1]), one verifies that sgn
(∂h±i
∂δ
)
= − sgn(f±i ) and f±i is strictly increasing on each
variable.17 It follows that for any d < d±i
∗
and δ < δ∗ (resp. d > d±i∗ and δ > δ∗),
f±i (δ, d) < f
±
i (δ
∗, d±i
∗
) = 0 (resp. f±i (δ, d) > f
±
i (δ∗, d
±
i∗) = 0), which proves (1.4.5.2).
In the same way, if d ∈ (d±i ∗, d±i∗) and −∞ < δ∗ < δ∗ < +∞, then f±i (δ∗, d) < 0
and f±i (δ
∗, d) > 0. Hence, the continuity of f±i (·, d) implies (1.4.5.3) (the uniqueness of the
solution being due to the strict monotonicity of f±i (·, d)). The cases of unconstrained spreads
are proved as in [Gue´17].
Lastly, the cases d = d±i
∗
> −∞ and d = d±i∗ < +∞ follow in the same manner; and the
new expressions for the Hamiltonians are immediate, putting H±i (d) = h
±
i
(
δ±i (d), d
)
.
As done in [Gue´17, Lemma 3.1], (1.4.5.3) can be replaced by the explicit formula
δ±i (d) = (Λ
±
i )
−1
(
γH±i (d)−H±i ′(d)
)
,
but the computation of (Λ±i )
−1, H±i and H
±
i
′
still has to be carried out numerically, in gen-
eral. We state now a few simplifications that arise in some particular cases, i.e., when the
intensities are exponential or when N∗ = ∞, γ = ζ = 0 ≡ `. These are all derived by
straightforward substitution. We refer to [Gue´17, Sect.4] for some asymptotic approxima-
tions when t << T in the one regime case, with unconstrained spreads and N∗ <∞.
17sgn denotes the sign function, with sgn(0) := 0.
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Corollary 1.4.5.3. If N∗ = +∞ and γ = ζ = 0 ≡ `, then
δ±(t, i) = δ∗ if ∓ µ(T − t) < d±i ∗, δ±i (d) = δ∗ if ∓ µ(T − t) > d±i∗, (1.4.5.4)
and if ∓µ(T − t) ∈ (d±i ∗, d±i∗), then δ±(t, i) is the unique solution of the fixed point equation
δ±(t, i) = − Λ
±
i (δ
±(t, i))
Λ±i
′
(δ±(t, i))
± µ(T − t). (1.4.5.5)
If additionally Λ±i (δ) = a
±
i e
−b±i δ, with a±i , b
±
i > 0 for each 1 ≤ i ≤ k, then
δ±(t, i) = δ∗ ∨
(
1
b±i
± µ(T − t)
)
∧ δ∗.
In other words, if N∗ = ∞ and γ = ζ = 0 ≡ `, then solving (1.4.1.3) is no longer
necessary and one only needs to solve the fixed point equations (1.4.5.5). Further, the MM’s
spreads do not depend on n. This is to be expected, since in this case she is neutral to
all types of inventory risks and the terminal execution cost is neglected. However, she does
need to re-adjust for changes in the regime as these impact on her probability of getting
orders. If additionally, the orders intensities are exponential, then the spreads are computed
straightforwardly avoiding the need of any numerical scheme. Note also how this simple
model makes evident a second component of the optimal spreads through equation (1.4.5.5):
a drift adjustment by which the MM takes into account the overall tendency of the asset’s
price.
Now we look at the results obtained for exponential intensities in general, and in par-
ticular for N∗ < +∞. Equation (1.4.5.3) becomes an explicit formula in this case, as the
percentage liquidity sensitivities, Λ±i
′
/Λ±i , are constant.
Corollary 1.4.5.4. If Λ±i (δ) = a
±
i e
−b±i δ, with a±i , b
±
i > 0 for each 1 ≤ i ≤ k, then
δ±(t, n, i) = δ∗ ∨
(
−U−1γ
(−1/b±i )− (Θ(t, n∓ 1, i)−Θ(t, n, i))) ∧ δ∗.
This means that for exponential intensities in general, it is no longer necessary to solve any
fixed point equations but only the system of ODEs (1.4.1.3). The latter still needs to be
solved numerically in general. (Alternatively, see [Gue´17] for some asymptotic approxima-
tions.)
Remark. Apart from the case N∗ = +∞, γ = ζ = 0 ≡ `, a noteworthy scenario in which
(1.4.1.3) can be further simplified to a linear system of ODEs (with constant coefficients)
is when k = 1, N∗ < +∞, δ∗ = −∞, δ∗ = +∞ and Λ±(δ) = ae−bδ, with a, b > 0. The
reduction is achieved via the transformation Θ(t, n) = 1
b
log Ψ(t, n). See [GLFT13] for more
details.
1.5 Numerical analysis
In this section we present our numerical results, focusing on the difference in optimal be-
haviours between the partial and full information frameworks, and the intuition behind the
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filter. To exemplify our findings in a concrete manner, while keeping the presentation as
simple as possible, we will assume throughout this section that:
• The MM has risk aversion parameter γ = 0.
• There are only two possible states: state 1 represents a ‘bad’ regime with low liquidity
taken by clients, and state 2 a ‘good’ regime with high liquidity.
• The transition rate matrix Q is constant.
• The intensities are symmetric, proportional and exponential, i.e., Λ±1 (δ) = Λ1(δ) =
ae−bδ and Λ±2 (δ) = Λ2(δ) = mΛ1(δ), with a, b > 0, m > 1.
The latter assumption allows us to perform the optimizations in equation (1.3.1.5) analyt-
ically. Practically, proportional intensities mean that while there is more active trading on
the good regime, the way in which the clients react to movements in the spreads remains
unaffected. As in [CJ15], we will allow for the three type of penalties to manage inventory
risk: constraints on the maximum long and short positions, accumulated inventory penalty
and a quadratic (possibly negligible) terminal penalty (or cost) for the MM. That is,
• N∗ < +∞, ζ ≥ 0 and `(n) = cn2, for some c ≥ 0.
Let us write pi := pi1 for the conditional probability of being in the bad regime given the
observable information. Note that pi is a scalar in this section, since pi2 = 1−pi1 neglects the
need of the additional variable. The PIDE (1.3.1.5) at the point (t, n, pi) reads:
0 = θt + µn− 1
2
σ2n2ζ + 2qˆ(pi)θpi +
a
b
mˆ(pi)
(
1{n<N∗}e−bδ̂
−
+ 1{n>−N∗}e−bδ̂
+
)
, (1.5.0.1)
with terminal condition θ(T, n, pi) = −cn2 and partial information optimal spreads given by
δ̂±(t, n, pi) =
1
b
− 2w(pi)
mˆ(pi)
θpi(t, n, pi)−
(
θ(t, n∓ 1, pi/mˆ(pi))− θ(t, n, pi)), where: (1.5.0.2)
(i) qˆ(pi) = q11pi + q21(1− pi) is the observable transition rate to the bad regime.
(ii) mˆ(pi) = pi + (1 − pi)m is the observable intensity increase from the bad regime (as a
ratio).
(iii) w(pi) = (m−1)pi(1−pi) is the observable variance, of the square root, of the percentage
intensity increase from the bad regime; i.e., a measure of observable order flow volatility.
The previous equations are valid for δ∗  0  δ∗, or more precisely, for δ∗, δ∗ such that
δ∗ ≤ δ̂± ≤ δ∗ holds true over the whole domain. Otherwise, one needs to floor and cap the
optimal spreads and change the Hamiltonians accordingly, as done in Proposition 1.4.5.2.
A finite differences scheme of simple implementation to solve (1.5.0.1) consists of reversing
time and using an explicit upwind Euler scheme over a uniform grid for (t, pi) and n =
−N∗,−N∗ + 1, . . . , N∗. The terms of the form θ(t, n ∓ 1, pi/mˆ(pi)), where pi/mˆ(pi) will
typically fall outside of the grid, can be approximated by linear interpolation as in [DF14].
The limiting equations can be used for pi → 0+ and pi → 1− provided that −q11 > 0,
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which we assume henceforth. Such a scheme can be shown to be consistent, stable and
monotone under an appropriate CFL condition. In light of equation (1.3.1.5) satisfying
a comparison principle (see [CEFS16a, Thm.5.3] and why it holds for our model in the
proof of Theorem 1.3.1.3), we know the scheme converges to the unique continuous viscosity
solution [BS91], and we can recover the expected penalized P&L of the MM (Theorems 1.3.1.1
and 1.3.1.3). The optimal strategy to be followed by the MM is then given in feedback form
by
(
δ̂−(t, Nt− ,Πt−), δ̂+(t, Nt− ,Πt−)
)
.18
We will focus our attention on the optimal ask spread, with analogous observations hold-
ing for the bid spread. The parameter values in Table 1.1 were used for all the experiments
presented in this section. For those present in the classical one regime models, we have
chosen values used in previous works (in the γ = 0 case [CJ15]) to make the comparison
clearer. In particular, the value of c will be taken as either 0 or 0.01, to be further specified
in each experiment. The time horizon will always be the one displayed on the corresponding
axis. Note that we work in a symmetric market, which justifies analyzing one side only.
Parameter µ σ ζ a b N∗ m −q11 = q21 −δ∗ = δ∗
Value 0 0.1 0.1 2 25 3 5 5 10
Table 1.1: Standing parameter values for numerical tests presented.
1.5.1 Comparing full and partial information optimal strategies
Under the standing assumptions of this section, the full information equation (1.4.1.3), for
a function θ˜, becomes:
0 = θ˜t + µn− 1
2
σ2n2ζ + q˜i
(
θ˜(t, n, 1)− θ˜(t, n, 2)
)
+
a
b
m˜i
(
1{n<N∗}e−bδ˜
−
+ 1{n>−N∗}e−bδ˜
+
)
,
(1.5.1.1)
with terminal condition θ˜(T, n, i) = −cn2 and full information optimal spreads given by
δ˜±(t, n, i) =
1
b
− (θ˜(t, n∓ 1, i)− θ˜(t, n, i)), where: (1.5.1.2)
(i) q˜i = q
11
1{1}(i) + q211{2}(i) is the effective transition rate to the bad regime.
(ii) m˜i = 1{1}(i) + 1{2}(i)m is the effective intensity increase from the bad regime (as a
ratio).
The previous equations are valid for δ∗  0 δ∗, as in the partial information case.
Although similar, equation (1.5.1.1) for the bad regime i = 1 (resp. good regime i = 2)
is not the limiting equation of (1.5.0.1) for pi → 1− (resp. pi → 0+). Indeed, a MM with
full information can expect to make a larger profit. Thus, in general, θ˜ > θ even in these
18As previously mentioned, these are technically only candidates for optimal (or in general, ε-optimal)
strategies. We do not rigorously prove their optimality character here, but merely note that well known
results of discrete time dynamic programming, together with the convergence of the discrete solutions of
(1.5.0.1) to the analytical one, suggest that they can be safely used as such.
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extreme cases.19 However, the corresponding optimal strategies do (at least approximately)
agree, as Figures 1.1 and 1.2 show.
Figure 1.1: Optimal ask spread as a function of time, under full and partial information
(dashed and solid lines resp.), and for different inventory and filter values. Inventory levels
increase from top to bottom in all cases. Terminal execution cost is neglected (c = 0).
Figure 1.1 shows the optimal ask spread under partial information as a function of time,
for different inventory levels (solid lines). It also displays how it changes for different filter
values (pi = 0, 0.6 and 1 from left to right) and how it compares to the optimal ask spread
under full information (dashed lines) in the good regime (left) and bad regime (right). The
inventory levels increase from top to bottom in all cases, and the terminal execution cost is
neglected (c = 0). We have chosen to display pi = 0.6 due to the effect of the filter being
more pronounced around this value; it results in an optimal spread which is, for t  T ,
between 6% and 30% higher (depending on the inventory level) than the corresponding ones
under full information (a sizeable difference in practice). We will come back to this in Section
1.5.2. All other values show similar intermediate behaviours. Recall that when the inventory
reaches the minimum n = −N∗ = −3, the MM will not sell any more (either abstaining from
quoting or giving a ‘stub’ quote) until her inventory increases again, which is why there is
no spread plotted for this position. We see that some of the features already present in
one regime models are preserved for two regimes, both under full and partial information;
namely:
19Our numerical findings were indeed consistent with this intuitive statement.
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• For t  T the spread does not depend on time (approximately) and its asymptotic
value becomes higher as the inventory decreases to the lower constraint n = −N∗.
Indeed, for flat or short positions, any additional ask order will increase inventory
risk, moving it closer to the minimum allowed and raising the accumulated inventory
penalty. The MM manages this risk by increasing the spread, thus demanding a higher
instantaneous profit and reducing the probability of getting executed. Similarly for
long positions, the higher the exposure the lower the spread, as the MM seeks to
unwind her inventory.
• In the case of negligible terminal cost, the spread converges to a terminal value inde-
pendent of the inventory. This is the optimal spread of a fully risk-neutral MM with
negligible costs (Corollary 1.4.5.3), who only maximizes ‘expected instantaneous mar-
gin’. (This value is given by δ̂+(T, ·, ·) = 1/b, the reciprocal percentage sensitivity of
the liquidity to spread changes; cf. Proposition 1.4.5.2). The reason being that as the
time horizon approaches, it becomes less and less likely for the MM to get executed
again. The accumulated penalty cannot change too much at this point, and the risk
of reaching the inventory constraints diminishes. The MM therefore takes a bit more
risk and makes a last attempt at increasing her expected P&L, either by increasing
execution probability (for null or short positions) or increasing her instantaneous profit
if executed (for long positions).
Nevertheless, the following differences can be observed:
• Under full information (and for symmetric markets), the spreads are always symmetric
in the inventory with respect the risk-neutral level, i.e., 1/b−δ˜+(·, n, ·) = δ˜+(·, 1−n, ·)−
1/b, for 0 < n ≤ N∗. However, under partial information this symmetry is broken, as
the MM increases her spreads. This holds in fact for any 0 < pi < 1 and it is suggested
by the comparison of equations (1.5.0.2) and (1.5.1.2), since θpi < 0 (an increasing
probability of being in the bad regime lowers the expected P&L; see argument of [BL09,
Lemma 3.3]). As a result, the full information spreads are downward biased when the
exact regime is unknown. Loosely speaking, this bias is approximately proportional to
the product of θpi (sensitivity of the expected P&L to observable regime changes) and
w(pi) (observable order flow volatility), and inversely proportional to the observable
intensity increase mˆ(pi). Intuitively, a partially informed MM faces not only the risk
of the market regime shifting but also uncertainty on the current state, and must
increase her spreads accordingly. This is done by considering the cost of any observable
changes on the P&L and the fluctuations in the order flow, and discounting by liquidity
increases.
• The good and bad regimes differ in the rate of order flow at the reference price (i.e.,
the amplitude parameters a and am of the orders intensities). Consequently, one
could erroneously think that the partial information strategy should essentially be a
one regime strategy for some intermediate parameter, such as amˆ(pi). However, in
the full information framework, an increase in the liquidity taken by clients results
in the asymptotic spreads (i.e., for t  T ) moving closer to the risk-neutral level
(see [CJ15, GLFT13]). On the other hand, this is not true any more in the partial
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information case, due to the regime risk adjustment previously mentioned that shifts
the spreads.
• Lastly, we remark that there is a distinguished change in behaviour close to expiry,
with the spreads overshooting above the risk-neutral level for some inventories, before
approaching it again. Intuitively, the overshooting is due to the added regime risk
adjustment, and the convergence is due to the vanishing of additional inventory risks.
(Recall that the MM’s main concern becomes her terminal hedging cost, should there
be one, and this does not depend on the market regime.) A somewhat similar effect
can be found under full information in asymmetric markets [CJ15].
Figure 1.2 serves the same comparison as Figure 1.1, but including in this case a terminal
execution cost. The observations remain mostly the same, except for a change in the terminal
behaviour of the spreads, just as in the classical one regime case. Here, the spreads diverge
from the risk-neutral no-costs value instead of approaching it, as the MM makes a last instant
attempt to cover her hedging cost.
Figure 1.2: Optimal ask spread as a function of time, under full and partial information
(dashed and solid lines resp.), and for different inventory and filter values. Inventory levels
increase from top to bottom in all cases. Terminal execution cost: `(n) = −cn2, with
c = 0.01.
Figure 1.3 shows the partial information optimal ask spread as a function of time and
filter, for three different inventory positions: extreme short (left), flat (center) and extreme
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long (right), and no terminal penalty. We can see that the spread is concave on the filter,
and the maximum concavity is reached for a null inventory and pi ≈ 0.6, gradually decreasing
as the position becomes short or long. We had observed already in equation (1.5.0.2) that
the partially informed MM increases her spreads to manage higher regime risk, and that
this correction is approximately proportional to the expected P&L sensitivity, θpi, times the
observed order flow volatility w(pi) = (m − 1)pi(1 − pi). Heuristically, it seems reasonable
that the change in spread should resemble the concavity of w(pi) for a risk averse MM, and
that the cost of regime uncertainty is the highest for a flat position (since deviations from
it increase in turn price exposure). The question of why the maximum variation is reached
around pi ≈ 0.6 is once again differed to Section 1.5.2.
Figure 1.3: Optimal partial information ask spread as a function of time and filter (observable
probability of bad regime), for different inventory levels. Terminal execution cost is neglected
(c = 0).
1.5.2 Sample paths and a closer look at the filter
There are different ways to simulate point processes with stochastic intensity. A classical
approach of simple implementation is the so-called thinning method [Oga81]. This method
is particularly well suited to our framework, as it can be combined with the filtering theory
developed in Section 1.2 by making use of the observable intensity of N (see Theorem 1.3.1.1
and [GKM11, Alg.3.2]). The interested reader is referred to [LTT18] for optimizations in
terms of the thinning bound.
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Figure 1.4 shows four sample paths resulting from an optimal behaviour of the MM with
incomplete information. They were obtained by jointly simulating the inventory N (middle)
starting from n0 = 0, the filter Π = Π
α,1 (bottom) starting from pi0 = 0.5, and the optimal
strategy α =
(
δ̂−(t, Nt− ,Πt−), δ̂+(t, Nt− ,Πt−)
)
(top), for c = 0.
Figure 1.4: Sample paths of optimal partial information bid/ask spreads (first), inventory
(second) and filter (third), with c = 0, n0 = 0 and pi0 = 0.5.
We want to analyze the behaviour of Π. Let us recall that Πt represents the probability
of being in the bad regime (a slow market with low liquidity) given the information observed
by the MM at time t. The MM makes her assessment based on the orders (both buy and sell)
that she received so far, which is the same as looking at the evolution of her inventory. If
we take a close look at what happens between any two consecutive orders, we see that there
is a pattern that repeats itself. As time passes without the MM receiving any order, she
deems more likely that the market is in the bad regime, and so Πt increases. If enough time
goes by in this way, then Πt gets asymptotically closer to some preponderant ‘equilibrium’
value which is around 0.6. (Recall that this is the same value we have encountered before as
having the greatest effect on the spreads.) But as soon as an order arrives, the MM revisits
her probabilities, as being in the good regime of high liquidity seems a lot more likely. This
is why we see that Πt jumps downwards with each trade (i.e., at the jump times of the
inventory).
So what makes pi ≈ 0.6 so special? If we look at the SDE (1.2.1.2) governing the filter
dynamics, it now reads:
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dΠt =
(
qˆ(Πt) + w(Πt)a
(
1
−
t e
−bδ̂−t + 1+t e
−bδ̂+t
))
dt+ Πt−
(
1
mˆ
(
Πt−
) − 1)(dN−t + dN+t ).
(1.5.2.1)
In between jumps, each path of Πt evolves according to an ODE. If enough time passes by
without another order arriving, we can consider the asymptotic behaviour for t → T . For
c = 0, this leads to
dΠt
dt
≈ qˆ(Πt) + w(Πt)a
e
β, with β = 1 or β = 2,
depending on the current inventory level. The right-hand side of this ODE is a concave
parabola in Πt with a negative root and another one, pi
∗, between 0 and 1. For the parameter
values in Table 1.1, it is either pi∗ ≈ 0.572 for β = 1, or pi∗ ≈ 0.636 for β = 2. Therefore,
pi∗ is an attractor (i.e., a stable equilibrium) for the filter, which explains the tendency of
Πt towards 0.6 and the central role of this value. Indeed, as the filter approaches one of its
attractors, the MM exhausts all the information she has and can make no further assessment
on the state of the market until she is hit by another order. In a sense, this is when she faces
the most uncertainty, and she increases her spreads accordingly to manage regime risk.
Chapter 2
A policy iteration algorithm for
nonzero-sum stochastic impulse games
Introduction
Stochastic differential games model the interaction between players whose objective functions
depend on the evolution of a certain continuous-time stochastic process. The subclass of
impulse games focuses on the case where the players only act at discrete (usually random)
points in time by shifting the process. In doing so, each of them incurs into costs and
possibly generates ‘gains’ (not necessarily nonnegative) for the others at the same time.
They constitute a generalization of the well-known (single-player) optimal impulse control
problems [ØS09, Chpt.7-10], which have found a wide range of applications in finance, energy
markets and insurance [Bre´81,CCTZ06,EH88,Kor99], among plenty of other fields.
From a deterministic numerical viewpoint, an impulse control problem entails the reso-
lution of a differential quasi-variational inequality (QVI) to compute the value function and,
when possible, retrieve an optimal strategy. Policy-iteration-type algorithms [AF16,CØS02,
CMS07] undoubtedly occupy an ubiquitous place in this respect, and more so in the infinite
horizon case.
The presence of a second player makes matters much more challenging, as one needs
to find two optimal (or equilibrium) payoffs dependent on one another, and the optimal
strategies take the form of Nash equilibria (NEs), i.e., strategies such that no player can
benefit from unilaterally changing her own. And while impulse controls give a more realistic
setting than ‘continuous’ controls in applications as the aforementioned ones, they normally
lead to less tractable and very technical models.
It is not surprising then, that the literature in impulse games is limited and mainly
focused on the zero-sum case [Azi19b, Cos13, EAM18]: when the cost for one player equals
the gain for the other, and the same is true for the objective functions. The more general
and flexible nonzero-sum instance, which dispenses with the former constraints, has only
recently began to receive more attention. The authors of [ABC+19] consider for the first
time a general two-player game where both participants act through impulse controls,1 and
1 [CWW13,WW17] also consider nonzero-sum impulse games but assuming the intervention times of the
players are known from the outset.
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characterize certain type of equilibrium payoffs and NEs via a system of QVIs by means
of a Verification Theorem. Using this result, they provide the first example of an (almost)
fully analytically solvable game, motivated by central banks competition over the exchange
rate. The result is generalized to arbitrary N players in [BCG19], which also gives a semi-
analytical solution (i.e., depending on several parameters found numerically) to a concrete
cash management problem.2 A different, more probabilistic, approach is taken in [FK19] to
find a semi-analytical solution of a strategic pollution control problem and to prove another
Verification Theorem.
The previous examples, and the lack of others,3 give testimony of how difficult it is to
explicitly solve nonzero-sum impulse games. The analytical approaches require an educated
guess to start with and (with the exception of the henceforth referred to as the linear game
in [ABC+19]) several parameters need to be solved for in general from highly-nonlinear
systems of equations coupled with order conditions. All of this can be very difficult, if not
prohibitive, when the structure of the game is not simple enough. Further, all of them (as
well as the majority of the concrete examples in the impulse control literature) assume linear
costs. In general, for nonlinear costs, the state to which each player wants to shift the process
when intervening is not unique, but depends on the starting point. This effectively means
that infinite parameters may need to be solved for, drastically discouraging this methodology.
While the need for numerical schemes able to handle nonzero-sum impulse games is obvi-
ous, unlike in the single-player case, this is an utterly underdeveloped line of research. Focus-
ing on the purely deterministic approach, solving the system of QVIs derived in [ABC+19]
involves handling coupled free boundary problems, further complicated by the presence of
nonlinear, nonlocal and noncontractive operators. Additionally, solutions will typically be
irregular even in the simplest cases such as the linear game. Moreover, the absence of a
viscosity solutions framework such as that of impulse control [Sey09] means that it is not
possible to know whether the system of QVIs should have a solution or not (not to mention
some form of uniqueness) unless one can explicitly solve it. This is further exacerbated by
the fact that even defining such system requires a priori assumptions on the solutions (the
unique impulse property). This is also the case in [FK19].
In this chapter (based on [ABM+19, Zab19]), we make the first attempt (to the best
of our knowledge) at numerically solving nonzero-sum impulse games. In a nutshell, the
iterative algorithm we put forward treats the game at each iteration as a combination of
a fixed point problem and a slowly relaxing single-player impulse control problem. This
allows us to take advantage of the machinery for the latter. Because no convergence analysis
is provided in this chapter, the proposed algorithm is admittedly heuristic. Instead, we
report on a range of numerical experiments which show convergence on fixed grids as well
as convergence of the error with respect to the discretization. In fact, errors are quite
satisfactory and, in the examples we have tackled, the relative errors easily drop well below
0.1%. The algorithm can thus be used to assist further development of the field, as well
as to gain insight into applications modelled by nonzero-sum impulse games. In Chapter 3,
which focuses on symmetric games, a modified algorithm will be presented together with a
2 [BCG19] also studies the mean field limit game.
3 [ABC+19] also gives semi-analytical solutions to modifications of the linear game when changing the
payoffs in a non-symmetric way. To the best of the author’s knowledge, these are the collection of examples
available at the time of writing.
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rigorous convergence analysis.
Let us outline the organization of the rest of the chapter. We start in Section 2.1 by
properly setting up nonzero-sum stochastic impulse games and recalling the main result
of [ABC+19], namely, the Verification Theorem with the corresponding system of QVIs. For
the sake of completeness, the linear game and the underlying problem of competing central
banks are also presented. Section 2.2 motivates, lists, and discusses our algorithm. Section
2.3 presents numerical evidence supporting it, in the light of which we draw some conclusions
in Section 2.4.
2.1 Analytical continuous-space problem
In this section we start by reviewing a general formulation of two-player nonzero-sum stochas-
tic differential games with impulse controls, as considered in [ABC+19], together with the
main theoretical result of the authors: a characterization of certain NEs via a deterministic
system of QVIs. The indexes of the players are denoted i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i 6= j. Since no
other type of games is considered in this thesis, we will often speak simply of ‘games’ for
brevity.
Throughout the thesis, we restrict our attention to the one-dimensional infinite-horizon
case. Some of the most technical details, concerning the well-posedness of the model, are
left out for the sake of briefness and can be found in [ABC+19, Sect.2].
2.1.1 General two-player nonzero-sum impulse games
Let (Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0,P) be a filtered probability space under the usual conditions supporting
a standard one-dimensional Wiener process W . We consider two players that observe the
evolution of a state variable X, modifying it when convenient through controls of the form
ui = {(τ ki , δki )}∞k=1 for i = 1, 2. The stopping times (τ ki ) are their intervention times and
the Fτki -measurable random variables (δki ) are their intervention impulses. Given controls
(u1, u2) and a starting point X0− = x ∈ R, we assume X = Xx;u1,u2 has dynamics
Xt = x+
∫ t
0
µ(Xs)ds+
∫ t
0
σ(Xs)dWs +
∑
k: τk1≤t
δk1 +
∑
k: τk2≤t
δk2 , (2.1.1.1)
for some given drift and volatility functions µ, σ : R → R, locally Lipschitz with linear
growth.4
Equation (2.1.1.1) states that X evolves as an Itoˆ diffusion in between the intervention
times, and that each intervention consists in shifting X by applying an impulse. It is assumed
that the players choose their controls by means of threshold-type strategies of the form ϕi =
(Ii, δi), where Ii ⊆ R is a closed set called intervention (or action) region and δi : R→ R is an
impulse function assumed to be continuous. The complement Ci = Ici is called continuation
(or waiting) region.5 That is, player i intervenes if and only if the state variable reaches
her intervention region, by applying an impulse δi(Xt−) (or equivalently, shifting Xt− to
4See [ABC+19, Def.2.2] for a precise recursive definition in terms of the strategies.
5In [ABC+19], strategies are described in terms of continuation regions instead.
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Xt− + δi(Xt−)). Further, we impose a priori constraints on the impulses: for each x ∈ R
there exists a set ∅ 6= Zi(x) ⊆ R such that δi(x) ∈ Zi(x) if x ∈ Ii.6 We also assume the
game has no end and player 1 has the priority should they both want to intervene at the
same time.
Given a starting point and a pair strategies, the (expected) payoff of player i is given by
Ji(x;ϕ1, ϕ2) := E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρisfi(Xs)ds−
∞∑
k=1
e−ρiτ
k
i ci
(
X(τki )− , δ
k
i
)
+
∞∑
k=1
e−ρiτ
k
j gi
(
X(τkj )− , δ
k
j
) ,
with X = Xx;u1,u2 = Xx;ϕ1,ϕ2 . For player i, ρi > 0 represents her (subjective) discount rate,
fi : R → R her running payoff, ci : R2 → (0,+∞) her cost of intervention and gi : R2 → R
her gain due to her opponent’s intervention (not necessarily non-negative). The functions
fi, ci, gi are assumed to be continuous.
Throughout this thesis, only admissible strategies are considered. Briefly, (ϕ1, ϕ2) is ad-
missible if it gives well-defined payoffs for all x ∈ R, ‖X‖∞ has finite moments and, although
each player can intervene immediately after the other, infinite simultaneous interventions are
precluded.7 As an example, if the running payoffs have polynomial growth, the ‘never inter-
vene strategies’ ϕ1 = ϕ2 = (∅, ∅ ↪→ R) are admissible and the game can be played.
Given a game, we want to know whether it admits some Nash equilibrium and how to
compute it. Recall that a pair of strategies (ϕ∗1, ϕ
∗
2) is a Nash equilibrium (NE) if for every
admissible (ϕ1, ϕ2),
J1(x;ϕ
∗
1, ϕ
∗
2) ≥ J1(x;ϕ1, ϕ∗2) and J2(x;ϕ∗1, ϕ∗2) ≥ J2(x;ϕ∗1, ϕ2),
i.e., no player can gain from a unilateral change of strategy. If one such NE exists, we refer
to (V1, V2), with Vi(x) = Ji(x;ϕ
∗
1, ϕ
∗
2), as a pair of equilibrium payoffs.
2.1.2 General system of quasi-variational inequalities
To present the system of QVIs derived in [ABC+19], we need to define first the intervention
operators. For any V1, V2 : R→ R and x ∈ R, the loss operator of player i is defined as
MiVi(x) := sup
δ∈Zi(x)
{Vi(x+ δ)− ci(x, δ)}.8 (2.1.2.1)
When applied to an equilibrium payoff, the loss operator Mi gives a recomputed present
value for player i due to the cost of her own intervention. Given the optimality of the NEs,
one would intuitively expect thatMiVi ≤ Vi for equilibrium payoffs and that the equality is
attained only when it is optimal for player i to intervene. Under this logic:
6In [ABC+19], Zi(x) is the same for every x ∈ R. The generalization in this chapter is a standard one in
impulse control and will prove useful in the sequel. The results in [ABC+19] still hold with the same proofs.
7More precisely, these would be R-admissible strategies. See [ABC+19, Def.2.5] for more details.
8Although we could have MiVi(x) = +∞, this will be excluded when enforcing the system of QVIs
(2.1.2.3).
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Definition 2.1.2.1. We say that the pair (V1, V2) has the unique impulse property (UIP)
if for each i = 1, 2 and x ∈ {MiVi = Vi}, there exists a unique impulse, denoted δ∗i (x) =
δ∗i (Vi)(x) ∈ Zi(x), that realizes the supremum in (2.1.2.1).9
If (V1, V2) enjoys the UIP, we define the gain operator of player i as
HiVi(x) := Vi(x+ δ∗j (x)) + gi(x, δ∗j (x)), for x ∈ {MjVj = Vj} (2.1.2.2)
When applied to equilibrium payoffs, the gain operator Hi gives a recomputed present value
for player i due to her opponent’s intervention.
Finally, let us denote by A the infinitesimal generator of X when uncontrolled, i.e.,
AV (x) := 1
2
σ2(x)V ′′(x) + µ(x)V ′(x),
for any V : R → R which is C2 at some open neighborhood of a given x ∈ R. We as-
sume this regularity holds whenever we compute AV (x) for some V and x. The following
Verification Theorem, due to [ABC+19, Thm.3.3], states that if a regular enough solution
(V1, V2) to a certain system of QVIs exists, then it must be a pair of equilibrium payoffs, and
a corresponding NE can be retrieved. We state here a simplified version that applies to the
one-dimensional infinite-horizon games at hand.10
Theorem 2.1.2.2 (General system of QVIs). Given a game as in Section 2.1.1, let
V1, V2 : R→ R be pair of functions with the UIP, such that for any i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j:
MjVj − Vj ≤ 0 on R
HiVi − Vi = 0 on {MjVj − Vj = 0} =: I∗j
max
{AVi − ρiVi + fi,MiVi − Vi} = 0 on {MjVj − Vj < 0} =: C∗j (2.1.2.3)
and Vi ∈ C2(C∗j \∂C∗i ) ∩ C1(C∗j ) ∩ C(R) has polynomial growth and bounded second deriva-
tive on some reduced neighbourhood of ∂C∗i . Suppose further
(
(I∗i , δ∗i )
)
i=1,2
are admissible
strategies.11
Then, (V1, V2) are equilibrium payoffs attained at a NE
(
(I∗i , δ∗i )
)
i=1,2
.
The first equation of system (2.1.2.3) states that at an equilibrium, a player cannot
increase her own payoff by a unilateral intervention. One therefore expects that the equality
MjVj = Vj will only hold when player j intervenes, or in other words, when the value
she gains can exactly compensate the cost of her intervention. Consequently, the second
equation says that a gain results from the opponent’s intervention. Finally, the last one,
9We do not require the UIP to hold outside of {MiVi = Vi}, as this is not the case for equilibrium payoffs
in many examples, such as the linear game with constant costs/gains. Proofs in [ABC+19] carry through
unaltered.
10Unlike in [ABC+19], there is no terminal condition in the system of QVIs and the assumption that ∂C∗i
be a Lipschitz surface is trivially satisfied for an open C∗i ⊆ R, as it is a countable union of disjoint open
intervals.
11For consistency with the strategies’ definition, one should assume that δ∗ has been continuously extended
to R. The conclusion is unaffected by the choice of the extension.
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means that when the opponent does not intervene, each player faces a single-player impulse
control problem.
We conclude this section with some final observations that we will come back to in
Chapter 3:
Remark 2.1.2.3. An immediate consequence of assuming strictly positive costs is that inter-
vening at any state with a null impulse reduces the payoff of the acting player and is therefore
suboptimal. This is also displayed in system (2.1.2.3): if at some state x, MjVj(x) was re-
alized for δ = 0, then MjVj(x) = Vj(x) + cj(x, 0) < Vj(x). At the same time, allowing for
vanishing costs often leads to degenerate games in the current framework [ABC+19, Sect.4.4].
Hence, assuming cj > 0 is quite reasonable.
Remark 2.1.2.4. Consider the case of nonegative impulses and cost functions being strictly
concave in the impulse, as in [Cos13]. (Concave costs are also assumed in [EAM18].) That
is, ci(x, δ + δ¯) < ci(x, δ) + ci(x + δ, δ¯) for all x ∈ R, δ, δ¯ ≥ 0. This models the situation in
which simultaneous interventions are more expensive than a single one to the same effect.
In such cases, it is easy to see that in the context of Theorem 2.1.2.2, player i will only shift
the state variable towards her continuation region.12
2.1.3 Linear game and motivation
For completeness, we finish this Section by explicitly recalling the linear game of [ABC+19],
the only almost fully analytically solvable game in the literature at the time of writing, and
the application that motivates it. Recall that the choice of a linear structure (as opposed to
piecewise linear-quadratic as in the original impulse control formulations [AF16,CZ99,JP93,
MØ98]) is made for tractability reasons.
Central banks competing over the foreign exchange rate (FEX): Consider two
central banks that compete to influence the FEX between their respective currencies, both
seeking to devalue (resp. appreciate) their own one. In this application, either central bank
intervenes when it deems its currency too strong (resp. too weak). Each bank’s strategy
is made up of the ensuing devaluation (resp. appreciation) amount and the threshold FEX
triggering it. Both of these are to be optimally determined in advance, by solving the
game. Let the process X model the FEX, evolving as a Brownian motion when there are
no interventions. In a simplified model, we assume the running payoffs of the banks are
X − s1 and s2−X respectively (s2 > s1) and that the costs/gains upon interventions have a
fixed component and another one proportional to the size of the change induced. We further
assume that both banks discount their winnings/losses at the same rate ρ > 0 and they have
the same cost/gain parameters. More specifically,
Xt = x+ σWt +
∑
k: τk1≤t
δk1 +
∑
k: τk2≤t
δk2 , and
12Let x ∈ I∗i and suppose y∗i := x+ δ∗i (x) ∈ I∗i . Set y∗∗i := y∗i + δ∗i (y∗i ). Then, by the UIP, the definitions
of δ∗i (x) and I∗i , and the concavity of the cost: Vi(y∗∗i ) − ci(x, δ∗i (x) + δ∗i (y∗i )) ≤ Vi(y∗i ) − ci(x, δ∗i (x)) =
Vi(y
∗∗
i )− ci(y∗i , δ∗i (y∗i ))− ci(x, δ∗i (x)) < Vi(y∗∗i )− ci(x, δ∗i (x) + δ∗i (y∗i )) , which is a contradiction.
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Ji(x;ϕ1, ϕ2) := Ex
∫ ∞
0
e−ρs(−1)i−1(Xs − si)ds−
∞∑
k=1
e−ρτ
k
i (c+ λ|δki |) +
∞∑
k=1
e−ρτ
k
j (c˜+ λ˜|δkj |)
 ,
where 0 ≤ c˜ ≤ c, 0 ≤ λ˜ ≤ λ and (c, λ) 6= (c˜, λ˜). These parametric restrictions ensure the
existence of a NE (see [ABC+19] and Section 3.3.3 in Chapter 3).13
An exact solution of this game can be found by an application of Theorem 2.1.2.2. To
this purpose, the system of QVIs (2.1.2.3) is heuristically solved, yielding candidates for
equilibrium payoffs and a NE. This is done, first, by making some educated guesses. Second,
by solving the ordinary differential equations (ODEs) in (2.1.2.3) where appropriate. Finally,
by imposing the regularity requirements of Theorem 2.1.2.2 through pasting conditions.
Upon verification of the remaining hypotheses, the following turns out to be a solution of
the game:
V2(x) =

ϕA1,A2(x∗1) + c˜+ λ˜(x
∗
1 − x) if x ∈ (−∞, x¯1]
ϕA1,A2(x) if x ∈ (x¯1, x¯2)
ϕA1,A2(x∗2)− c− λ(x− x∗2) if x ∈ [x¯2,+∞),
V1(x) = V2(2s˜− x),
where:
ϕA1,A2(x) = A1e
θx + A2e
−θx +
1
ρ
(s2 − x),
s˜ :=
s1 + s2
2
, θ :=
√
2ρ/σ2, η := (1− λρ)/ρ,
x¯i := s˜+
(−1)i
θ
log
(√
η + ξ
η − ξ
(√
Γ + 1 +
√
Γ
))
,
x∗i := s˜+
(−1)i
θ
log
(√
η − ξ
η + ξ
(√
Γ + 1 +
√
Γ
))
,
Ai := exp
(
(−1)iθs˜
)√η2 − ξ2
2θ
(
(−1)i+1√Γ + 1−
√
Γ
)
,
Γ :=
θ(c− c˜)
4ξ
+
θc(λ− λ˜)
4ηξ
+
λ− λ˜
2η
,
and ξ ∈ [0, η] is the unique zero of F (y) := 2y − η log
(
η+y
η−y
)
+ θc.
2.2 Iterative algorithm for impulse games
Compared with the single-value-function problems of impulse control, general two-player
games are distinctly more challenging. Recall that a deterministic approach based on The-
orem 2.1.2.2 entails that:
131 − ρλ > 0 is also imposed in [ABC+19], but this is only necessary to preclude the case in which the
players never intervene.
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• two equilibrium payoffs, governed by a system of QVIs, must be solved for,
• the dependence between a pair of solutions (V1, V2) is highly nonlinear due to the
presence of the gain operators Hi(Vj)Vi,
• the gain operators are only well-defined for pairs with the UIP,
• solutions will typically be less regular. For example, if (V1, V2) is the solution in Section
2.1.3 of the linear game, then Vi is singular at x¯j (i.e., each equilibrium payoff is non
differentiable at the border of the opponent’s intervention region), in spite of the game
having linear running payoffs, costs and gains. Note that Theorem 2.1.2.2 contemplates
this lack of regularity within the smoothness assumptions (compare to the classical
Verification Theorems for single-player problems [ØS09] where greater regularity is
assumed).
Algorithm 2.2.1.1 below is, as far as we know, the first ever numerical attempt at two-
player nonzero-sum stochastic impulse games. It is admittedly heuristic and supported
only by the numerical evidence reported in Section 2.3. A rigorous analysis concerning an
improved algorithm, specific to symmetric games, will be carried out in Chapter 3.
The remainder of this Section is organized as follows. We start by giving a quick overview
of the discretization scheme we shall be using for system of QVIs (2.1.2.3). (A more detailed
description can be found in Chapter 3.) We then explain the idea and motivate the under-
lying heuristics of our iterative method. Finally, we list the new algorithm.
Notation. RG denotes the set of functions v : G → R. We shall identify grid points with
indexes, functions in RG with vectors and linear operators with matrices. The (partial)
order considered in RG and RG×G is the usual pointwise order for functions (elementwise for
vectors and matrices), and the same is true for the supremum, maximum and arg-maximum
induced by it. All set complements are taken with respect to the grid.
Discretization: From now on we localize the domain and work on a discrete finite grid
G ⊆ R. In all of the numerical experiments described in the sequel we have taken G as an
equispaced grid of M steps between certain xmin < 0 < xmax with |xmin|, |xmax| and M large
enough (more about this in Chapter 3).
We approximate the impulse constraint sets Z(x) with x ∈ R by finite sets ∅ 6= Z(x)
with x ∈ G and we set Z := ∏x∈G Z(x). For i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j, v1, v2 ∈ RG and x ∈ G, we
define discretized versions of the loss and gain operators as
Mivi(x) := max
δ∈Z
{
vi[[x+ δ(x)]]− ci(x, δ(x))
}
, Hi(vj)vi(x) := vi[[x+ δ
∗
j (x)]] + gi(x, δ
∗
j (x))
with δ∗j (x) = δ
∗
j (vj)(x) := min
(
arg max
δ∈Z
{
vj[[x+ δ(x)]]− cj(x, δ(x))
})
,
where v[[y]] denotes linear interpolation of v on y using the closest nodes on the grid, and
v[[y]] = v(xmin) (resp. v[[y]] = v(xmax)) if y < xmin (resp. y > xmax); i.e., ‘no extrapolation’.
For the experiments presented in Section 2.3 we assumed Z(x) = R for all x ∈ R and we set
Z(x) = G− x = {y − x : y ∈ G} for simplicity.
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Next, we choose a finite difference scheme for the ODEs
0 = AVi − ρiVi + fi = 1
2
σ2V ′′i + µV
′
i − ρiVi + fi
which is consistent, monotone and stable, adding artificial Dirichlet or Neumann-type bound-
ary conditions (BCs). In all of our experiments, we have chosen an upwind (or positive
coefficients) finite difference scheme, where
V ′i (x) ≈
Vi
(
x+ sgn(µ(x))h
)− Vi(x)
sgn(µ(x))h
, V ′′i (x) ≈
Vi(x+ h)− 2Vi(x) + Vi(x− h)
h2
and Vi(xmin − h), V˜i(xmax + h) were solved for using artificial Neumann conditions. (See
Chapter 3 for more details on this choice as well as that of the grid extension.) The described
procedure leads to a discretization of the ODEs as
Livi + fi = 0,
with −Li strictly diagonally dominant (SDD) L0-matrices (see definitions in Appendix A).
Note that the values of fi at xmin, xmax need to be modified to account for the boundary
conditions.
Heuristics: Having discretized the system of QVIs (2.1.2.3), we start from an initial
guess (v01, v
0
2) to approximate its solution. We seek an iterative procedure to consecutively
compute (vk+11 , v
k+1
2 ), given (v
k
1 , v
k
2) at the k-th iteration.
Let i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j. A natural idea is, first, to partition the grid into the ‘approximate
intervention region’ of player j, {Mjvkj − vkj ≥ 0} (equivalent to {Mjvkj − vkj = 0} for a
solution), and its complement, the ‘approximate continuation region’; and then to compute
vk+1i either by calculating a gain as Hi(v
k
j )v
k
i in the former region, or by solving an impulse
control problem in the latter. Unfortunately, our numerical experiments with these hard
threshold definitions lead to unstable behaviours more often than not, and a successive
relaxation procedure proved to be more useful. Consequently, the approximate intervention
region of player j is set as {Mjvkj −vkj ≥ −rk} instead, where (rk) are small positive numbers
decreasing to zero.
It remains to schedule the relaxation procedure and to specify a stopping criteria for
the algorithm. Regarding the former, having computed (vk+11 , v
k+1
2 ), r
k is linearly relaxed.
(This relaxation procedure is chosen for simplicity.). Then the largest pointwise residual
to the system of QVIs (incurred by either payoff) is calculated across the grid, taking into
account a numerical tolerance tol > 0. We denote this residual Rk+1 and we consider the
algorithm has ‘converged’ when the residual drops below a certain threshold. We use the
largest residual (instead of the distance between consecutive approximations) because in
the absence of a convergence analysis it is a practical metric reflecting whether a solution
of the discrete system of QVIs has been found (as opposed to the algorithm stagnating or
converging to something other than a solution). Additionally, the residuals give valuable
information at each grid node. It is not without its caveats nonetheless, as it will be seen in
the experiments that floating point arithmetic can often lead to a ‘spiking’ of the residuals at
the nodes where the discrete solutions reproduce singularities of the analytical ones. Thus,
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the largest residual on its own can at times be artificially big and misleading, and further
inspection over all grid nodes is recommended in such cases (see Section 2.3 and more details
in Chapter 3). We should also mention that in Chapter 3, aided by a convergence analysis,
we will take the opposite view and the largest residual will become a tool for secondary
assessment.
As a final remark, we note that numerical experiments show Algorithm 2.2.1.1 does not
enjoy global convergence (i.e. it is not guaranteed to converge from arbitrary initial guesses).
Providing a good enough pair (v01, v
0
2) is thus a practical issue; in Section 2.3, a natural way
of constructing educated guesses is explained.
In the following, a+ := max{a, 0} denotes the positive part of a given a ∈ R, 1S denotes
the indicator function of S ⊆ R and ‖ · ‖∞ is computed over G. We take for granted that
we have a convergent solver for single-player impulse control problems. In Chapter 3 this
point will be addressed in detail, showing how one can use either classical policy iteration
or fixed-point policy iteration (the latter was used in the experiments presented in Section
2.3). Additionally, we note that in practice a maximum number of iterations should be used
as an additional stopping criteria. We neglect this to simplify the presentation.
Algorithm 2.2.1.1 Iterative algorithm for general impulse games
Set tol > 0 and relaxation parameters 0 < α < 1, r0 > 0.
1: Choose initial guess: (v01, v
0
2) ∈ RG × RG
2: Set R0 = +∞
3: for k = 0, 1, . . . do
4: for i=1, 2 do
5: j = 3− i
6: Ikj = {Mjvkj − vkj ≥ −rk}
7: vk+1i = Hi(v
k
j )v
k
i on I
k
j
8: Solve impulse control: max
{
Liv
k+1
i + fi,Miv
k+1
i − vk+1i
}
= 0 on (Ikj )
c
9: end for
10: rk+1 = αrk
11: Ik+1,tolj = {Mjvk+1j − vk+1j ≥ −tol}
12: Rk+1 =
∥∥∥maxi,j∈{1,2},i 6=j {(Mivk+1i − vk+1i )+, ∣∣Hi(vk+1j )vk+1i − vk+1i ∣∣1Ik+1,tolj +∣∣max{Livk+1i + fi,Mivk+1i − vk+1i }∣∣1(Ik+1,tolj )c}∥∥∥∞
13: if Rk+1 < tol then
14: break from the iteration
15: end if
16: end for
Line 8 of Algorithm 2.2.1.1 deserves special attention. Although at this step we want to
solve an impulse control problem restricted to the subgrid D = (Ikj )
c (for fixed k, j), we still
need the information in Ikj in two ways; namely:
• To compute the non-local operator Mi.
• To restrict to D the system Livk+1i + fi = 0.
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It is also for this reason that the gain vk+1i = Hi(v
k
j )v
k
i (x) is computed in advance in line 7,
effectively making the QVI in line 8 a constrained QVI over the whole grid. Thus, one needs
to algebraically modify it into a classical QVI on D before an impulse control solver can be
applied. See more details in Chapter 3.
2.3 Numerical results
In this section we assess the performance of Algorithm 2.2.1.1. The system of QVIs (2.1.2.3)
is discretized as explained in Section 2.2 on an equispaced grid of M + 1 nodes, and the
computational domain is always the plotted one. We assume Z(x) = R for all x ∈ R and set
Z(x) = G− x = {y − x : y ∈ G}. Throughout this section, tol = 10−8, α = 0.8 and r0 = 1.
The largest pointwise residual at convergence is denoted by R∞.
As mentioned before, the only almost fully analytically solvable game currently available
is the linear game of Section 2.1.3. Therefore, we shall eventually focus on that problem for
validation purposes. However, we introduce two other games first for which we do not have
an analytical solution. For these games, we solve the corresponding QVIs systems on a fixed
grid and find approximate NEs (as much as this can be claimed from a numerical viewpoint).
Additionally, they illustrate how an initial guess for the linear game can be constructed and
provide further numerical evidence supporting Algorithm 2.2.1.1.
2.3.1 Non-symmetric parabolic game
This is a version of the linear game where the running payoffs are replaced by (non-symmetric)
concave parabolae with roots rLi and r
R
i :
fi = −(x− rLi )(x− rRi ), with rLi < rRi . (2.3.1.1)
Let us motivate this game. We seek to use as initial guess the pair of value functions of
the single-player versions of the game. That is, the impulse control problems in which one
of the players never intervenes. Removing the action of one of the players, however, may not
always lead to a well-posed problem. For example, for running payoffs without maxima one
can easily end up with ‘infinite-valued value functions’ or ‘infinite-valued optimal impulses’.
This is indeed the case for the linear game. In order to skirt that difficulty it is convenient
to consider modifications with running payoffs that attain a maximum value, like those in
(2.3.1.1).
Figure 2.1 shows a numerical solution, (v1, v2), to a parabolic game (pair of solid curves)
along with the initial guess (pair of dashed curves). The latter are, in turn, the value functions
of the corresponding single-player games. It is intuitively clear that (v1, v2) approximate, over
the grid, functions which indeed satisfy the assumptions of the Verification Theorem 2.1.2.2.
The NE exhibited in this Theorem, (ϕ∗1, ϕ
∗
2), can be retrieved from the pair of equilibrium
payoffs, giving ϕ∗1 =
(
[1.068,+∞),−1.848− x) and ϕ∗2 = ((−∞,−3.048],−0.120− x).
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Figure 2.1: Equilibrium payoffs of non-symmetric parabolic game: f1 = −(x + 4.5)(x − 1)
and f2 = −(x + pi)(x− 2.7), ρ = .03, σ = .25, c = 100, c˜ = 30, λ = λ˜ = 0. Overlaid, initial
guesses (solutions of the respective single-player games). Here, M = 1000; check Table 2.1
for other values.
As it turns out, for this parabolic game Algorithm 2.2.1.1 also converges from the ‘zero
guess’ (v01 = v
0
2 = 0). On Table 2.1, the value of R
∞ over a wide range of finite difference
grids (with 301, 601, . . . , 3001 nodes) is compiled. In all cases, either initial guess leads to
convergence (up to tolerance tol). Nonetheless, the algorithm takes in general fewer iterations
when starting from the value functions of the single-player parabolic games. (We stress that
those on Table 2.1 are the outer iterations of Algorithm 2.2.1.1. Within each one there is an
inner loop of an impulse control solver as in Chapter 3.)
M R∞ its.a its.b
300 1.4×10−12 54 53
600 4.0×10−9 74 77
1200 3.3×10−9 144 77
1800 9.7×10−9 95 77
2400 7.3×10−9 123 77
3000 5.9×10−9 215 103
Table 2.1: Largest residual to
QVIs at convergence (R∞) vs.
number of grid nodes (M + 1)
for parabolic game in Figure 2.1.
Iterations to convergence within
tol = 10−8 starting from: zero
guess (its.a) and value functions
of single-player problems (its.b).
We conclude this example by illustrating the interplay between the equilibrium payoffs
found with Algorithm 2.2.1.1, the NE derived from them and the evolution of the optimally
controlled state variable. Once the optimal strategies (ϕ∗1, ϕ
∗
2) are available, they can be
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executed on specific realizations of the game. Sticking to the parameters and numerical
solution in Figure 2.1, Figure 2.2 depicts one exemplary path of the state process in the time
interval [0, 1000], starting from x = 0 and subjected to the pair of optimal strategies. For
numerical purposes, let us consider the finite horizon payoffs:
Jˆi(x;ϕ1, ϕ2, T ) := E

∫ T
0
e−ρisfi(Xs)ds−
∑
k:
τki ≤T
e−ρiτ
k
i ci
(
X(τki )− , δ
k
i
)
+
∑
k:
τkj ≤T
e−ρiτ
k
j gi
(
X(τkj )− , δ
k
j
)
 .
(2.3.1.2)
For ‘good enough’ games and strategies, one intuitively expects that Jˆi(x;ϕ1, ϕ2, T ) →
Ji(x;ϕ1, ϕ2) as T → ∞. In fact, after T & 300, the integrals in (2.3.1.2) for the parabolic
game and NE of Figure 2.1 have essentially attained their asymptotic value. Thus, we sim-
ply take Ji(x;ϕ
∗
1, ϕ
∗
2) ≈ Jˆi(x;ϕ∗1, ϕ∗2, T = 1000). With this clarification, Figure 2.3 shows
in particular v1(0) = J
1(0;ϕ∗1, ϕ
∗
2), v2(0) = J
2(0;ϕ∗1, ϕ
∗
2), v1(−1) = J1(−1;ϕ∗1, ϕ∗2), and
v2(−1) = J2(−1;ϕ∗1, ϕ∗2), obtained by Monte Carlo simulations.14 They compare fairly well
with the values of v1(0), v2(0), v1(−1) and v2(−1) in Figure 2.1 obtained by our algorithm.
(Even better agreement could be obtained by increasing M in that figure and reducing
the discretization bias and statistical error of the Monte Carlo simulation, but this is good
enough to make our point.)
Figure 2.2: Sample path from x = 0 with parameters and solution from Figure 2.1. Blue
and red dashed lines are intervention thresholds for players 1 and 2, respectively.
14The expected values in (2.3.1.2) are approximated by the mean over N = 200 realizations integrated
with the Euler-Maruyama method with time step ∆t = 0.001.
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Figure 2.3: Approximations of the equilibrium payoffs at x = 0 (solid curves) and x = −1
(dashed curves), obtained by Monte Carlo simulation (see text for details). Parameters and
optimal strategies from Figure 2.1. Compare with v1(0), v2(0), v1(−1) and v2(−1) there.
The NE itself can be visually explored in the following way. For a given starting point
x, we keep the optimal strategy for one of the two players, and slightly alter the strategy
of the other one. For concreteness, let us assume that player 1 changes her strategy to
ϕ1 = (1± 0.25U)ϕ∗1 while player 2 maintains ϕ2 = ϕ∗2, where U is the uniform distribution,
‘±’ means ‘with equal chance’.15 Then, we proceed to calculate J1(x;ϕ1, ϕ∗2) by Monte
Carlo simulations as before. By definition of the NE, J1(x;ϕ1, ϕ
∗
2) cannot be larger than
v1(x). Within numerical tolerance, this is indeed observed in Figure 2.4, where the blue
empty circles (J1(x;ϕ1, ϕ
∗
2)) do not lie over the blue curve (v1(x)). Full red circles represent
J2(x;ϕ1, ϕ
∗
2): note that the player who sticks to her optimal strategy may indeed improve
over v2(x), should her opponent depart from a NE. (When player 2 is the one who changes,
the red empty circles, red curve and full blue circles apply instead.) We stress, however,
that Monte Carlo simulations such as these cannot prove that a pair of strategies form a NE.
(At most, they can disprove it.) This is why Algorithm 2.2.1.1 becomes a valuable tool in
solving the underlying system of QVIs and applying the Verification Theorem 2.1.2.2.
15Changes are applied to each of the two parameters defining ϕ∗1.
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Figure 2.4: Empty blue (resp. red) circles mean that the player 1 (resp. 2) has departed from
her optimal strategy while her opponent has not. By virtue of NE, she cannot be (within
numerical tolerance) better off than v1 (resp. v2). Full circles: payoff of the player who does
not change her optimal strategy. Parameters and optimal strategies from Figure 2.1. (Note
that results are subject to numerical error.)
2.3.2 Capped linear game
In this game, we cap the running payoffs of the linear game at K > 0:
fi = (−1)i−1(x− si) ∧K.16 (2.3.2.1)
We shall always take K = 5. Once again, the corresponding single-player games are well-
posed and their solutions can be used as initial guess for the capped linear game. As in
the previous example, the capped game also seems to converge from the zero guess. Some
convergence results are compiled in Table 2.2. Note that convergence falters with M = 600
and M = 3300; we will come back to this later.
16a ∧ b denotes the minimum of a and b for any a, b ∈ R.
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M R∞ its.
600 — ∞
900 6.5× 10−10 100
1200 8.8× 10−9 124
1500 7.4× 10−9 78
2700 4.1× 10−9 96
3000 6.7× 10−9 125
3300 — ∞
Table 2.2: Iterations
needed for convergence
and largest terminal resid-
ual (R∞) in capped linear
game using zero initial
guess (a hyphen stands for
lack of convergence within
tol). Same parameters as
in Figure 2.5.
Figure 2.5: Difference (in absolute value, less than 1%) between (numerical, with M = 1200)
equilibrium payoffs of the capped linear game and those (exact) of the linear game from
Section 2.1.3, justifying the former payoffs being used as initial guess for the latter game.
Parameters: σ = .25, ρ = .03, c = 100, c˜ = 30, λ = 0.5, λ˜ = 0.3, s1 = −pi/3, s2 =
pi/3, K = 5.
The equilibrium payoffs found for the capped linear game are a good approximation to
those of the linear game shown in Section 2.1.3 (see Figure 2.5). This seems to make sense:
due to the action of the opponent and for σ  K, the discarded portion of the payoff is not
very relevant in practice.
2.3.3 Linear game with educated initial guess
Finally, we tackle the linear game, for which an exact solution is available (see Section 2.1.3).
Contrary to the previous examples, Algorithm 2.2.1.1 does not seem to enjoy unconditional
convergence here. In fact, when the zero guess was used, it failed to converge more often than
not (not reported). In order to construct an adequate initial guess, we first solve for some
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equilibrium payoffs of the capped linear game. Using them as the initial guess, convergence
was achieved in every experiment.
Figure 2.6: Equilibrium payoffs of two instances of linear game. Initial guess: solutions of
capped linear games (K = 5). Overlaid, error of the initial guess. Parameters: ρ = .02,
σ = .15, s1 = −3, s2 = 3, c = 100, c˜ = 0, λ = λ˜ = 15, M = 1000 (left); ρ = .03, σ = .25,
s1 = −2, s2 = 2, c = 100, c˜ = 30, λ = 4, λ˜ = 3, M = 1000 (right).
The results of two experiments are plotted on Figure 2.6. The numerical approxima-
tions can hardly be distinguished from the exact solutions with the naked eye. As it
was done with the parabolic game, once again we can retrieve an approximate NE from
the numerical solution. For the left figure, this gives ϕ∗1 =
(
(−∞,−2.82], 1.53 − x) and
ϕ∗2 =
(
[2.82,+∞),−1.53 − x). When compared with the exact equilibrium, the errors on
the corresponding abscissae are smaller than the grid step size.
M R∞ |error| its.
500 3.8×10−10 0.687 126
1000 1.2×10−9 0.805 154
1500 7.2×10−9 0.512 157
2000 3.5×10−9 0.365 172
2500 — — ∞
Table 2.3: Convergence of Al-
gorithm 2.2.1.1 for linear game.
Same parameters as in Figure 2.6
(left).
On Tables 2.3 and 2.4, the convergence of the numerical approximation provided by
Algorithm 2.2.1.1 to the true solution is demonstrated. However, R∞ fails to drop below tol
for some discretizations as the algorithm stagnates, with the highest residuals found on and
around the nodes where the payoffs display a singularity. Figure 2.7 illustrates this situation.
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M R∞ |error| its.
600 — — ∞
800 9.5×10−10 0.023 183
1000 3.7×10−9 0.330 177
1400 8.7×10−9 0.196 159
1800 6.8×10−9 0.121 226
2200 5.6×10−9 0.073 224
2600 — — ∞
Table 2.4: Convergence of Algo-
rithm 2.2.1.1 for linear game (same
parameters as in Figure 2.6 (right).
It can be seen that errors continue to be acceptable (far less than 1% relative error in the
worst case), but further refinements of the grid did not yield any major improvements. The
algorithm for symmetric games, presented and studied in Chapter 3, is far better-behaved in
this respect as well. It will be seen that for games in which one intuitively expects a solution
to exist, cases of stagnation were always resolved by refining the grid.
Figure 2.7: Stagnation of accuracy: the pair with M = 1983 is fully converged (within
numerical tolerance); the pair with M = 1984 (overlaid) is not. The insets zoom in on both
pairs of functions. Parameters: ρ = .02, σ = .15, s1 = −1, s2 = 1, c = 100, c˜ = 30, λ = 4,
λ˜ = 3.
2.4 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, we have designed and tested a novel policy iteration algorithm (the first
one as far as we know) to numerically solve nonzero-sum stochastic impulse control games.
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The approach consists in solving a system of QVIs which characterizes certain equilibrium
payoffs and NEs, exploiting the Verification Theorem of [ABC+19].
Our algorithm iteratively computes the approximate solution by partitioning, for each
of the players, the discretized localized spatial domain into approximate continuation and
intervention regions of the opponent. These are defined through a relaxation parameter
that evolves along the iterations. In the continuation region, we solve a constrained single-
player impulse control problem, whereas in the complement, a gain is computed. A way of
producing an educated initial guess to start the iterations, which relies on solving standard
impulse control problems, has been presented along with the new algorithm.
The algorithm was validated numerically with satisfactory results, by considering different
games and both fixed and refining grids, but it was noted that cases of stagnation could not
be resolved by simple grid refinements. In particular, we have tested the convergence to
an analytical solution of the linear game, the only one almost fully tractable at the time
of writing. Results show that the algorithm offers a means of gaining quantitative insight
into applications modelled by general nonzero-sum stochastic impulse games. In the case
of symmetric games however, we shall see in the next chapter a modified algorithm which
substantially improves the current one, and we will provide the missing convergence analysis.
Chapter 3
A fixed-point policy-iteration-type
algorithm for symmetric nonzero-sum
stochastic impulse games
Introduction
To the author’s best knowledge, the only numerical method available in the literature of
nonzero-sum stochastic impulse games is our algorithm in [ABM+19] (Algorithm 2.2.1.1 in
Chapter 2), which tackles the system of QVIs (2.1.2.3) by sequentially solving single-player
impulse control problems combined with a relaxation scheme. Unfortunately, the choice of
the latter scheme is not obvious in general and it was verified that the convergence of the
algorithm was reliant on a good initial guess. It was also observed that stagnation could
put a cap on the accuracy of the results, without any simple solution to it. Lastly, while a
numerical validation was performed, no rigorous convergence analysis was provided at the
time.
Restricting attention to the one-dimensional infinite horizon two-player case, this chapter
(based on [Zab19]) puts the focus on certain nonzero-sum impulse games which display
a symmetric structure between the players. This class is broad enough to include many
interesting applications; no less than the competing central banks problem (whether in its
linear form [ABC+19] or others considered in the single bank formulation [AF16,CZ99,JP93,
MØ98]), the cash management problem [BCG19] (reducing its dimension by a simple change
of variables) and the generalization of many impulse control problems to the two-player case.
For this class of games, an iterative algorithm is presented which substantially improves
Algorithm 2.2.1.1 by harnessing the symmetry of the problem, removing the strong depen-
dence on the initial guess and dispensing with the relaxation scheme altogether. The result is
a simpler and more intuitive, precise and efficient routine, for which a convergence analysis is
provided. It is shown that the overall routine admits a representation that strongly resembles,
both algorithmically and in its properties, that of the combined fixed-point policy-iteration
methods [HFL12, Cli07], albeit with nonexpansive operators. Still, a certain contraction
property can still be established.
To perform the analysis, assumptions are imposed on the discretization scheme used on
63
CHAPTER 3. ALGORITHM FOR SYMMETRIC IMPULSE GAMES 64
the system of QVIs and the discrete admissible strategies. These naturally generalize those of
the impulse control case [AF16] and admit graph-theoretic interpretations in terms of weakly
chained diagonally dominant (WCDD) matrices and their matrix sequences counterpart
[Azi19a]. We establish a clear parallel between these discrete type assumptions, the behaviour
of the players and the mimicking of the Verification Theorem.
Section 3.1 deals with the analytical problem. We give a precise definition of the class of
symmetric nonzero-sum impulse games and establish some preliminary results.
Section 3.2 moves on the analogue discrete problem. Section 3.2.1 specifies a general
and abstract discrete version of the system of QVIs, such that any discretization scheme
compliant with the assumptions to be imposed will be subject to the same results. Section
3.2.2 presents the iterative algorithm subject of this chapter, and shows how the impulse
control problems that need to be sequentially solved have a unique solution and can be
handled by policy iteration. However, the latter has costly efficiency drawbacks, which is
why Section 3.2.3 provides a general solver for impulse control problems which outperforms
classical policy iteration in many practical situations. It consists of an instance of fixed-
point policy-iteration that is noncompliant with the standard assumptions [HFL12] and, as
far as the author knows, it was not used in the context of impulse control before, other than
heuristically in Chapter 2. We prove its convergence under our framework.
Section 3.2.4 characterizes the overall iterative algorithm as a fixed-point policy-iteration-
type method, allowing for reformulations of the original problem and results pertaining the
solutions. (The necessary matrix and graph-theoretic definitions and results are collected
in Appendix A for the reader’s convenience.) Section 3.2.5 carries on with the convergence
analysis, and shows to which extent different sets of reasonable assumptions are enough
to guarantee convergence to solutions, convergence of strategies and boundedness of iter-
ates. A result of theoretical interest, giving sufficient conditions for convergence, is proved.
Discretization schemes within the standing framework are provided in Section 3.2.6.
Section 3.3 presents all the numerical results. In Section 3.3.1, a variety of symmetric
nonzero-sum impulse games, many seemingly too complicated to be handled analytically,
are explicitly solved for equilibrium payoffs and NEs strategies with great precision. This is
done on a fixed grid, while considering different performance metrics and addressing practical
matters of implementation. In the absence of a viscosity solutions framework to establish
convergence to analytical solutions as the grid is refined, Section 3.3.2 performs a numerical
validation using the only examples of symmetric solvable games in the literature. Section
3.3.3 addresses the case of games without NEs. Section 3.3.4 tackles games such that the
results go beyond the scope of all the currently available theory, displaying discontinuous
impulses and very irregular payoffs. The latter give insight and motivate further research
into this field. Lastly, Section 3.4 concludes.
3.1 Analytical continuous-space problem:
the symmetric case
In Section 2.1 we established a general framework for two-player nonzero-sum stochastic
impulse control games. We now want to focus our study on games which present a certain
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type of symmetric structure between the players, generalising the linear game in Section 2.1.3
and the cash management game [BCG19].1 We shall make a slight abuse of terminology with
respect to the more common use of the term ‘symmetric’ in games theory, but this will be
consistent all throughout.
Notation. The type of games presented in Section 2.1.1 are fully defined by setting the drift,
volatility, impulse constraints, discount rates, running payoffs, costs and gains. In other
words, any such game can be represented by a tuple G = (µ, σ,Zi, ρi, fi, ci, gi)i=1,2.
Definitions 3.1.1.1. We say that a game G = (µ, σ,Zi, ρi, fi, ci, gi)i=1,2 is symmetric (with
respect to zero) if
(S1) µ is odd and σ is even (i.e., µ(x) = −µ(−x) and σ(x) = σ(−x) for all x ∈ R).
(S2) −Z2(−x) = Z1(x) ⊆ [0,+∞) for all x ∈ R and Z1(x) = {0} = Z2(−x) for all x ≥ 0.
(S3) ρ1 = ρ2, f1(x) = f2(−x), c1(x, δ) = c2(−x,−δ) and g1(x,−δ) = g2(−x, δ), for all
δ ∈ Z1(x), x ∈ R.
We say that the game is symmetric with respect to s (for some s ∈ R), if the s-shifted game
(µ(x+ s), σ(x+ s),Zi(x+ s), ρi, fi(x+ s), ci(x+ s, δ), gi(x+ s, δ))i=1,2 is symmetric. We refer
to x = s as a symmetry line of the game.
Condition (S1) is necessary for the state variable to have symmetric dynamics. In partic-
ular, together with (S3), it guarantees symmetry between solutions of the Hamilton–Jacobi–
Bellman (HJB) equations of the players when there are no interventions, i.e.,
V = V ∗(x) solves AV−ρ1V+f1 = 0 if and only if V = V ∗(−x) solves AV−ρ2V+f2 = 0.
Examples 3.1.1.2. The most common examples of Itoˆ diffusions satisfying this assumption are
the scaled Brownian motion (symmetric with respect to zero) and the Ornstein–Uhlenbeck
(OU) process (symmetric with respect to its long term mean).
Condition (S3) is self-explanatory, while (S2) is only partly so. Indeed, although sym-
metric constraints on the impulses Z1(x) = −Z2(−x) should clearly be a requirement, the
rest of (ii) is in fact motivated by the numerical method to be presented and the type of
problems it can handle. On the one hand, the third equation of the QVIs system (2.1.2.3)
implies that a stochastic impulse control problem for player i needs to be solved on C∗j . The
unidirectional impulses assumption is a common one for the convergence of policy iteration
algorithms in impulse control.2 However, it is often too restrictive for many interesting appli-
cations, such as when the controller would benefit the most from keeping the state variable
within some bounded interval instead of simply keeping it ‘high’ or ‘low’ (see, e.g., [Bas19]
and [AF16, Sect.6.1]). Interestingly enough, assuming unidirectional impulses turns out to
be less restrictive when there is a second player present, with an opposed objective. Indeed,
it is often the case that each player needs not to intervene in one of the two directions, and
1The latter can be reduced to one dimension with the change of variables x = x1 − x2. Additionally, we
will restrict attention to unidirectional impulses, as these yield the ‘most relevant’ NE found in [BCG19].
2See this assumption in [CMS07, Sect.4] or [ØS09, Sect.10.4.2], its graph-theoretic counterpart in [AF16,
Asm.(H2) and Thm.4.3], and a counterexample of convergence in its absence in [AF16, Ex.4.9].
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can instead rely on her opponent doing so, while capitalising a gain rather than paying a
cost. See examples in Section 3.3.1 with quadratic and degree four running payoffs.
On the other hand, Z1(x) = {0} = Z2(−x) for all x ≥ 0 means that we can assume
without loss of generality that the admissible intervention regions do not cross over the
symmetry line; i.e., I1 ⊆ (−∞, 0) and I2 ⊆ (0,+∞) for every pair of strategies. (See
Remark 2.1.2.3.) This guarantees in particular that the players never want to intervene at
the same time and the priority rule can be disregarded.
There are different reasons why the last mentioned condition is less restrictive than it
first appears to be. It is not uncommon to assume connectedness of either intervention or
continuation regions (or other conditions implying them) both in impulse control [Ega08]
and nonzero-sum games [DAFM18, Sect.1.2.1]. The same can be said for assumptions that
prevent the players from intervening in unison [DAFM18, Sect.1.2.1], [Cos13, Rmk.6.5]. 3
In the context of symmetric games and payoffs (see Lemma 3.1.1.7) such assumptions would
necessarily imply the intervention regions need to be on opposed sides of the symmetry
line. Additionally, without any further requirements, strategies such that I1 ⊇ (−∞, 0]
and I2 ⊇ [0,+∞) would be inadmissible in the present framework, as per yielding infinite
simultaneous impulses.
Definitions 3.1.1.3. Given a symmetric game, we say that
(
(Ii, δi)
)
i=1,2
are symmetric
strategies (with respect to zero) if I1 = −I2 and δ1(x) = −δ2(−x). Given a symmetric game
with respect to some s ∈ R, we say that((Ii, δi))i=1,2 are symmetric strategies with respect
to s if
(
(Ii − s, δi(x + s))
)
i=1,2
are symmetric, and we refer to x = s as a symmetry line of
the strategies.
Definition 3.1.1.4. We say that V1, V2 : R → R are symmetric functions (with respect to
zero) if V1(x) = V2(−x). We say that they are symmetric functions with respect to s (for
some s ∈ R) if V1(x+ s), V2(x+ s) are symmetric, and we refer to x = s as a symmetry line
for V1, V2.
Remark 3.1.1.5. Definition 3.1.1.3 singles out strategies that share the same symmetry line
with the game. For the linear game, for example, the authors find infinitely many NEs
[ABC+19, Prop.4.7], each presenting symmetry with respect to some point s, but only one
for s = 0 (hence, symmetric in the sense of Definition 3.1.1.3). At the same time, the latter
is the only one for which the corresponding equilibrium payoffs V1, V2 have a symmetry line
as per Definition 3.1.1.4. The same is true for the cash management game [BCG19].
Remark 3.1.1.6. Throughout the chapter we will work only with games symmetric with
respect to zero, to simplify the notation. Working with any other symmetry line amounts
simply to shifting the game and results back and forth.
Lemma 3.1.1.7. For any symmetric game, strategies (ϕ1, ϕ2) and functions V1, V2 : R→ R:
(i) If V1, V2 are symmetric, then M1V1,M2V2 are symmetric.
3In [Cos13, Rmk.6.5], assumptions are given to guarantee the zero-sum analogue toMiVi ≤ HiVi, with a
strict inequality if such assumptions are slightly strengthened. These inequalities, in the context of Theorem
2.1.2.2, imply that the equilibrium intervention regions cannot intersect.
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(ii) If V1, V2 are symmetric and have the UIP, then δ
∗
1(x) = −δ∗2(−x) and H1V1,H2V2 are
symmetric.
(iii) If (ϕ1, ϕ2) are symmetric, then J1(·;ϕ1, ϕ2), J2(·;ϕ1, ϕ2) are symmetric.
(iv) If V1, V2 are as in Theorem 2.1.2.2 and (ϕ
∗
1, ϕ
∗
2) is the corresponding NE of the theorem,
then (ϕ∗1, ϕ
∗
2) are symmetric if and only if V1, V2 are symmetric.
Proof. (i) and (ii) are straightforward from the definitions.
To see (iii), one can check with the recursive definition of the state variable [ABC+19,
Def.2.2] that X−x;ϕ1,ϕ2 has the same law as −Xx;ϕ1,ϕ2 (recall that the continuation regions are
simply disjoint unions of open intervals). Noting also that intervention times and impulses
are nothing but jump times and sizes of X, one concludes that J1(x;ϕ1, ϕ2) = J2(−x;ϕ1, ϕ2),
as intended.
Finally, (iv) is a consequence of (i), (ii) and (iii).
Convention 3.1.1.8. In light of Lemma 3.1.1.7, for any symmetric game we will often lose the
player index from the notations and refer always to quantities corresponding to player 1,4
henceforth addressed simply as ‘the player’. Player 2 shall be referred to as ‘the opponent’.
Statements like ‘V has the UIP’ or ‘V is a symmetric equilibrium payoff’ are understood to
refer to (V (x), V (−x)). Likewise, ‘(I, δ) is admissible’ or ‘(I, δ) is a NE’ refer to the pair
(I, δ(x)), (−I,−δ(−x)).
Due to their general lack of uniqueness, it is customary in game theory to restrict attention
to specific type of NEs, depending on the problem at hand (see for instance [HS81] for a
treatment within the classical theory). Motivated by Lemma 3.1.1.7 (iii) and (iv), and
by Remark 3.1.1.5, one can arguably state that symmetric NEs are the most meaningful
for symmetric games. Furthermore, Lemma 3.1.1.7 implies that for symmetric games, one
can considerably reduce the complexity of the full system of QVIs (2.1.2.3) provided the
conjectured NE (or equivalently, the pair of payoffs) is symmetric. Using Convention 3.1.1.8,
Theorem 2.1.2.2 and Lemma 3.1.1.7 give:
Corollary 3.1.1.9 (Symmetric system of QVIs). Given a symmetric game as in Defi-
nition 3.1.1.1, let V : R→ R be a function with the UIP, such that:{
HV − V = 0 on − {MV − V = 0} =: −I∗
max
{AV − ρV + f,MV − V } = 0 on − {MV − V < 0} =: −C∗ (3.1.1.1)
and V ∈ C2(−C∗\∂C∗)∩C1(−C∗)∩C(R) has polynomial growth and bounded second deriva-
tive on some reduced neighbourhood of ∂C∗. Suppose further that (I∗, δ∗) is an admissible
strategy.
Then, V is a symmetric equilibrium payoff attained at a symmetric NE (I∗, δ∗).
4Note that g will denote g(x, δ) := g1(x,−δ), as δ ≥ 0 for player 1, yet g1 depends on the (negative)
impulse of player 2.
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Note that system (3.1.1.1) also omits the equationMV −V ≤ 0 as per being redundant.
Indeed, by Definition 3.1.1.1 and Remark 2.1.2.3, at a NE the player does not intervene
above 0, nor the opponent below it. Thus, MV − V ≤ max{AV − ρV + f,MV − V } = 0
on −C∗ ⊃ (−∞, 0] and MV − V < 0 on [0,+∞).
System (3.1.1.1) simplifies a numerical problem which is very challenging even in cases
of linear structure (see Chapter 2). In light of the previous, we will focus our attention on
symmetric NEs only and numerically solving the reduced system of QVIs (3.1.1.1).
3.2 Numerical discrete-space problem
In this section we consider a discrete version of the symmetric system of QVIs (3.1.1.1) over
a fixed grid, and propose and study an iterative method to solve it. As it is often done in
numerical analysis for stochastic control, for the sake of generality we proceed first in an
abstract fashion without making reference to any particular discretization scheme. Instead,
we give some general assumptions any such scheme should satisfy for the results presented
to hold. Explicit discretization schemes within our framework are presented in Section 3.2.6
and used in Section 3.3.
3.2.1 Discrete system of quasi-variational inequalities
From now on we work on a discrete symmetric grid
G : x−N = −xN < · · · < x−1 = −x1 < x0 = 0 < x1 < · · · < xN .
Recall that RG denotes the set of functions v : G → R and S : RG → RG denotes the
symmetry operator, Sv(x) = v(−x). In general, by an ‘operator’ we simply mean some
F : RG → RG, not necessarily linear nor affine unless explicitly stated. We shall identify
grid points with indexes, functions in RG with vectors and linear operators with matrices;
e.g., S = (Sij) with Sij = 1 if xi = −xj and 0 otherwise. The (partial) order considered in RG
and RG×G is the usual pointwise order for functions (elementwise for vectors and matrices),
and the same is true for the supremum, maximum and arg-maximum induced by it.
We want to solve the following discrete nonlinear system of QVIs for v ∈ RG:{
Hv − v = 0 on − {Mv − v = 0} =: −I∗
max
{
Lv + f,Mv − v} = 0 on − {Mv − v < 0} =: −C∗, (3.2.1.1)
where f ∈ RG and L : RG → RG is a linear operator. The nonlinear operators M,H : RG →
RG are as follows: let ∅ 6= Z(x) ⊆ R be a finite set for each x ∈ G, with Z(x) = {0} if
x ≥ 0. Set Z := ∏x∈G Z(x) and for each δ ∈ Z let B(δ) : RG → RG be a linear operator,
c(δ) ∈ (0,+∞)G and g(δ) ∈ RG, the three of them being row-decoupled (i.e., row x of
B(δ), c(δ), g(δ) depends only on δ(x) ∈ Z(x)). Then
Mv := max
δ∈Z
{
B(δ)v − c(δ)}, Hv = H(δ∗)v := SB(δ∗)Sv + g(Sδ∗) (3.2.1.2)
and δ∗ = δ∗(v) := max
(
arg max
δ∈Z
{
B(δ)v − c(δ)}). (3.2.1.3)
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Some remarks are in order. Firstly, in the same fashion as the continuous-space case,
the sets I∗, C∗ form a partition of the grid and represent the (discrete) intervention and
continuation regions of the player, while −I∗,−C∗ are such regions for the opponent.
Secondly, the general representation of M follows [CMS07, AF16]. For the standard
choices of B(δ), our definition of H is the only one for which a discrete version of Lemma
3.1.1.7 holds true (see Section 3.2.6). However, since B and g are row-decoupled, SB(δ∗)S
and g(Sδ∗) cannot be, as each row x depends on δ∗(−x). For this reason and the lack of
maximization over −I∗, there is no obvious way to reduce problem (3.2.1.1) to a classical
Bellman problem:
sup
ϕ
{− A(ϕ)v + b(ϕ)} = 0, (3.2.1.4)
like in the impulse control case [AF16], to apply Howard’s policy iteration [BMZ09, Ho-
1]. Furthermore, unlike in the control case, even with unidirectional impulses and good
properties for L and B(δ), system (3.2.1.1) may have no solution as in the analytical case
[ABC+19].
Thirdly, we have defined δ∗ in (3.2.1.3) by choosing one particular maximizing impulse for
each x ∈ G. The main motivation behind fixing one is to have a well defined discrete system
of QVIs for every v ∈ RG. (This is not the case for the analytical problem (3.1.1.1) where
the gain operator H is not well defined unless V has the UIP.) Being able to plug in any v in
(3.2.1.1) and obtain a residual will be useful in practice, when assessing the convergence of the
algorithm (see Section 3.3). Whether a numerical solution verifies, at least approximately, a
discrete UIP (and the remaining technical conditions of the Verification Theorem) becomes
something to be checked separately.
Remark 3.2.1.1. Choosing the maximum arg-maximum in (3.2.1.3) is partly motivated by
ensuring a discrete solution will inherit the property of Remark 2.1.2.4. (The proof remains
the same, for the discretizations of Section 3.2.6.) We will also motivate it in terms of the
proposed numerical algorithm in Remark 3.2.6.4. Note that in [ABM+19] (Chapter 2) the
minimum arg-maximum was used instead for both players. Nevertheless, the replication of
property (ii), Lemma 3.1.1.7, dictates that it is only possible to be consistent with [ABM+19]
for one of the two players (in this case, the opponent).
3.2.2 Iterative algorithm for symmetric games
This section introduces the iterative algorithm developed to solve system (3.2.1.1), which
builds on Algorithm 2.2.1.1 by harnessing the symmetry of the problem and dispenses with
the need for a relaxation scheme altogether. It is presented with a pseudocode that highlights
the mimicking of system (3.2.1.1) and the intuition behind the algorithm; namely:
• The player starts with some suboptimal strategy ϕ0 = (I0, δ0) and payoff v0, to which
the opponent responds symmetrically, resulting in a gain for the player (first equation
of (3.2.1.1); lines 1, 2 and 4 of Algorithm 3.2.2.1).
• The player improves her strategy by choosing the optimal response, i.e., by solving a
single-player impulse control problem through a policy-iteration-type algorithm (sec-
ond equation of (3.2.1.1); line 5 of Algorithm 3.2.2.1).
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• This procedure is iterated until reaching a stopping criteria (lines 6-8 of Algorithm
3.2.2.1).
Notation 3.2.2.1. In the following: G<0 and G≤0 represent the sets of grid points which are
negative and nonpositive respectively, and Φ the set of (discrete) strategies
Φ := {ϕ = (I, δ) : I ⊆ G<0 and δ ∈ Z}. (3.2.2.1)
Set complements are taken with respect to the whole grid, Id : RG → RG is the identity
operator; and given a linear operator O : RG → RG ' RG×G, v ∈ RG and subsets I, J ⊆ G,
vI ∈ RI denotes the restriction of v to I and OIJ ∈ RI×J the submatrix/operator with rows
in I and columns in J .
Algorithm 3.2.2.1 Iterative algorithm for symmetric games
Set tol, scale > 0.
1: Choose initial guess: v0 ∈ RG
2: Set I0 = {Lv0 + f ≤Mv0 − v0} ∩G<0 and δ0 = δ∗(v0)
3: for k = 0, 1, . . . do
4: vk+1/2 =
{
H(δk)vk on − Ik
vk on (−Ik)c
5: (vk+1, Ik+1, δk+1) = SolveImpulseControl(vk+1/2, (−Ik)c)
6: if ‖(vk+1 − vk)/max{|vk+1|, scale}‖∞ < tol then
7: break from the iteration
8: end if
9: end for
The scale parameter in line 5 of Algorithm 3.2.2.1, used throughout the literature by
Forsyth, Labahn and coauthors [AF16, FL07, HFL12, HFL13], prevents the enforcement of
unrealistic levels of accuracy for points x where vk+1(x) ≈ 0. Additionally, note that having
chosen the initial guess for the payoff v0, the initial guess for the strategy is taken as the
one induced by v0. (The alternative expression for the intervention region gives the same as{
Mv0 − v0 = 0} for a solution of (3.2.1.1).)
Line 5 of Algorithm 3.2.2.1 assumes we have a subroutine SolveImpulseControl(w,D)
that solves the constrained QVI problem:
max{Lv + f,Mv − v} = 0 on D, subject to v = w on Dc (3.2.2.2)
for fixed G≤0 ⊆ D ⊆ G (approximate continuation region of the opponent) and w ∈ RG
(approximate payoff due to the opponent’s intervention). Although we only need to solve
for v˜ = vD, the value of vDc = wDc impacts the solution both when restricting the equations
and when applying the nonlocal operator M . Hence, the approximate payoff vk+1/2 fed to
the subroutine serves to pass on the gain that resulted from the opponent’s intervention and
as an initial guess if desired (more on this on Remark 3.2.3.3).
The remaining of this section consists in establishing an equivalence between problem
(3.2.2.2) and a classical (unconstrained) QVI problem of impulse control. This allows us to
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prove the existence and uniqueness of its solution. In particular, we will see that SolveIm-
pulseControl can be defined, if wanted, by policy iteration. However, we will present in
the next section an alternative method that performs better in many practical situations and,
in particular, in the examples treated in Section 3.3. Let us suppose from here onwards that
the following assumptions hold true (see Appendix A for the relevant Definitions A.1.1.1):
(A0) For each strategy ϕ = (I, δ) ∈ Φ and x ∈ I, there exists a walk in graphB(δ) from row
x to some row y ∈ Ic.
(A1) −L is a strictly diagonally dominant (SDD) L0-matrix and, for each δ ∈ Z, Id−B(δ)
is a weakly diagonally dominant (WDD) L0-matrix.
Remark 3.2.2.2 (Interpretation). Assumptions (A0),(A1) are (H2),(H3) in [AF16]. For an
impulse operator (say, ‘B(δ)v(x) = v(x + δ)’), (A0) asserts that the player always wants
to shift states in her intervention region to her continuation region through finitely many
impulses. (This does not take into account the opponent’s response.) On the other hand,
if problem (3.2.2.2) was rewritten as a fixed point problem, (A1) would essentially mean
that the uncontrolled operator is contractive while the controlled ones are nonexpansive
(see [CMS07] and [AF16, Sect.4]).
Theorem 3.2.2.3. Assume (A0),(A1). Then, for every G≤0 ⊆ D ⊆ G and w ∈ RG, there
exists a unique v∗ ∈ RG that solves the constrained QVI problem (3.2.2.2). Further, v∗D is
the unique solution of
max
{
L˜v˜ + f˜ , M˜ v˜ − v˜
}
= 0, (3.2.2.3)
where L˜ := LDD, f˜ := fD+LDDcwDc , Z˜ :=
∏
x∈D Z(x), c˜(δ˜) := c(δ˜)−B(δ˜)DDcwDc and B˜(δ˜) :=
B(δ˜)DD for δ˜ ∈ Z˜; and M˜v˜ := maxδ˜∈Z˜
{
B˜(δ˜)v˜ − c˜(δ˜)} for v˜ ∈ RD.
Additionally, for any initial guess, the sequence (v˜k) ⊆ RD defined by policy itera-
tion [AF16, Thm.4.3] applied to problem (3.2.2.3), converges exactly to v∗D in at most |Φ˜|
iterations, with Φ˜ := {ϕ˜ = (I, δ˜) : I ⊆ G<0 and δ˜ ∈ Z˜} the set of restricted admissible
strategies.5
Proof. The equivalence between problems (3.2.2.2) and (3.2.2.3) is due to simple algebraic
manipulation and B(δ), c(δ) being row-decoupled for every δ ∈ Z. (B(δ˜), c(δ˜) are thus
defined in the obvious way for each δ˜ ∈ Z˜.)
The rest of the proof is mostly as in [AF16, Thm.4.3]. Let I˜d = IdDD. Each intervention
region I, can be identified with its indicator ψ˜ = 1I ∈ {0, 1}D since D ⊇ I, and each ψ˜ can be
identified in turn with a diagonal matrix having ψ˜ as main diagonal: Ψ˜ = diag(ψ˜) ∈ RD×D.
Then problem (3.2.2.3) takes the form of the classical Bellman problem
max
ϕ˜∈Φ˜
{− A(ϕ˜)v + b(ϕ˜)} = 0, (3.2.2.4)
if we take
A(ϕ˜) = −(I˜d− Ψ˜)L˜+ Ψ˜(I˜d− B˜(δ˜)) and b(ϕ˜) = (I˜d− Ψ˜)f˜ − Ψ˜c˜.
5|A| denotes the cardinal of set A.
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Note that Φ˜ can be identified with the Cartesian product
Φ˜ =
( ∏
x∈G<0
{0, 1} × Z(x)
)
×
( ∏
x∈D\G<0
{0} × Z(x)
)
and A(ϕ˜), b(ϕ˜) are row-decoupled for every ϕ˜ ∈ Φ˜. Since Φ˜ is finite, all we need to show
is that the matrices A(ϕ˜) are monotone (Definitions A.1.1.1 and [BMZ09, Thm.2.1]). Let
us check the stronger property (Thm. A.1.1.4 and Prop. A.1.1.3) of being weakly chained
diagonally dominant (WCDD) L0-matrices (see Definitions A.1.1.1).
If (A0) and (A1) also held true for the restricted matrices and strategies, the conclusion
would follow. While (A1) is clearly inherited, (A0) may fail to do so, but only in non-
problematic cases. To see this, let ϕ˜ = (I, δ˜) ∈ Φ˜, x ∈ I ⊆ D and let δ ∈ Z be some
extension of δ˜. Note that row x of A(ϕ˜) is WDD. We want to show that there is a walk in
graphA(ϕ˜) from x to an SDD row.
By (A0) there must exist some walk x → y1 → · · · → yn ∈ Ic in graphB(δ). If this is
in fact a walk from x to Ic ∩D in graphB˜(δ˜), then it verifies the desired property (just as
in [AF16, Thm.4.3]). If not, then there must be a first 1 ≤ m ≤ n such that the subwalk
x → y1 → · · · → ym is in graphB˜(δ˜) but ym+1 /∈ D. Since ym → ym+1 is an edge in
graphB(δ), we have B(δ)ym,ym+1 6= 0 and the WDD row (by (A1)) ym of I˜d − B˜(δ˜) is in
fact SDD. Meaning that the subwalk x → y1 → · · · → ym verifies the desired property
instead.
Remark 3.2.2.4. (Practical considerations) 1. While convergence is guaranteed to be ex-
act, floating point arithmetic can bring about stagnation [HFL13]. A stopping criteria like
that of Algorithm 3.2.2.1 should be used in those cases, with a tolerance  tol. 2. The
solution of system (3.2.2.3) does not change if one introduces a scaling factor λ > 0:
max
{
L˜v˜+ f˜ , λ
(
M˜v˜− v˜)} = 0 [AF16, Lem.4.1]. This problem-specific parameter is typically
added in the implementation to enhance performance [HFL12, AF16]. It can intuitively be
thought as a units adjustment.
3.2.3 Iterative subroutine for impulse control
Due to Theorem 3.2.2.3, a sensible choice for SolveImpulseControl is the classical pol-
icy iteration algorithm [AF16, Thm.4.3] applied to (3.2.2.3) (i.e., [BMZ09, Ho-1] applied to
(3.2.2.4)), adding an appropriately chosen scaling factor λ to improve efficiency (Remark
3.2.2.4 2). It does, however, bear some drawbacks in practice. At each iteration, one needs
to solve the system −A(ϕ˜k)vk+1 + b(ϕ˜k) = 0 for some ϕ˜k ∈ Φ˜. While the matrix L˜ typi-
cally has a good sparsity pattern in applications (often tridiagonal), the presence of B˜(δ˜k)
prevents A(ϕ˜k) from inheriting the same structure and makes the resolution of the previous
system a lot more costly, even when using a good ordering technique. An exact resolution
often becomes prohibitive and an iterative method, such as GMRES or BiCGSTAB with
preconditioning, is relied upon.
To circumvent the previous problem, we propose to choose SolveImpulseControl
as an instance of a very general class of algorithms known as fixed-point policy iteration
[HFL12,Cli07]. As far as the author knows, this application to impulse control was never done
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in the past other than heuristically in Chapter 2. Instead of solving −A(ϕ˜k)vk+1 + b(ϕ˜k) = 0
at the k-th iteration, we will solve(
(I˜d− Ψ˜k)L˜− Ψ˜k
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
−A˜(ϕ˜k)
vk+1 + Ψ˜kB˜(δ˜k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
B˜(ϕ˜k)
vk + b(ϕ˜k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
C˜(ϕ˜k)
= 0, (3.2.3.1)
(scaled by λ) where the previous iterate value vk is given and Ψ˜k is the diagonal matrix with
ψk as diagonal. In other words, we split the original policy matrix A(ϕ˜) = A˜(ϕ˜)− B˜(ϕ˜) and
we apply a one-step fixed-point approximation,
A˜
(
ϕ˜k
)
v˜k+1 = B˜
(
ϕ˜k
)
v˜k + C˜
(
ϕ˜k
)
, (3.2.3.2)
at each iteration of Howard’s algorithm. The resulting method can be expressed as follows
(tol and scale are as in Algorithm 3.2.2.1):
Subroutine 3.2.3.1 (v, I, δ) = SolveImpulseControl(w,D)
Inputs w ∈ RG and solvency region G≤0 ⊆ D ⊆ G
Outputs v ∈ RG, I ⊆ G<0, δ ∈ Z
Set scaling factor λ > 0 and 0 < t˜ol tol.
// Restrict constrained problem
1: L˜ := LDD, f˜ := fD + LDDcwDc
2: Z˜ :=
∏
x∈D Z(x), c˜(δ˜) := c(δ˜)−B(δ˜)DDcwDc , B˜(δ˜) := B(δ˜)DD for δ˜ ∈ Z˜
3: M˜v˜ := maxδ˜∈Z˜
{
B˜(δ˜)v˜ − c˜(δ˜)} for v˜ ∈ RD, I˜d := IdDD
// Solve restricted problem
4: Choose initial guess: v˜0 ∈ RD, I0 ⊆ G<0
5: for k = 0, 1, 2, . . . do
6: L˜kij =
{
L˜ij if xi ∈ D\Ik
−I˜dij if xi ∈ Ik
f˜k =
{
f˜ on ∈ D\Ik
M˜v˜k on Ik
7: v˜k+1 solution of L˜kv˜ + f˜k = 0
8: Ik+1 =
{
L˜v˜k+1 + f˜ ≤ λ(M˜v˜k+1 − v˜k+1)}
9: if ‖(v˜k+1 − v˜k)/max{v˜k+1, scale}‖∞ < t˜ol then
10: v =
{
v˜k+1 on D
wDc on D
c
, I = Ik+1, δ = δ∗(v) and break from the iteration
11: end if
12: end for
Lines 1-3 of Subroutine 3.2.3.1 deal with restricting the constrained problem, while the
rest give a routine that can be applied to any QVI of the form (3.2.2.3). Starting from
some suboptimal v˜0 and I0, one computes a new payoff v˜1 by solving the coupled equations
M˜v˜0− v˜1 = 0 on I0 and L˜v˜1 + f˜ = 0 outside I0. A new intervention region I1 = {L˜v˜1 + f˜ ≤
λ
(
M˜v˜1 − v˜1)} is defined and the procedure is iterated.
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Algorithmically, the difference with classical policy iteration is that v˜k+1 is computed in
Line 7 with a fixed obstacle M˜vk, changing a quasivariational inequality for a variational one.
The resulting method is intuitive and simple to implement, and the linear system (3.2.3.1)
(Line 7) inherits the sparsity pattern of L˜. This will normally result in more precision and
lower space and time complexity.6 For example, for an SDD tridiagonal L˜, the system can
be solved (exactly in exact arithmetic, and stably in floating point one) in O(n) operations,
with n = |D| [How60, Sect.9.5]. The matrix-vector multiply B˜(δ˜k)v˜k can take at most O(n2)
operations, but will reduce to O(n) for standard discretizations of impulse operators.
It is also worth mentioning that Subroutine 3.2.3.1 differs from the so-called iterated
optimal stopping [CØS02,ØS09] in that the latter solves max
{
L˜v˜k+1 + f˜ , M˜ v˜k − v˜k+1} = 0
exactly at the k-th iteration (by running a full subroutine of Howard’s algorithm with fixed
obstacle), while the former only performs one approximation step.
To establish the convergence of Subroutine 3.2.3.1 in the present framework, we add the
following assumption:
(A2) B(δ) has nonnegative diagonal elements for all δ ∈ Z.
Remark 3.2.3.1. (A2) and the requirement of (A1) that Id − B(δ) be a WDD L0-matrix
are equivalent to B(δ) being substochastic (see Appendix A). This is standard for impulse
operators (see Section 3.2.6) and other applications of fixed-point policy iteration [HFL12,
Sect.4-5].
Theorem 3.2.3.2. Assume (A0)–(A2) and set I0 = ∅. Then, for every G≤0 ⊆ D ⊆ G
and w ∈ RG, the sequence (v˜k) defined by SolveImpulseControl(w,D) is monotone
increasing for k ≥ 1 and converges to the unique solution of (3.2.2.3).
Proof. We can assume without loss of generality that λ = 1. Subroutine 3.2.3.1 takes the
form of a fixed-point policy iteration algorithm as per (3.2.3.2). Assumptions (A0),(A1) en-
sure (3.2.2.3) has a unique solution (Theorem 3.2.3.1) and that this scheme satisfies [HFL12,
Cond.3.1 (i),(ii)]. That is, A˜(ϕ˜) and A˜(ϕ˜) − B˜(ϕ˜) are nonsingular M -matrices (see proof
of Theorem 3.2.3.1 and Appendix A) and all coefficients are bounded since Φ˜ is finite.
In [HFL12, Thm.3.4] convergence is proved under one additional assumption of ‖ · ‖∞-
contractiveness [HFL12, Cond.3.1 (iii)], which is not verified in our case. However, the
same computations show that the scheme satisfies
A˜(ϕ˜k)(v˜k+1 − v˜k) ≥ B˜(ϕ˜k−1)(v˜k − v˜k−1) for all k ≥ 1. (3.2.3.3)
Since I0 = ∅, and due to (A1) and (A2), B˜(ϕ˜0) = 0 and B˜(ϕ˜k) ≥ 0 for all k. Thus, (v˜k)k≥1 is
increasing by monotonicity of A˜(ϕ˜k). Furthermore, it must be bounded, since for all k ≥ 1:
A˜
(
ϕ˜k
)
v˜k+1 = B˜
(
ϕ˜k
)
v˜k + C˜
(
ϕ˜k
) ≤ B˜(ϕ˜k)v˜k+1 + C˜(ϕ˜k),
which gives v˜k+1 ≤ (A˜(ϕ˜k) − B˜(ϕ˜k))−1C˜(ϕ˜k) ≤ maxϕ˜∈Φ˜(A˜(ϕ˜) − B˜(ϕ˜))−1C˜(ϕ˜). Hence, (v˜k)
converges.
6This refers to the overall time complexity of Subroutine 3.2.3.1, including the linear solves, and not just
the number of outer loops.
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Remark 3.2.3.3. In light of Theorem 3.2.3.2, moving forward we will set I0 = ∅ in Subroutine
3.2.3.1. It is natural however to choose v˜0 = wD and I
0 =
{
L˜v˜0 + f˜ ≤ λ(M˜v˜0 − v˜0)}. The
experiments performed with the latter choice displayed (non-monotone) convergence and
usually a faster one; but this is not proved here. Additionally, exact convergence was often
observed.
3.2.4 Overall routine as a fixed-point policy-iteration-type method
The system of QVIs (3.2.1.1) cannot be reduced in any apparent way to a Bellman for-
mulation (3.2.1.4) (see comments preceding equation). Notwithstanding, we shall see that
Algorithm 3.2.2.1 does take a very similar form to a fixed-point policy iteration algorithm
as in (3.2.3.2) for some appropriate A,B,C. Further, assumptions resembling those of the
classical case [HFL12] will be either satisfied or imposed to study its convergence. This
is independent of whether SolveImpulseControl is chosen as in Subroutine 3.2.3.1 or
Howard’s algorithm (Theorem 3.2.2.3), although we shall assume that the outputs Ik, δk in
the latter case are defined in the same way as in the former. The matrix and graph-theoretic
definitions and properties used throughout this section can be found in Appendix A.
Notation 3.2.4.1. We identify each intervention region I ⊆ G<0 with its indicator function
ψ = 1I ∈ {0, 1}G and each ψ with a diagonal matrix having ψ as main diagonal: Ψ =
diag(ψ) ∈ RG×G. The sequences (vk) and (ϕk), with ϕk = (ψk, δk), are the ones generated
by Algorithm 3.2.2.1. We consider v∗ ∈ RG fixed and ϕ∗ = (ψ∗, δ∗(v∗)) the induced strategy
with ψ∗ := {Lv∗ + f ≤Mv∗ − v∗} ∩G<0.
Proposition 3.2.4.2. Assume (A0)–(A2). Then,
A
(
ϕk, ϕk+1
)
vk+1 = B
(
ϕk
)
vk + C
(
ϕk, ϕk+1
)
, where: (3.2.4.1)
(i) ψk = 1{Lvk+f≤Mvk−vk}∩G<0 and δ
k ∈ arg maxδ∈Z
{
B(δ)vk − c(δ)}.
(ii) A
(
ϕ, ϕ
)
:= Id− (Id−Ψ− SΨS)(Id+L)−ΨB(δ) is a WCDD L0-matrix, and thus a
nonsingular M-matrix.
(iii) B
(
ϕ
)
:= SΨB(δ)S = diag(Sψ)SB(δ)S is substochastic.
(iv) C
(
ϕ, ϕ
)
:=
(
Id−Ψ− SΨS)f −Ψc(δ) + SΨSg(Sδ).
Proof. Using that (vk+1, Ik+1, δk+1) = SolveImpulseControl(vk+1/2, (−Ik)c) solves the
constrained QVI problem (3.2.2.2) for D = (−Ik)c and w = vk+1/2 (Theorem 3.2.2.3 or
3.2.3.2), the recurrence relation (3.2.4.1) results from simple algebraic manipulation.
Given ϕ, ϕ ∈ Φ, (A0) and (A1) ensure A(ϕ, ϕ) is a WCDD L0-matrix, while (A1) and
(A2) imply B
(
ϕ
)
is substochastic.
The following corollary is immediate by induction. It gives a representation of the se-
quence of payoffs in terms of the improving strategies throughout the algorithm.
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Corollary 3.2.4.3. Assume (A0)–(A2). Then,
vk+1 =
 0∏
j=k
A−1B
(
ϕj, ϕj+1
) v0 + k∑
n=0
n+1∏
j=k
A−1B
(
ϕj, ϕj+1
)A−1C(ϕn, ϕn+1).7 (3.2.4.2)
We now establish some properties of the strategy-dependent matrix coefficients that will
be useful in the sequel. Given a WDD (resp. substochastic) matrix A ∈ RG×G, we define its
set of ‘non-trouble states’ (or rows) as
J [A] := {x ∈ G : row x of A is SDD} (resp. Jˆ [A] := {x ∈ G : row x of A sums less than one}),
and its index of connectivity conA (resp. index of contraction ĉonA) by computing for each
state the least length that needs to be walked on graphA to reach a non-trouble one, and then
taking the maximum over all states (more details in Appendix A). This recently introduced
concept gives an equivalent charaterization of the WCDD property for a WDD matrix as
conA < +∞, and can be efficiently checked for sparse matrices in O(|G|) operations [Azi19a].
On the other hand, if A is substochastic then ĉonA < ∞ if and only if its spectral radius
verifies ρ(A) < 1 (Theorem A.1.1.6). The proof of the following lemma can be found in
Appendix A.
Lemma 3.2.4.4. Assume (A0)–(A2). Then for all ϕ, ϕ ∈ Φ, A−1B(ϕ, ϕ) is substochastic,
(A− B)(ϕ, ϕ) is a WDD L0-matrix and ĉon[A−1B(ϕ, ϕ)] ≤ con[(A− B)(ϕ, ϕ)].
As previously mentioned, system (3.2.1.1) may have no solution. The matrix coefficients
introduced in this section allow us to algebraically characterize the existence of such solutions
through strategy-dependent linear systems of equations. For each strategy ϕ ∈ Φ, let O(ϕ) :
RG → RG be the operator that applies Id+ L, M and H on the continuation, intervention
and opponent’s intervention regions, respectively. That is, O
(
ϕ
)
= Id − (A − B)(ϕ∗, ϕ∗) =(
Id−Ψ−SΨS)(Id+L)+ΨB(δ)+SΨB(δ)S. Then the following equivalences are immediate.
Proposition 3.2.4.5. Assume (A0)–(A2). Then the following statements are equivalent:
(i) v∗ solves the system of QVIs (3.2.1.1).
(ii) A
(
ϕ∗, ϕ∗
)
v∗ = B
(
ϕ∗
)
v∗ + C
(
ϕ∗, ϕ∗
)
.
(iii) v∗ = O
(
ϕ∗
)
v∗ + C
(
ϕ∗, ϕ∗
)
.
As mentioned in Remark 3.2.2.2, Assumption (A0) constrains the type of strategies the
player can use, but without taking into account the opponent’s response. This is enough
for the single-player constrained problems to have a solution and, therefore, for Algorithm
3.2.2.1 to be well defined. But we cannot expect this restriction to be sufficient in the study
of the two-player game and the convergence of the overall routine.
In order to improve the result of Proposition 3.2.4.5 let us consider the following stronger
version of (A0) reflecting the interaction between the player and the opponent.
7For any index i ≤ k, ∏ij=k Aj := AkAk−1 . . . Ai.
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(A0’) For each pair of strategies ϕ, ϕ ∈ Φ, and for each x ∈ I ∪ (−I), there exists a walk in
graph(ΨB(δ) + SΨB(δ)S) from row x to some row y ∈ C ∩C, where C = Ic, C = Ic.
Remark 3.2.4.6. (Interpretation) If ϕ,−ϕ are the strategies used by the player and the
opponent respectively,8 then (A0’) asserts that states in their intervention regions will even-
tually be shifted to the common continuation region. This precludes infinite simultaneous
interventions and emulates the admissibility condition of the continuous-state case. Fixing
I = ∅ we recover (A0). Additionally, (A0’) together with (A1) imply that (A − B)(ϕ, ϕ)
is a WCDD L0-matrix, hence an M -matrix. This is another one of the assumptions of the
classical fixed-point policy iteration [HFL12].
Under this new assumption, the ϕ∗ = ϕ∗(v∗)-dependent systems of Proposition 3.2.4.5
will admit a unique solution. Then solving the original problem (3.2.1.1) amounts to finding
v∗ ∈ RG that solves its induced linear system of equations.
Proposition 3.2.4.7. Assume (A0’),(A1),(A2). In the context of Proposition 3.2.4.5, the
following statements are also equivalent:
(iv) v∗ = (A− B)−1C(ϕ∗, ϕ∗).
(v) v∗ = (Id − A−1B)−1A−1C(ϕ∗, ϕ∗) = ∑n≥0 (A−1B)nA−1C(ϕ∗, ϕ∗). (cf. equation
(3.2.4.2).)
Proof. Both expressions result from rewriting and solving the systems of Proposition 3.2.4.5.
Assumptions (A0’),(A1) guarantee that (A− B)(ϕ∗, ϕ∗) is WCDD and, hence, nonsingular.
Then (v) is due to Lemma 3.2.4.4, Theorem A.1.1.6 and the matrix power series expansion
(1−X)−1 = ∑n≥0Xn, when ρ(X) < 1.
3.2.5 Convergence analysis
We now study the convergence properties of Algorithm 3.2.2.1. Henceforth, the UIP refers
to the obvious discrete analogue of Definition 2.1.2.1, where we replace the domain R, the
impulse constraints Z and the operatorM by their discretizations G, Z and M respectively.
The obvious first question to address is whether when Algorithm 3.2.2.1 converges, it does
so to a solution of the system of QVIs (3.2.1.1). Unlike in the classical Bellman problem
(3.2.1.4), problem (3.2.1.1) is intrinsically dependent on the particular strategy chosen by the
player (see Propositions 3.2.4.5 and 3.2.4.7). Accordingly, we start with a lemma addressing
what can be said about the convergence of the strategies (ϕk) when the payoffs (vk) converge.
Notation 3.2.5.1. ∂I∗ := {Lv∗+f = Mv∗−v∗}∩G<0 denotes the ‘border’ of the intervention
region {Lv∗ + f ≤Mv∗ − v∗} ∩G<0 defined by v∗.
Lemma 3.2.5.2. Assume (A0)-(A2) and suppose vk → v∗. Then:
(i) ψk → ψ∗ in (∂I∗)c and Mvk →Mv∗.
8The slight abuse of notation −ϕ stands for the strategy symmetric to ϕ, i.e., −ϕ = (−I,−δ(−x)).
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(ii) If ψ, δ are any two limit points of (ψk), (δk) resp.,9 then
δ ∈ arg max
δ∈Z
{
B(δ)v∗ − c(δ)}, ψ = 0 on G>=0 and ψ ∈ arg max
i∈{0,1}
{
Oiv
∗} on G<0,
with O0v = Lv + f and O1v = Mv − v.
(iii) If v∗ has the UIP, then δk → δ∗(v∗) and Hvk → Hv∗.
Proof. That Mvk →Mv∗ is clear by continuity of the operators B(δ) and finiteness of Z.
Let x ∈ (∂I∗)c and suppose Lv∗(x) + f(x) < Mv∗(x) − v∗(x) (the other case being
analogue). By continuity of L and M there must exist some k0 such that Lv
k(x) + f(x) <
Mvk(x)− vk(x) for all k ≥ k0, which implies ψk(x) = 1 = ψ∗(x) for k ≥ k0.
The statement about ψ, δ is proved as before by considering appropriate subsequences.
Consequently, if v∗ has the UIP, then necessarily δk → δ∗(v∗) and Hvk → Hv∗.
As a corollary we can establish that, should the sequence (vk) converge, its limit must
solve problem (3.2.1.1). If convergence is not exact however (i.e., in finite iterations), then we
will ask that v∗ verifies some of the properties of the Verification Theorem in Corollary 3.1.1.9.
Namely, the UIP and a discrete analogue of the continuity in the border of the opponent’s
intervention region. We emphasize that our main motivation in solving system (3.2.1.1)
relies in Corollary 3.1.1.9 and its framework. Additionally, in most practical situations
and for fine-enough grids, one can intuitively expect the discretization of an equilibrium
payoff as in Corollary 3.1.1.9 to inherit the UIP. Lastly, we note that the exact equality
Lv∗+ f = Mv∗− v∗ will typically not be verified for any point in the grid in practice, giving
∂I∗ = ∅.
Corollary 3.2.5.3. Assume (A0)–(A2) and suppose vk → v∗. Then:
(i) If the convergence is exact, then v∗ solves the system of QVIs (3.2.1.1).
(ii) If v∗ has the UIP and Lv∗ + f = Hv∗ − v∗ on −∂I∗, then v∗ solves (3.2.1.1).
Proof. (i) is immediate from the definition of Algorithm 3.2.2.1.
In the general case, since {0, 1}G is finite, there is a subsequence of (ψk, ψk+1) that
converges to some pair (ψ, ψ). Passing to such subsequence, by Lemma 3.2.5.2, the UIP of
v∗ and equation (3.2.4.1), we get that v∗ solves the system A
(
ϕ, ϕ
)
v∗ = B
(
ϕ
)
v∗ + C
(
ϕ, ϕ
)
for ϕ =
(
ψ, δ∗(v∗)
)
, ϕ =
(
ψ, δ∗(v∗)
)
and ψ, ψ coincide with ψ∗ except possibly on ∂I∗. Thus,
it only remains to show that v∗ also solves the equations of the system (3.2.1.1) for any
x ∈ ∂I∗ ∪ (−∂I∗).
For x ∈ ∂I∗, the previous is true by definition. Suppose now x ∈ −∂I∗ ⊆ Ic. We have
ψ∗(−x) = 1. If ψ(−x) = 1, there is nothing to prove. If ψ(−x) = 0, then x ∈ Ic ∩ (−I)c and
0 = Lv∗(x) + f(x) = Hv∗(x)− v∗(x), where the last equality holds true by assumption.
Lemma 3.2.5.2 shows to what extent the convergence of the payoffs imply the convergence
of the strategies. The following theorem, of theoretical interest, establishes a reciprocal
under the stronger assumption (A0’). In general, since the set of strategies Φ is finite, the
9By ‘limit point’ we mean the limit of a convergent subsequence.
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sequence of strategy-dependent coefficients of the fixed-point equations (3.2.4.1) will always
be bounded and with finitely many limit points. However, if the approximating strategies
are such that the former coefficients convergence, then Algorithm 3.2.2.1 is guaranteed to
converge. Further, instead of looking at the convergence of
(
A,B,C
)(
ϕk, ϕk+1
)
, we can
instead consider the weaker condition of
(
A−1B,A−1C
)(
ϕk, ϕk+1
)
converging.
Theorem 3.2.5.4. Assume (A0’),(A1),(A2). If
(
A−1B
(
ϕk, ϕk+1
))
and
(
A−1C
(
ϕk, ϕk+1
))
converge, then (vk) converges.
Proof. Set b = limk A−1C
(
ϕk, ϕk+1
)
. Since Φ is finite, there must exist k0 ∈ N and ϕ, ϕ ∈ Φ
such that A−1B
(
ϕk, ϕk+1
)
= A−1B
(
ϕ, ϕ
)
and A−1C
(
ϕk, ϕk+1
)
= b for all k ≥ k0. Moreover,
under our assumptions, (A−B)(ϕ, ϕ) is a WCDD L0-matrix. Then Lemma 3.2.4.4 and The-
orem A.1.1.6 imply that A−1B
(
ϕ, ϕ
)
is contractive for some matrix norm. Lastly, note that
the sequence of payoffs (vk)k≥k0 now satisfies the classical (constant-coefficients) contractive
fixed-point recurrence vk+1 = A−1B
(
ϕ, ϕ
)
vk + b, which converges to the unique fixed-point
of the equation.
The classical fixed-point policy-iteration framework [HFL12,Cli07] assumes uniform con-
tractiveness in ‖·‖∞ of the sequence of operators. This is a natural norm to consider in a con-
text where matrices have properties defined row by row, such as diagonal dominance.10 How-
ever, the authors mention convergence in experiments where only ‖ · ‖∞-non-expansiveness
held true. The latter is the typical case in our context, for the matrices A−1B
(
ϕk, ϕk+1
)
,
which is why Theorem 3.2.5.4 relies on the fact that a spectral radius strictly smaller than
one guarantees contractiveness in some matrix norm.
It is natural to ask whether there is some contractiveness condition that may account
for the observations in [HFL12,Cli07] and that can be generalized to our context to further
the study of Algorithm 3.2.2.1. Imposing a uniform bound on the spectral radii would
not only be hard to check, but also difficult to manipulate, as the spectral radius is not
sub-multiplicative.11 Instead, we can consider the sequential indexes of contraction and
connectivity, which naturally generalize those of the previous section by means of walks in
the graph of a sequence of matrices (see Appendix A for more details). As before, they
can be identified with one another (see Lemma A.1.1.5) and, given substochastic matrices,
the sequential index of contraction tells us how many we need to multiply before the result
becomes ‖ ·‖∞-contractive (Theorem A.1.1.7). Thus, let us consider a uniform bound on the
following sequential indexes of connectivity:
(A0”) There exists m ∈ N0 such that for any sequence of strategies (ϕk) ⊆ Φ,
con
[(
A− B)(ϕk, ϕk+1))
k
]
≤ m.
Remark 3.2.5.5. Given ϕ, ϕ ∈ Φ, by considering the sequence ϕ, ϕ, ϕ, ϕ, . . . , we see that
(A0”) implies (A0’). In fact, (A0”) can be interpreted as precluding infinite simultaneous
impulses even when the players can adapt their strategies (cf. Remark 3.2.4.6) and imposing
10Recall that this norm can be computed as the maximum absolute value row sum.
11ρ(AB) ≤ ρ(A)ρ(B) does not hold in general when the matrices A and B do not commute.
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that the number of shifts needed for any state to reach the common continuation region is
bounded.
Under this stronger assumption, we have:
Proposition 3.2.5.6. Assume (A0”),(A1),(A2). Then (vk) is bounded.
Proof. In a similar way to Lemma 3.2.4.4, one can check that under (A0”),(A1),(A2) we
have the following uniform bound for the sequential indexes of contraction:
ĉon
[(
A−1B)
(
ϕk, ϕk+1
))
k
]
≤ m,
for any sequence of strategies (ϕk) ⊆ Φ. In other words, multiplying any m + 1 of the
previous substochastic matrices results in a ‖.‖∞-contractive one. Furthermore, since Φm+1
is finite, there must a be uniform uniform contraction constant C1 < 1. Let C2 > 0 be a
uniform bound for A−1C. By the representation in Corollary 3.2.4.2,
‖vk+1‖∞ ≤ ‖v0‖∞ + C2
k∑
n=0
C
[
k−n
m+1
]
1 ≤ ‖v0‖∞ + (m+ 1)C2
∞∑
n=0
Cn1 < +∞.12
Given n0 ∈ N and k > (m + 1)n0, the same argument of the previous proof shows that
one can decompose (vk) as vk+1 = uk + F (ϕk−(m+1)n0 , . . . , ϕk) + wk, for a fixed function
F , ‖uk‖∞ ≤ C [k/(m+1)]1 ‖v0‖ → 0 and ‖wk‖∞ ≤ (m + 1)C2
∑∞
n=n0
Cn1 . The latter is small if
n0 is large. Hence, one could heuristically expect that the trailing strategies are often the
ones dominating the convergence of the algorithm. In fact, in all the experiments carried
out with a discretization satisfying (A0”),(A1),(A2), a dichotomous behaviour was observed:
the algorithm either converged or at some point reached a cycle between a few payoffs. In
the latter case, and restricting attention to instances in which one heuristically expects a
solution to exist (more details in Section 3.3), it was possible to reduce the residual to the
QVIs and the distance between the iterates by refining the grid.
The previous motivates the study of Algorithm 3.2.2.1 when the grid is sequentially
refined, instead of fixed. Such an analysis however, would likely entail the need of a viscosity
solutions framework as in [ABL18, BS91], which does not currently exist in the literature
of nonzero-sum stochastic impulse games. Consequently, this analysis and the stronger
convergence results that may come out of it are inevitably outside the scope of this thesis.
3.2.6 Discretization schemes
Let us conclude this section by showing how one can discretize the symmetric system of
QVIs (3.1.1.1) to obtain (3.2.1.1) in a way that satisfies the assumptions present throughout
the chapter. Recall that we work on a given symmetric grid G : x−N = −xN < · · · < x−1 =
−x1 < x0 = 0 < x1 < · · · < xN .
12For any x ∈ R, [x] denotes its integer part.
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Firstly, we want a discretization L of the operator A − ρId such that −L is an SDD
L0-matrix as per (A1). A standard way to do this is to approximate the first (resp. second)
order derivatives with forward and backward (resp. central) differences in such a way that we
approximate the ODE 1
2
σ2V ′′ + µV ′ − ρV + f = 0 with an upwind (or positive-coefficients)
scheme. More precisely, for each x = xi ∈ G we approximate the first derivative with a
forward (resp. backward) difference if its coefficient in the previous equation is nonegative
(resp. negative) in xi,
V ′(xi) ≈ V (xi+1)− V (xi)
xi+1 − xi if µ(xi) ≥ 0 and V
′(xi) ≈ V (xi)− V (xi+1)
xi − xi+1 if µ(xi) < 0
and the second derivative by
V ′′(xi) ≈ V (xi+1)− V (xi)
(xi+1 − xi)(xi+1 − xi−1) −
V (xi)− V (xi−1)
(xi − xi−1)(xi+1 − xi−1) .
In the case of an equispaced grid with step size h, this reduces to
V ′(x) ≈ V
(
x+ sgn(µ(x))h
)− V (x)
sgn(µ(x))h
and V ′′(x) ≈ V (x+ h)− 2V (x) + V (x− h)
h2
.13
For the previous stencils to be defined in the extreme points of the grid, we consider two
additional points x−N−1, xN+1 and replace V (x−N−1), V (xN+1) in the previous formulas by
some values resulting from artificial boundary conditions. A common choice is to impose
Neumann conditions to solve for V (x−N−1), V (xN+1) using the first order differences from
before. For example, in the equispaced grid case, given LBC,RBC ∈ R we solve for V (x−N−
h) (resp. V (xN + h)) from the Neumann condition
LBC = V ′
(
x−N − h1{
µ(x−N )≥0
}) (resp. RBC = V ′(xN + h1{
µ(xN )<0
})),
yielding V (x−N − h) ≈ V (x−N) − LBCh (resp. V (xN + h) ≈ V (xN) + RBCh). The choice
of LBC,RBC is problem-specific and intrinsically linked to that of xN , although it does not
affect the properties of the discrete operators. See more details in Section 3.3.
The described procedure leads to a discretization of the ODE as Lv + f = 0, with L
satisfying the properties we wanted. (The strict diagonal dominance is a consequence of
ρ > 0.) Note that the values of f at x−N , xN need to be modified to account for the
boundary conditions.
Remark 3.2.6.1. One could increase the overall order of approximation by using central
differences as much as possible for the first order derivatives, provided the scheme remains
upwind (see [FL07, WF08] for more details). This is not done here in order to simplify the
presentation.
We now approximate the impulse constraint sets Z(x) (x ∈ R) by finite sets ∅ 6= Z(x) ⊆
[0,+∞) (x ∈ G), such that Z(x) = {0} if x ≥ 0, and define the impulse operators
B(δ)v(x) = v[[x+ δ(x)]], for v ∈ RG, δ ∈ Z, x ∈ G,
13sgn denotes the sign function, sgn(x) = 1 if x ≥ 0 and −1 otherwise.
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where v[[y]] denotes linear interpolation of v on y using the closest nodes on the grid, and
v[[y]] = v(x±N) if ±y > ±x±N (i.e., ‘no extrapolation’). This univocally defines the discrete
loss and gain operators M and H as per (3.2.1.2), as well as the optimal impulse δ∗ according
to (3.2.1.3). The set of discrete strategies Φ is defined as in (3.2.2.1).
This general discretization scheme satisfies assumptions (A0)–(A2) and one can impose
some regularity conditions on the sets Z(x) and Z(x) such that the solutions of the discrete
QVI problems (3.2.2.2) converge locally uniformly to the unique viscosity solution of the
analytical impulse control problem, as the grid is refined.14 See [Azi17, ABL18] for more
details.
Example 3.2.6.2. In the case where Z(x) = [0,+∞) for x < 0, a natural and most simple
choice for Z(x) is Z(xi) = {0, xi+1 − xi, . . . , xN − xi} for i < 0. In this case, B(δ)v(x) =
v(x + δ(x)) and Hv(x) = v(x − δ∗(−x)) + g(x,−δ∗(−x)). This choice, however, does not
satisfy (A0’).
In order to preclude infinite simultaneous interventions it is enough to constrain the
size of the impulses so that the symmetric point of the grid cannot be reached. That is,
Z(x) ⊆ [0,−2x) for any x ∈ G<0. In this case, the scheme satisfies the stronger conditions
(A0”),(A1),(A2) (and in particular, (A0’)). Note that we can take m = N in (A0”), as
each positive impulse will lead to a state which is at least one node closer to x0 = 0, where
no player intervenes. Practically, it makes sense to make this choice when one suspects (or
wants to check whether) there is a symmetric NE with no ‘far-reaching impulses’, in the
previous sense.
Example 3.2.6.3. If Z(x) = [0,+∞) for x < 0, the analogous of Example 3.2.6.2 is now
Z(xi) = {0, xi+1 − xi, . . . , x−i−1 − xi} for i < 0.
Remark 3.2.6.4. Consider Example 3.2.6.3 in the context of Remark 3.2.1.1. As in Proposi-
tion 3.2.5.6 and due to Theorem A.1.1.7, the less impulses needed between the two players to
reach the common continuation region, the faster that the composition of the fixed-point op-
erators of Algorithm 3.2.2.1 becomes contractive. Hence, one could intuitively expect that
when close enough to the solution, the choice of the maximum arg-maximum in (3.2.1.3)
improves the performance of Algorithm 3.2.2.1. This is another motivation for such choice.
3.3 Numerical results
This section presents numerical results obtained on a series of experiments. See the introduc-
tion of Chapter 2, Section 2.1.3 and Section 3.1 for the motivation and applications behind
some of them. We do not assume additional constraints on the impulses in the analytical
problem. All the results presented were obtained on equispaced grids with step size h > 0
(to be specified) and with a discretization scheme as in Section 3.2.6 and Example 3.2.6.3.
The extreme points of the grid are displayed on each graph.
For the games with linear costs and gains of the form c(x, δ) = c0 + c1δ and g(x, δ) =
g0 + g1δ, with c0, c1, g0, g1 constant, the artificial boundary conditions were taken as LBC
14Additional technical conditions include costs bounded away from zero and a comparison principle for
the analytical QVI.
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= c1 and RBC = g1 for a sufficiently extensive grid. They result from the observation
that on a hypothetical symmetric NE of the form ϕ∗ =
(
(−∞, x], δ∗(x) = y∗ − x), with
x < 0, x < y∗ ∈ R, the equilibrium payoff verifies V (x) = V (y∗)− c0 − c1(y∗ − x) for x < x
and V (x) = V (−y∗) + g0 + g1(x+ y∗) for x > −x. For other examples, LBC, RBC and the
grid extension were chosen by heuristic guesses and/or trial and error. However, in all the
examples presented the error propagation from poorly chosen LBC,RBC was minimal.
The initial guess was set as v0 = 0 and its induced strategy in all cases. SolveImpulseC-
ontrol was chosen as Subroutine 3.2.3.1 with t˜ol = 10−15 and λ = 1.15 Its convergence
was exact however, in all the examples, and faster (in terms of time elapsed and number of
operations) when it was compared with Howard’s policy iteration (not reported). Instead of
fixing a terminal tolerance tol beforehand, we display the highest accuracy that was attained
in each case and the number of iterations needed for it.
Section 3.3.1 considers a fixed grid and games where the results point to the existence
of a symmetric NE as per Corollary 3.1.1.9. Not having an analytical solution to compare
with, results are assessed by means of the percentage difference between the iterates
Diff :=
∥∥∥(vk+1 − vk)/max{|vk+1|, scale}∥∥∥
∞
,
with scale = 1 as in [AF16], and the maximum pointwise residual to the system of QVIs
(3.2.1.1), defined for v ∈ RG by setting I = {Lv + f ≤Mv − v} ∩G<0, C = Ic and
maxResQVIs(v) :=
∥∥max{Lv + f,Mv − v}1−C + (Hv − v)1−I∥∥∞ .
Section 3.3.2 considers the only symmetric games in the literature with (semi-) analyt-
ical solution: the central bank linear game of Section 2.1.3 and the cash management
game [BCG19], and computes the errors made by discrete approximations, showing in par-
ticular the effect of refining the grid. Not considered here is the strategic pollution control
game [FK19], due to its inherent non-symmetric nature. Section 3.3.3 comments on results
obtained for games without NEs. Finally, Section 3.3.4 shows results that go beyond the
scope of the currently available theory for impulse games.
3.3.1 Convergence to discrete solution on a fixed grid
Throughout this section the grid step size is fixed as h = 0.01, unless otherwise stated (al-
though results where corroborated by further refinements). Each figure specifies the struc-
ture, G = (µ, σ, ρ, f, c, g), of the symmetric game solved and shows the numerical solutions
at the terminal iteration for the equilibrium payoff, vk, and NE. Graphs plot payoff versus
state of the process. The intervention region is displayed in red over the graph of the payoff
for presentation purposes.
As a general rule, we focus on games with higher costs c than gains g, as the opposite
typically leads to players attempting to apply infinite simultaneous impulses [ABC+19] (i.e.,
inducing a gain from the opponent’s intervention is ‘cheap’) leading to degenerate games.
The following games resulted in exact convergence in finite iterations, which guarantees a
15For very fine grids, one should increase the value of t˜ol to avoid stagnation as per Remark 3.2.2.4, and
the same being true for Subroutine 3.2.3.1.
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solution of (3.2.1.1) was reached (Corollary 3.2.5.3), although very small acceptable errors
were reached much sooner.
Figure 3.1
Figure 3.2
Figure 3.3
The following is an example in which the accuracy stagnates. At that point, the iterates
start going back and forth between a few values. Although we cannot guarantee that we
are close to a solution of (3.2.1.1), the results seem quite convincing, with both Diff and
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maxResQVIs reasonably low. In fact, simply halving the step size to h = 0.005 produces a
substantial improvement of Diff=9.16e-11% and maxResQVIs=9.19e-11 in k =33 iterations.
Figure 3.4
The previous games have a state variable evolving as a scaled Brownian motion. We now
move on to a mean reverting OU process with zero long term mean. (Recall that any other
value can be handled simply by shifting the game.) In general, the experiments with these
dynamics converged exactly in a very small number of iterations.
Figure 3.5
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Figure 3.6
Note how all the games treated in this section exhibit a typical feature known to hold
for simpler symmetric games (see Chapter 2 and [ABC+19,BCG19]): the equilibrium payoff
of the player is only C1 at the border of the intervention region ∂I∗ = {AV − ρV + f =
MV − V } ∩ R<0, and only continuous at the border of the opponent’s intervention region
−∂I∗. In floating point arithmetic, the former makes the discrete approximation of ∂I∗
particularly elusive, while the latter can lead to high errors when close to −∂I∗. As a
consequence, Subroutine 3.2.3.1 (or any equivalent) will often misplace a few grid nodes
between intervention and continuation regions, which will in turn make the residual resQVIs
‘spike’ on the opponent’s side. Thus, a large value of maxResQVIs can at times be misleading,
and further inspection of the pointwise residuals is advisable.
As a matter of fact, halving the step size to h = 0.005 in the last example results in exact
convergence with terminal maxResQVIs= 2510, but the residuals on all grid nodes other
than the ‘border’ of the opponent’s intervention region and a contiguous one are less than
1.43e-11. This is an extreme example propitiated by the almost vertical shape of the solution
close to such border. Thus, while it is useful in practice to consider a stopping criteria for
Algorithm 3.2.2.1 based on maxResQVIs, this phenomenon needs to be minded.
The last example also shows how impulses at a NE can lead to different endpoints de-
pending on the state of the process. This is often the case when costs are nonlinear. In
fact:
Lemma 3.3.1.1. Let (I∗, δ∗) and V be a symmetric NE and equilibrium payoff as in Corol-
lary 3.1.1.9. Assume that Z(x) = [0,+∞) for x < 0 and c = c(x, δ) ∈ C2(R × (0,+∞)),
and consider the re-parametrization c = c(x, y) := c(x, y − x). Suppose that y∗ := x + δ∗(x)
is constant for all x ∈ (I∗)◦.16 Then cxy(x, y∗) ≡ 0 on (I∗)◦.
The result is immediate since MV (x) = supy>x{V (y) − c(x, y)} = V (y∗) − c(x, y∗) on
(I∗)◦ and V ∈ C1( − C∗). (y∗ /∈ −I∗ or there would be infinite simultaneous impulses.)
While the sufficient condition cxy(x, y
∗) ≡ 0 for some y∗ is verified for linear costs, it is not
in general and certainly not for c(x, δ) = 10 + 20
√
δ as in the last example.
16A◦ denotes the interior of the set A ⊆ R.
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3.3.2 Convergence to analytical solution with refining grids
A convergence analysis from discrete to analytical solution with refining grids is outside the
scope of this thesis, and seems to be far too challenging when a viscosity solutions framework
is yet to be developed. Instead, we present here a numerical validation using the solutions
of the linear and cash management games. We focus first and foremost in the former, as it
has an almost fully analytical solution, with only one parameter to be found numerically as
opposed to four for the latter. The structure of the game is defined with parameter values
used in [ABC+19] (also in Chapter 2). To minimize rounding errors from floating point
arithmetic, we proceed as in [AF16] considering grids made up entirely of machine numbers.
The results are displayed in Table 3.1.
For each step size, Algorithm 3.2.2.1 either converged or was terminated upon stagnation.
Regardless, we can see the errors made when approximating the analytical solution are quite
satisfactory in all cases, and overall decrease as h → 0. Moreover, we see once again how
the ‘spiking’ of the residual can be misleading (the highest value was always at the ‘border’
of the opponent’s intervention region).
h %error Its. maxResQVIs
1 6.67% 17 8.88e-16
1/2 8.33% 13 5.33e-15
1/4 0.23% 4 13.2
1/8 0.21% 8 15.1
1/16 0.16% 8 30
1/32 0.07% 21 21.2
1/64 0.0043% 37 0.343
Table 3.1: Convergence to analytical
solution when refining equispaced sym-
metric grid with step size h and end-
point xN = 4. Game: µ = 0, σ =
.15, ρ = .02, f = x + 3, c = 100 +
15δ, g = 15δ. %error := ‖(v−V )/V ‖∞,
with V exact solution and v discrete ap-
proximation after Its iterations. ‖ · ‖∞
is computed over the grid.
An exact symmetric NE for this game (up to five significant figures) is given by the
intervention region I∗ = (−∞,−2.8238] and impulse function δ∗(x) = 1.5243− x, while the
approximation given by Algorithm 3.2.2.1 with h = 1/64 is
(
(−∞,−2.8125], 1.5313 − x),
with absolute errors on the parameters of no more than the step size.
The cash management game [BCG19] with unidirectional impulses can be embedded in
our framework by reducing its dimension with the change of variables x = x1 − x2, chang-
ing minimization by maximization and relabelling the players. With the parameter values
of [BCG19, Fig.1b], it translates into the game: µ = 0, σ = 1, ρ = .5, f = −|x|, c =
3 + δ, g = −1. The authors found numerically a symmetric NE approximately equal
to
(
(−∞,−5.658], 0.686 − x), while Algorithm 3.2.2.1 with xN = 8 and h = 1/64 gives(
(−∞,−5.6563], 0.6875−x). The absolute difference on the parameters is once again below
the grid step size.
3.3.3 Games without Nash equilibria
It is natural to ask how Algorithm 3.2.2.1 behaves on games without symmetric NEs, and
whether anything can be inferred from the results. For the linear game, two cases without
NEs (symmetric or not) are addressed in [ABC+19]: ‘no fixed cost’ and ‘gain greater than
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cost’. Both of them yield degenerate ‘equilibria’ where the players perform infinite simul-
taneous interventions. When tested for several parameters, Algorithm 3.2.2.1 converged in
finitely many iterations (although rather slowly) and yielded the exact same type of ‘equi-
libria’.17 For a fine enough grid, the previous can be identified heuristically by some node in
the intervention region that would be shifted to its symmetric one (infinite alternated inter-
ventions), or to its immediate successor over and over again, until reaching the continuation
region (infinite one-sided interventions).18
In the first case, we recovered the limit ‘equilibrium payoffs’ of [ABC+19, Props.4.10,4.11].
Intuitively, the players in this game take advantage of free interventions, whether by no cost
or perfect compensation, in order to shift the process as desired. Note that when c = g, the
impulses that maximimize the net payoff are not unique.
In the second case, grid refinements showed the discrete payoffs to diverge towards infinity
at every point. This is again consistent with the theory: each player forces the other one to
act, producing a positive instantaneous profit. Iterating this procedure infinitely often leads
to infinite payoffs for every state.
Tested games in which Algorithm 3.2.2.1 failed to converge (and not due to stagnation nor
a poor choice of the grid extension) were characterized by iterates reaching a cycle, typically
with high values of Diff and maxResQVIs regardless of the grid step size. In many cases,
the cycles would visit at least one payoff inducing infinite simultaneous impulses. While this
might, potentially and heuristically, be indicative of the game admitting no symmetric NE,
there is not much more than can be said at this stage.
3.3.4 Beyond the Verification Theorem
We now present two games in which the solution of the discrete QVIs system (3.2.1.1)
found with Algorithm 3.2.2.1 (by exact convergence) does not comply with the continuity
and smoothness assumptions of Corollary 3.1.1.9. However, the results are sensible enough
to heuristically argue they may correspond to NEs beyond the scope of the Verification
Theorem. In both cases h = 0.01. Finer grids yielded the same qualitative results.
The first game considers costs convex in the impulse. When far enough from her con-
tinuation region, it is cheaper for the player to apply several (finitely many) simultaneous
impulses instead of one, to reach the state she wishes to (cf. Remark 2.1.2.4). In this game,
the optimal impulse δ∗ becomes discontinuous, and its discontinuity points are those in the
intervention region where the equilibrium payoff is non-differentiable. These, in turn, trans-
late into discontinuities on the opponent’s intervention region (one smoothness degree less,
as with the border of the regions).
17There were also cases of stagnation, improved by refining the grid as in Section 3.3.1.
18More precisely, due to our choice of Z(x) a node can be shifted at most to that immediately preceding
its symmetric one.
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Figure 3.7
The second game considers linear gains, quadratic running payoffs and costs concave on
the impulse. The latter makes the player shift the process towards her continuation region (cf.
Remark 2.1.2.4). However, when far enough from the border, instead of shifting the process
directly to her ‘preferred area’, the player chooses to pay a bit more to force her opponent’s
intervention, inducing a gain and letting the latter pay for the final move. Once again, this
causes δ∗ to be discontinuous and leads to a non-differentiable (resp. discontinuous) point
for the equilibrium payoff in the intervention (resp. opponent’s intervention) region.
Figure 3.8
Under the previous reasoning, one could intuitively guess that setting g = 0 in this game
should remove the main incentive the player has to force her opponent to act. This is in fact
the case, as shown below. As a result, δ∗ becomes continuous and the equilibrium payoff
falls back into the domain of the Verification Theorem.
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Figure 3.9
We remark that, should the previous solutions correspond indeed to NEs, then the al-
ternative semi-analytical approach of [FK19] could not have produced them either, as that
method can only yield continuous equilibrium payoffs.
3.4 Concluding remarks
This chapter presents a fixed-point policy-iteration-type algorithm to solve systems of quasi-
variational inequalities resulting from a Verification Theorem for symmetric nonzero-sum
stochastic impulse games. In this context, the method substantially improves the only
algorithm available in the literature (Chapter 2) while providing the convergence analysis
that we were missing. Graph-theoretic assumptions relating to weakly chained diagonally
dominant matrices, which naturally parallel the admissibility of the players strategies, allow
to prove properties of contractiveness, boundedness of iterates and convergence to solutions.
A result of theoretical interest giving sufficient conditions for convergence is also proved.
Additionally, a provably convergent impulse control solver is provided for added efficiency
over classical policy iteration.
Equilibrium payoffs and Nash equilibria of games too challenging for the available analyt-
ical approaches are computed with high precision on a discrete setting. Numerical validation
with analytical solutions is performed when possible, with reassuring results, but it is noted
that grid refinements may be needed at times to overcome stagnation. Thus, formalising
the approximating properties of the discrete solutions as well as deriving stronger conver-
gence results for the algorithm may need a viscosity solutions framework currently missing
in the theory. This is further substantiated by the irregularity of the solutions, particularly
those found which escape the available theoretical results. This motivates further research
while providing a tool that can effectively be used to gain insight into these very challenging
problems.
Appendix A
Matrix and graph-theoretic
definitions and results
For the reader’s convenience, this appendix summarizes some important algebraic and graph-
theoretic definitions and results used primarily throughout Chapter 3. More details can
be found in the references given below. Henceforth, A ∈ RN×N is a real matrix, Id ∈
RN×N is the identity, ρ(·) denotes the spectral radius and RN ,RN×N are equipped with the
elementwise order. We talk about rows and ‘states’ interchangeably.
Definitions A.1.1.1. (D1) A is a Z-matrix if it has nonpositive off-diagonal elements.
(D2) A is an L-matrix (resp. L0-matrix ) if it is a Z-matrix with positive (resp. nonnegative)
diagonal elements.
(D3) A is an M-matrix if A = sId−B for some matrix B ≥ 0 and scalar s ≥ ρ(B).
(D4) A is monotone if it is nonsingular and A−1 ≥ 0. Equivalently, A is monotone if Ax ≥ 0
implies x ≥ 0 for any x ∈ RN .
(D5) The i-th row of A is weakly diagonally dominant (WDD) (resp. strictly diagonally
dominant or SDD) if |Aii| ≥
∑
j 6=i |Aij| (resp. >).
(D6) A is WDD (resp. SDD) if every row of A is WDD (resp. SDD).
(D7) The directed graph of A is the pair graphA := (V,E), where V := {1, . . . , N} is the
set of vertexes and E ⊆ V × V is the set of edges, such that (i, j) ∈ E iff Aij 6= 0.
(D8) A walk p in graphA = (V,E) from vertex i to vertex j is a nonempty finite sequence
(i, i1), (i1, i2), . . . , (ik−1, j) ⊆ E, which we denote by i→ i1 → · · · → ik−1 → j. |p| := k
is called the length of the walk p.
(D9) A is weakly chained diagonally dominant (WCDD) if it is WDD and for each WDD
row of A there is a walk in graphA to an SDD row (identifying vertexes and rows).
(D10) A is (right) substochastic or sub-Markov (resp. stochastic or Markov) if A ≥ 0 and each
row sums at most one (resp. exactly one). Equivalently, A is substochastic if A ≥ 0
and ‖A‖∞ ≤ 1. (Recall that ‖A‖∞ is the maximum row-sum of absolute values.)
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(D11) If A is a WDD (resp. substochastic) matrix, its set of ‘non-trouble states’ (or rows)
is J [A] := {i : the i-th row of A is SDD} (resp. Jˆ [A] := {i : ∑j Aij < 1}). For each
i, we write Pi[A] := {walks in graphA from i to some j ∈ J [A]} (resp. analogously for
P̂i[A]). The index of connectivity (resp. index of contraction) of A [Azi19a] is
conA :=
(
sup
i/∈J [A]
{
inf
p∈Pi[A]
|p|
})+
(resp. analogously for ĉonA).1
It is clear that SDD =⇒ WCDD =⇒ WDD, and by definition, L-matrix =⇒ L0-
matrix =⇒ Z-matrix. Also by definition, if A is WDD then: A is WCDD ⇐⇒ conA < +∞.
Proposition A.1.1.2. (e.g., [AF16, Lem.3.2]) Any WCDD matrix is nonsingular.
Proposition A.1.1.3. (e.g., [Azi19a, Prop.2.15 and 2.17])
Nonsingular M-matrix ⇐⇒ monotone L-matrix ⇐⇒ monotone Z-matrix.
Theorem A.1.1.4. (e.g., [Azi19a, Thm.2.24]) WCDD L0-matrix ⇐⇒ WDD nonsingular
M-matrix.2
Proposition A.1.1.5. (see proof of [Azi19a, Lem.2.22]) A is substochastic if and only if
Id − A is a WDD L0-matrix and A has non-negative diagonal elements. In such case,
Jˆ [A] = J [Id − A], they have the same directed graphs (except possibly for self-loops i → i)
and ĉonA = con[Id− A].
For the following theorem, recall the characterization of the spectral radius ρ(A) =
inf{‖A‖ : ‖ · ‖ is a matrix norm} and Gelfand’s formula ρ(A) = limn→+∞ ‖An‖1/n, for any
matrix norm ‖ · ‖. Note also that if A is substochastic, then An is also substochastic for any
n ∈ N0, ‖An‖∞ ≤ 1 and ρ(A) ≤ 1.
Theorem A.1.1.6. ( [Azi19a, Thm.2.5 and Cor.2.6]) Suppose A is substochastic. Then
ĉonA = inf{n ∈ N0 : ‖An+1‖∞ < 1}.
In particular, ĉonA < +∞ if and only if ρ(A) < 1.
The indexes of contraction and connectivity can be generalized in a natural way to
sequences (Ak) ⊆ RN×N by considering walks i1 → i2 → . . . such that ik → ik+1 is an edge
in graphAk (see [Azi19a, App.B] for more details). Theorem A.1.1.6 extends in the following
way:
Theorem A.1.1.7. ( [Azi19a, Thm.B.2]) Suppose (Ak) are substochastic matrices and con-
sider the sequence of products (Bk), where Bk := A1 . . . Ak. Then,
ĉon
[
(Ak)k
]
= inf{k ∈ N0 : ‖Bk+1‖∞ < 1}.
1(·)+ denotes positive part, inf ∅ = +∞ and sup ∅ = −∞. The index is the least length that needs to be
walked on graphA to reach the non-trouble states when starting from an arbitrary trouble one.
2 [Azi19a, Thm.2.24] is formulated in terms of L-matrices instead. However, it is trivial to see that:
WCDD L0-matrix ⇐⇒ WCDD L-matrix.
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Proof of Lemma 3.2.4.4. For briefness, we omit the dependence on ϕ, ϕ from the nota-
tion.
A−1B ≥ 0 since B ≥ 0 and A is monotone. To see that its rows sum up to one, let 1 ∈ RG
be the vector of ones. It is easy to check that under (A1)–(A2), AA−1B1 = B1 ≤ A1, which
implies A−1B1 ≤ 1. The WDD L0-property of A− B is due to (A1).
Note that by Proposition A.1.1.5, we can consider A−1B and Id−A−1B interchangeably.
Let us show that J
[
(A − B)(ϕ, ϕ)] ⊆ Jˆ[A−1B(ϕ, ϕ)]. By monotonicity and L0-property,
A−1 must have strictly positive diagonal elements. Indeed, if there was some index i such
that A−1ii = 0, then 1 = [AA−1]ii =
∑
j 6=iAijA
−1
ji ≤ 0. Consider now some xi ∈ Jˆ
[
A−1B
]c
,
i.e.,
∑
j[A−1B]ij = 1. We want to see that
∑
j[A−B]ij = 0. We have 0 =
∑
j
[
Id−A−1B]
ij
=∑
j
[
A−1(A− B)]
ij
=
∑
k A
−1
ik
∑
j
[
A− B]
kj
. Since A−1ik and
∑
j
[
A− B]
kj
are non-negative
for all k, one of the two must be zero for each k. But A−1ii > 0, giving what we wanted.
The final conclusion follows from the previous properties and the fact that A(Id−A−1B) =
A− B.
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